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Directed by: Professor Jerome King
This study examines the potential impact on American
politics of a severe reduction in economic growth rates.
An important initial claim of this project is that a high
and steady rate of economic growth has been a major sup-
portive factor in maintaining political stability. Our
style of political conflict— termed "consensus politics"
—
is shov/n to be quite successful at submerging, deflecting
and moderating a host of potentially divisive issues
having to do with economic inequality. This success is
due in large measure to society's ability to provide mech-
anisms for the gratification of economic wants which do
not necessitate redistributive policies. In this way,
economic growth diverts the attention of materially deprived
groups away from disruptive political activity, thereby
maintaining the stability of the political system.
The study then turns to the forces and trends in
the physical and social environment which threaten to
vii
reduce rates of economic growth. Various possible
obstacles to continued growth are explored—natural re-
source scarcity, pollution, economic, political and social
breakdown. In addition, the influence of three central
variables affecting the likelihood of an economic downturn
are taken into account — technology, politics and time.
It is argued that an expectation of limits to growth is
reasonable, indeed probable, and therefore speculation
regarding the future of politics given such an eventuality
is a valid topic for further investigation.
The dissertation finally focuses on the changes
in the political system that can be anticipated in a no-
growth or slow-growth society. The "public choice"
approach employed in this analysis is contrasted with and
offered as an improvement upon the apolitical, elite-
oriented, deterministic forecasting methodologies utilized
in most futures research. Four different images of the
future (scenarios) are developed. In the process, the
strategies, values and policies associated with each
image, the probable political interaction (competition)
among them, and the situational variables which will
influence their relative public appeals are examined. The
study concludes by noting that while some attitudinal and
behavioral adjustment to economic limits is inevitable,
the actual nature of this adjustment is fraught with
viii
intense political significance and therefore will be
subject of intense political conflict. This conflict
constitutes the politics of the future.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that those who do not heed the
past are condemned to repeat it. Might it also be claimed
that those who do not wonder about the future are destined
to be its victims? Speculation on the future of politics
in the United States is a necessary and appropriate focus
of political research. Its academic legitimacy is aptly
defended by Bertrand de Jouvenel
:
Forecasting would be an absurd enter-
prise were it not inevitable. We have
to make wagers about the future; we have
no choice in the matter. . . . The proof
of improvidence lies in falling under
the empire of necessity. The means of
avoiding this lies in acquainting oneself
with emerging situations . . . before
^
they have become imperatively compelling.
We are living in a time in which events in environmental,
social and economic systems threaten or promise to bring
about vast changes in our political system,
studies of political behavior did not often take into
account such nonpolitical factors as the gradual depletion
of natural resources or the psychological tensions of
indicates the basic security their authors
had in an immutable present. Today that security is not
1
2deserved. Current patterns of political conflict are in
the process of being undermined. If we are not to be
overwhelmed by the changes and decisions facing us, then
we must discuss the future whenever we seek to describe a
dynamic present. These are inextricably interrelated
endeavors
.
The topic of this dissertation should be considered
in light of the foregoing. One general question directs
my research: What will be the effect of a severe decrease
in rates of economic growth on America's political atti-
tudes and behavior? It is my contention that our ability
to sustain growth at the levels we have and in the manner
we have is questionable. The factor of a high and steady
rate of economic growth, which many social scientists had
taken to be a fixed moderating influence on political con-
flict, has suddenly become a dynamic variable. This being
the case, it behooves us to contemplate the shape of the
political future as a consequence of our assumed economic
future. We cannot expect current political structures to
survive the coming economic upheaval.
The current political structures I focus on are those
aspects of the political system which reduce conflict over
economic inequality. The fact is that American politics
is uniquely nonpolarized and non-ideological. Though the
price of industrial development has been harsh and unevenly
3paid and in spite of a violent history of labor strife and
against the present backdrop of inequality and deprivation,
the issues of relative shares and the distribution of wealth
have rarely come up. Unlike other Western democracies we
have neither a strong radical tradition nor a major social-
ist party. Chapter II below explores this situation and
the processes--labeled "consensus politics" --by which it is
maintained. Other writers have recognized, often with
pleasure, the ability of the political system to prevent
the rise of a powerful structural critique of stratifica-
tion. Specific demands for economic redistribution rarely
see the political light of day, being suppressed, ignored,
deflected or transformed by the procedural and conceptual
biases of consensus politics. Actual conflict over economic
benefits and burdens often approaches (as an ideal type) a
self-perpetuating cycle of limited demands carried forward
by limited strategies and resulting in limited and nonre-
distributive concessions. That some temporary improvement
in the status of disfavored groups is often gained by this
process encourages its continued application, leaving the
fact and the structure of inequality, which had given rise
to the original demand, an unacknowledged and unchallenged
part of the political culture. In two distinct areas of
conflict
—
party politics and labor-management relations
combatants are locked into patterns of thought and action
4which perpetuate the structures of stratification. Chapter
II concludes by showing that both radical and establishment
explanations of these phenomena depend upon a common
element--economic growth.
The third chapter argues that economic growth under-
pins the operation of consensus politics and thereby insu-
lates the economic system from structural criticism. My
initial interest centers on public awareness of this nation's
material success. The perceptual context which helps to
define the concept of success determines the types of
demands placed on economic and political institutions, and
it provides criteria by which to evaluate the ability of
society to deliver. Within this context the system seems
to function well. Most groups believe that some improve-
ment in their standard of living will occur or has already
occurred. And this happens without the prolonged and in-
tense struggles which foster frustration, irreconcilable
positions, class consciousness and ideological criticism.
This expectation of incremental and peaceful progress rests
on a continuation of economic growth. In the absence of
growth a group can demand material progress for itself,
but only at the expense of some others; more income or
opportunity for disadvantaged classes necessarily involves
attacks upon the possessions and privileges of the economic
elite; the stratification system itself must then become
5the visible reason for relative deprivation and the visible
obstacle to advancement. Economic growth avoids the divi-
sive consequences of redistributive conflict by providing
two system-supportive outlets for economic demands. First,
growth increases rates of upward mobility by creating posi-
tions for advancement, so that pressures for a higher
standard of living are mostly channeled into demands for
more opportunity; and since growth appears to make upward
mobility possible, the political system is spared the resent
ment of those groups who otherwise would have been displaced
Second, growth allows most parties to gain from a shared
prosperity, thereby deflecting attention from the issue of
relative shares. As long as the future holds out the
promise of mutual progress, disadvantaged groups are less
inclined to challenge the inequities of the present. In
both these cases economic growth promotes the types of
demands and the levels of participation which are in line
with consensus politics.
The major thrust of these two initial chapters is to
establish what is often conceded and then ignored in most
research and debate about the future. The forces maintain-
ing stability, the foundations of the past, must be under-
stood in order to anticipate change and shape the future.
The success of consensus politics at reducing the tensions
of inequality is the premise upon which stability rests.
6Only by appreciating the social energy now directed toward
growth can we realize the strength of the tensions that
may be released upon growth's decline. It is important,
therefore, emphasize that our economy does indeed par-
cel out material resources very unequally and that such
economic stratification is the major variable in the dis-
tribution of every other desirable social value. The
viability of current political arrangements hinges on the
economy's ability to turn our attention av/ay from that
objective fact, to cloud that reality, by directing our
striving toward growth and growth's promises.
Under these circumstances, discussions about the
limits to economic growth must raise questions for political
analysis. Public policies, market mechanisms and advanced
technologies may ease the impact of economic slowdown or
even prolong our belief in the permanence of national
material progress. But increasing numbers of studies are
putting into doubt the capacity of the economy to expand at
the rates and in the directions it traditionally has. A
reckoning with limits cannot be indefinitely postponed. My
fourth and fifth chapters explore debates over no-growth
and slow-growth hypotheses. The major theme here is to
weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the contending argu-
ments in light of the three central variables in the debate:
politics, technology and time. While no definitive judgments
7on this raultifaceted question can be laid down, I do mean
to show that limits to growth positions have a substantial
basis. In light of this conclusion, speculation about the
.
future of politics under the assumption of limits thus
becomes a vital enterprise.
The sixth chapter examines possible consequences
of economic slowdown on political behavior. The future is
of course not predetermined. Social choice in a context of
political conflict must be accepted in any assessment of
future possibilities. Not surprisingly, the way we identify
these choices, the types of political scenarios we imagine
and desire are products of our social and ideological
perspectives. Liberals, emphasizing regulation and oppor-
tunity tend to promote policies centralizing economic plan-
ning without centralizing ownership and opening up the
class system without changing its basic structure. Radicals
sense that with economic slowdown may come the creation
of a massive socialist constituency demanding changes in
the stratification system. Authoritarian forces would seek
to shift power to established elites under the guise of
protecting democracy from internal and external threats.
Classic conservatives would preach a traditional conserva-
tive position, that lower classes lessen their economic
expectations and accept their station in a more static social
system. Thus, we have here four sets of values, strategies
8and policies, each designed to deal with future economic
realities. Whether a strategy will be effective in garner-
ing support, whether a scenario will be believable, depends
on a host of interrelated conditions: the actual extent
of decreased growth and how different groups are affected
by the decline, the presence of cross-cutting or status-
reinforcing foreign and domestic issues, the capability and
inclinations of leadership, the role of the media, the
extent of coercion employed in the face of dissent, the
evolution of values, etc. Thus, the politics of the future
will remain political; that is, choices will still have to
be made between competing alternative images of the future.
A futurology which stresses imperatives rather than options
has ignored the political nature of social history.
We determine the shape of tomorrow by what we do
today. "The future is not an overarching leap into the
2
distance; it begins in the present." Recent headlines
concerning natural resources, pollution, international
economic competition, social breakdown and the like reflect
and justify past work that has been done on these topics.
Present research is being conducted with the object of
anticipating the implications of these headlines for our
economy. Political science must take notice of the tram
of events which moves from one subsystem of society to
another. Change will not stop at the door of a discipline
9which chooses to ignore its own future—or its own past.
Knowing what to expect is not essentially, or even primar-
ily, an exercise in soothsaying. The crystal ball looks
backward as well as forward. As I have already implied,
past and future, history and forecasts ought to be employed
in any account of present political trends. It is to this
objective that this dissertation is directed.
CHAPTER II
CONSENSUS POLITICS
A Taxonomy of Conflict Management
The United States' economic system provides a vast
diversity of goods and services to the consumer
-citizen
.
Some of these have had an enormous influence on social at-
titudes and behavior, especially in the communications and
transportation fields. But of all the outputs (products
and by-products) of the economy, economic stratification
has had the most long-term impact on our lives. The prob-
lems, fears and wants of the majority of citizens are in
some measure shaped by their place in the stratification
system. Income and wealth variables are primary variables
in determining the distribution of almost every other valued
personal attribute, from mental health and job satisfaction
to educational attainment and leisure time. Given this
situation we might anticipate political battles over redis-
tributive policies, tense struggles of self-interest between
mobilized economic groupings, or theoretical critiques of
and justifications for the economic status quo. But the
issues of relative shares, generalized deprivation and the
rules of the stratification system rarely if ever animate
10
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our political processes. The institutions of government
seem isolated from those pressures and inequities which
debilitate our personal relationships and weaken our social
fabric. These problems get transformed as they enter the
political arena into issues of a nonideological and non-
structural nature. The policies these issues call forth
often satisfy the immediate demand without meeting the un-
derlying need which the expressed demand should reflect.
The pattern of conflict that has evolved in this country
to deal with the contradictions of economic inequality is
not uniquely American, but it is sharply distinguishable
from other types of political confrontation and other
models of democratic industrialized polities.
This chapter examines those elements of the politi-
cal system that cause the submergence of redistributive
issues. Initial reference is made to a four-cell taxonomy
which frames a comparison among different modes of dealing
with such issues. Our approach, termed "consensus politics
is then analyzed as to the nature of the economic demands
which are advanced and the political constraints confront-
ing economic demands. The structural mechanisms that will
have been thus far described are further illuminated by
investigating two arenas where conflict over economic
inequality conceivably might arise but in fact rarely does-
party politics and labor relations. As a style of conflict
12
management, consensus politics is the starting point in
this study's exploration of the direction of future economic
and political change.
which conflict over inequality is expressed in the politi-
cal system. Numerous variables could have been used for
this purpose. I have chosen to stress two characteristics
which seem most central to delineating differences in
styles of political conflict in the United States and in
similarly developed countries. The first factor is the
intended consequences of the economic policy demands that
are brought up for political debate. The dichotomy I wish
to offer is between structural and reformist demands. The
second factor highlights the level of intensity with which
these demands are sought--high vs. low intensity. Each of
the resulting cells refers to a pattern of political con-
flict which is more or less divisive and a set of political
strategies which is more or less threatening to the stabil-
ity and continuity of the system.
The following taxonomy classifies divergent ways in
Models of Political Conflict Over
Redistributive Issues
Intended Consequences
Level of Intensity Structural Reformist
High I II
Low III IV
13
The four models thus presented are not necessarily perman-
ent or stable approaches—movement from one to another cell
is possible and perhaps likely within a given set of circum-
stances; nor is it assumed that a society exemplifies the
same ideal type on all issues— some areas of conflict are
bound to be more intense and the positions taken to be
more destabilizing than would be true concerning other
matters of policy. The hope is that, in contrasting consen-
sus politics with other models of conflict, the distinctive
nature of our system will be emphasized.
Cell I, the politics of polarization, represents
those societies in which conflict rages over basic values.
The rules of the distribution system are themselves challenged
at either or both of the following points. An alternative
set of rules on the distribution of economic shares may be
presented against which the system of inequality is compared
and in light of which it will be modified, and/or policies
for the alleviation of generalized deprivation are demanded
which consciously and necessarily involve basic attacks on
the structure of stratification itself. A high level of
emotional involvement plus a narrowed time frame impart to
these demands an immediacy with which most governmental
processes cannot cope. Thus, confrontations of this type
often will involve strategies of mass mobilization and coun-
termobilization with both sides holding positions which
14
require basic concessions from the other. The stability
of such a system is usually dependent upon the sometimes
tenuous ability of status quo forces to check the power
and popularity of the party seeking change.
This pattern of political conflict, so alien to our
own experience, is not irrelevant to the histories of other
industrialized democratic states. The series of confronta-
tions between Communist and National Socialist forces in
Weinmar Germany is in some respects an example of this
style of politics. Modern day Japan exhibits many of the
qualities of political polarization, especially during
those times when crucial issues come to the fore and allow
various radical groups to mobilize opinion against the
established business ideology. All situations in which
there is a potential for revolutionary change through elec-
toral means can be placed with some validity in this category.
The politics of politici zation (11) involves the
highly intense pursuit of minor changes. Though there
exists general support for or acquiescence in the justifi-
cations and values of the stratification system, specific
improvements relating to one's particular economic situa-
tion are demanded. Often these proposed adjustments are
incremental in scope and reformist in character and can
easily be accommodated within the present structure of bene-
fits and burdens. However, demands of this type (more jobs.
15
higher wages, better social services) are made with such
an uncompromising intensity that immediate political ful-
fillment is difficult, often due to the resistance of
other groups in society. The strategies discussed with
respect to the preceding ideal type are somewhat relevant
here, but the focus of mobilization is on specific, struc-
turally isolated issues which subside once resolution is
achieved. There is the possibility that continual frustra-
tion will lead to permanent lines of combat with the need
for ideological supports which go beyond the original nar-
row issue. More likely, this pattern of political conflict
is the product of manipulation by group elites who sense
the usefulness of controlled intensity. An escalation of
the level of debate may have a number of strategic advan-
tages over subtler and more easily ignored forms of con-
frontation. For instance, groups gradually gaining power
and importance will seek to transform their new status into
economic improvements. But first they must prove themselves,
as it were, by demonstrating their own increased determina-
tion, unity and strength or by revealing the weakness of
countervailing interests. A show of force (sit-ins, marches)
would not be lost on political and economic leaders. The
development of industrial unionism, reflected in a bitterly
fought battle over relatively reformist objectives, repre-
sents an excellent example from our own history of such a
16
modus operandi (although the inference should not be drawn
that this conflict was purely a fabrication of union organ-
izers)
.
Cell III symbolizes the most common pattern of con-
frontation in industrial democratic society: the politics
of evolutionism. Mass based organizations representing
disadvantaged economic (or regional or cultural) groups
band together, more or less united in their support of a
party or movement whose expressed aims involve a basic re-
shaping of the distributive system. Anti-reformist in its
ultimate intent, this party or movement may propose policies
which appear incremental and system supportive but which,
taken in total, are consciously designed to change rather
than make more bearable the rules of stratification as they
currently operate. The critique of inequality put forth
interrelates the economic injustices of the various non-elites
in the society. Thus, solutions are generalized and struc-
tural (i.e., nationalize heavy industry, control investment
capital, redistribute wealth) rather than isolated and
reformist. But these policies and demands are not made with
the same intensity and immediacy nor do they lead to the
same level of mass involvement as is the case in the first
two ideal types. Instead, the leadership tries to work
within the boundaries of traditional political processes in
order to gradually and peacefully promote a more egalitarian
17
society. A long time frame allows supporters of this posi-
tion to deal with temporary electoral set-backs without
the divisive and unbending attitudes characteristic of the
politics of polarization or politicizat ion.
Countries with a strong democratic socialist party
seem to typify this pattern of political conflict. But the
resemblance could be rather superficial for the politics
of evolutionism is difficult to sustain. This is so, first,
because the party's leaders, unpressured and isolated from
an unmobilized membership, may gain more from preserving
the present structure than from working towards an egali-
tarian alternative. As Robert Michels demonstrates,
elites who head supposedly conflicting groups often have a
2
closer proximity of interests than do those tliey represent.
The piecemeal and reformist policies that come out of elite
compromises are masked behind ideological rhetoric and
public relations flourishes. Evolutionism is a precarious
political stance, secondly, because the nature of egalitari-
an alternatives involves redistributions of power as well
as wealth, increases in personal choice as well as popular
control. A worker who sits on the political sidelines
until told to march (or strike or vote) by his union's
leaders is not being allowed to participate in his own re-
structuring and growth. If inequality is such a critical
feature of our society and our life, then it is only logical
18
that an individual's political involvement on economic
issues should reflect that degree of importance. This is
not to say that evolutionism is not viable, but it is vul-
nerable to pressures which push the movement into a reform-
ist mold. The partial Americanization of party conflict
in England and VJest Germany (to mention two nations with
democratic socialist parties) is indicative of this shift.
As to examples closer to home, it may be argued
that Martin Luther King tried to establish a civil rights
movement that would press for basic changes in race rela-
tions, but with the calm, single-minded determination of
a long-distance runner. It should be obvious from the last
example that conflict of this type can intensify (Model I)
if people get frustrated with the slow pace or absence of
basic change. Thus, pressures of a reformist and a polariz-
ing nature combine to make the stability of evolutionism
suspect.
An analysis of the final ideal type, the politics
of consensus, constitutes the next section of this chapter,
but some prior remarks are in order. First among these is
the distinction that must be made between consensus politics
and consensual societies. Our reference here is to a politi-
cal system which structures out issues and demands and
policies of an ideologically divisive nature. This situation
in some cases may be the result of basic agreements on
19
values with respect to distributive issues, but this is not
necessarily true. Indeed, all systems exhibit some of the
manifestations of consensus politics on most issues. How-
ever, it is rare to find an industrialized society which
reflects its basic features so accurately as does our own.
It is a major achievement to have a political system in
which economic demands are presented in a form which allows
them to be so easily accommodated within the ongoiny pattern
of stratification.
But we should be clear as to the nature of the rela-
tive political peace accompanying consensus politics. It
does not imply that there exists a deep unanimity of opinion
supporting the value and legitimacy of the stratification
system; neither does this peace refer to the outwardly calm
signs of a repressive state. The political peace of con-
sensus politics is real in that i t stems from self-imposed
restraints on a citizen's thought and behavior at every
point in the political process. The structure protects
patterns of inequality by circumscribing how individuals
define their political interests and how they participate
(or do not participate) in politics. Internalized ideologi-
cal prohibitions discouraging the formation of redistribu-
tive demands, coupled with a policy-making process designed
to thwart those redistributi ve demands which do surface,
explain the safety and stability of inequality.
20
The most striking characteristic of consensus poli-
tics as it operates in the United States is that social
pressures originally stemming from redistributi ve needs
and desires are somehow modified and transformed before
entering the political arena. The resulting political
demands, without ideological or structural import, reflect
a narrow and easily accommodated range of choices. Indeed,
to label these inputs as "demands" is a misnomer since the
strategies that are associated with political conflict in
America do not involve the degree of intensity or depth of
commitment which is implied by the term "demand." The ex-
tent of political mobilization and consciousness-raising
entailed by these strategies is often minimal. Thus, there
is not even an organizational or attitudinal potential for
threatening or seriously disruptive political behavior on
behalf of economic objectives. On the contrary, limited
aims pursued through limiting procedural channels result in
the limited conflict typical of consensus politics: the
nature of economic demands and the means by which they are
promoted reinforce rather than undermine the political
system. Past power relationships among elites and between
elites and publics are maintained by this pattern of con-
flict. More importantly, the resulting public policies often
strengthen these relationships, despite the rhetoric of the
political battles which might suggest otherwise. The
21
economic concerns of lower income groups are perceived
as and transmitted to the political process in the form
of symptomatic wants; that is, they are transformed into
policy requests that skirt the structural roots of problems
and instead focus on their superficial mani festations
-
The system, if it responds at all, will not incur more
conflict than is necessary to ameliorate the situation.
Thus, somewhat superficial programs will be offered. But
precisely because of the nature of the political demands
and political strategies, these symptom-related programs
have been acceptable. Whether one believes that this
acceptance is akin to appeasement or to satisfaction, the
political peace that is its consequence is the central
feature of consensus politics.
Demand Formation
There is general agreement on the fact that the
pattern of economic demands, political strategies and insti-
tutional responses encompassed by consensus politics in the
United States has effectively defused inequality as a divi-
sive issue. Louis Hartz in his study of Liberalism in
America claims that the lack of class conflict or redistribu-
tive political pressures has been a major distinguishing
3
feature of our social system. Christopher Jencks supports
22
the above contention with this account of political inac-
tivity :
Almost none of the legislation passed
during the 1960 's tried to reduce dis-
parities in adult status, power, or in-
come in any direct way. There was no
significant effort, for example, to
make taxation more progressive, and
very little effort to reduce wage dis-
parities between highly paid and poorly
paid workers.
. . . Nor was there much
effort to reduce the social or psycho-
logical distance between high- and low-
status occupations.^
Jencks' statement, essentially an updated corroboration of
Hartz's observation on America's historic nature, has not
since been refuted by any massive shifts in public con-
sciousness or legislative action. But if existing economic
relationships and institutions are beyond the pale of
popular political challenge, what then is the sum and sub-
stance of the economic demands currently being made by
disadvantaged groups? What is the context of their desires
for a materially better life which explains why these
desires are compatible with the economic status quo?
Primary in that context is a bipartisan an ticommunist
perspective which "has had dramatic and for the most part
conservative effects upon liberal politics. . . . More than
any other single factor perhaps, it accounts for the demise
of political radicalism in the United States following World
War 11."^ The open and cultivated identification of
23
egalitarian demands with socialism and of socialism with
un-Americanism and Communism removed many potential
redistributive desires, programs and arguments from the
political arena. Without any pressure from the ideologi-
cal left, present day reformism became even less distin-
guished from a conservative, pro-business stance than was
Progressi vi sm.
Another factor affecting the political thrust of
economic demands is in large measure a consequence of an
individualistic and anticollectivi st ethos, of which
bipartisan anticommuni sm is a present day outgrowth. We
have made sharp distinctions between public and private,
between what is a legitimate issue for governmental
action and what is an unjustified instrusion on personal
freedom. This ideological bias results in an inhibition
against looking toward politics for redress of many social
grievances. It is difficult to politicize conflicts
which have been defined by society as private, requiring
private resolutions. This attenuation of the political
sphere combines with the cold war animosities mentioned
above to moderate redistributive impulses at the start.
They are part of the formative ideological environment
and, as such, they affect the way in which citizens view
the legitimacy and efficacy of public solutions to prob-
lems of inequality and want. But these conceptual
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obstacles to politically instigated income redistribution
are reinforced by other factors which flow from the
social structure itself.
It is an easily demonstrated fact that supposedly
nonclass divisions (regional, religious) and nonclass
issues (crime, pollution) are either minor in comparison
to or encompassed within class distinctions. Nevertheless,
the Madisonian notion persists that our role and interest
as a member of an economic class is only one of numerous
groupings we must respect. Regional, religious, commer-
cial and racial divisions create their own loyalties and
antagonisms. A society so fragmented into diverse,
overlapping and cross-cutting groups has as its counter-
part an individual whose political interests and passions
must also be spread rather thin. James Madison, fearing
a majority faction of debtors and propertyless organizing
to redistribute v/ealth, supported the prophylactic nature
of this social and political arrangement.
Either the existence of the same pas-
sion or interest in a majority at the
same time must be prevented, or the
majority, having such coexistent pas-
sion, or interest, must be rendered,
by their numbers and local situation,
unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of oppression [i.e., redistri-
bution] . ^
The practical political consequences of a fragmented
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society is that problems of a structural nature are
camouflaged behind divisions and conflicts that appear
more immediate and important. As we perceive our general
problems more narrowly, we unconsciously change the
focus and target of our economic demands. Hartz again:
"What [conservative strategy] did was to smash the 'mob'
into a million bits, so that its fierce acquisitive
passion, instead of being expended against property,
would be expended against itself in the quest for proper-
7ty." Redistributive policies, when consciously pursued
as such, necessitate a broad perspective. As our perspec-
tive shortens wo look for closer causes of our personal
problems: structural criticism and class consciousness
thereby give way to intraclass friction and parochial
animosities
.
The persistence of issues and divisions which blur
and even break down class ties has additional consequences
with respect to the degree of political conflict engendered
by economic demands. If redistributive desires have to
compete in the public's consciousness with other problems
and concerns, then egalitarian policies must become as
palatable as possible in order to gain majority support
from an increasingly disinterested public. In addition,
since issues as they are presently defined cut across
group lines, antagonists in one battle may be allies in
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the next. Thus, if one seeks more economic advantage
than an opponent would maximally want to give away, one
threatens one's position and strength on other non-
economic conflicts which one hopes to wage in the future.
All this is by way of saying that we formulate economic
demands within a web of conceptual and strategic con-
straints which impel deference, caution and moderation,
even to the point of political impotence.
Given these constraints, most economic demands on
the part of lower and middle income groups conform to
the pluralist model. Issues must be framed in terms
which allow for give and take, for compromise. This
seemingly innocuous condition, central to pluralist
democracy, eliminates from consideration redistributive
policies whose primary justification rests on a moral
rejection of inequality and its consequences. As Theodore
Lowi states, "there is something about [our political
system] that prevents us from raising the question of
justice at all, no matter what definition of justice is
o
used.' Moral concepts and arguments become instrumental
rather than basic to our policy debates in government.
Notions of freedom, equality, and justice, v/hen they do
arise, are used as v/eapons with which to buttress one's
bargaining position, not as a substantive comment on the
righteousness of the stratification system. Indeed,
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amoral politics provides no means by which to challenge
inequality as such save in the personal desire to better
one's economic situation relative to one's neighbor's.
Given the fragmented, fratricidal nature of
American society, this is precisely the thrust of economic
demands. Groups suffering under or threatened with
economic hardship seek to bolster their market position
vis-a-vis competitors rather than to align themselves
with these equally victimized groups for the purpose
of attacking the structural causes of their common
plight. They are unmindful of or unconcerned with the
coalition that could arise because they conceive of
these potential allies, if they directly consider them
at all, in terms of an adversary relationship. Out of
this mindset comes demands of limited impact on the
extent of inequality but of great strategic importance
on its future strength.
Some proposals for the alleviation of inequality's
sting center on the creation of a governmental agency
responsive to a narrow pressure group, an enclave of
public authority promoting and protecting the interests
of its client. Groups thereby hope to go beyond direct
legislative pressures with its continual battles and
insecurity. However, the attempt to set up governmental
privies of private power, opportunity and material gain
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ignores the generalized causes of hardship and, in fact,
creates obstacles to conceiving of demands in such terms.
In this way a fragmented demand structure complements a
fragmented social structure. Though writers like Grant
McConnell and Lowi have called into question the politi-
cal wisdom and democratic virtues of such techniques,
others like Charles Lindblom commend it as an appropri-
ate and beneficial outgrowth of pluralist democracy:
"Even partisanship and narrovsTiess
. . . will sometimes
be assets to rational decision-making."^ For Lindblom
as for James Madison, "rational decision-making" means
consensual, nonstructural, nonredistributive political
processes. In terms of long-range strategic considera-
tions, interest-group-bureaucratic-agency ties inhibit
class consciousness by reinforcing narrow perspectives.
In addition, these ties are system supportive as a form
of cooptation and social control. The institutionaliza-
tion of a group's political power is mistaken for the
reality of economic improvement--repressive tolerance
bureaucratic style. This type of demand is quite common
not only with respect to the promoting of bureaucratic
footholds but, in a more general way, with improving
the bargaining position of groups, narrowly defined,
versus other groups, also narrowly defined; "the creation
of countervai ling-power situations has become a major
—
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perhaps the ma jor--domestic function of the state. Much
of the legislation passed by Congress in the years
since 1933 may be fully understood only from this point
of view."'^'^
Economic demands that reach the political arena
are not solely or even primarily concerned with establish-
ing bureaucratic agencies to act as spokesmen for private
interests. The political system must respond to an array
of requests from economic groups seeking various types
of special treatment. Given the factors controlling the
demand-formation process, it is not surprising then that
the policy requests coming from disadvantaged groups are
totally devoid of redi stributive content and structural
complications. The political consequences of economic
want are demands for incremental reform.
Incremental ism in the United States reflects a
pattern of demands and decisions without conscious
structural and theoretical intent. Political proposals
having economic im.pacts depend upon limited comparisons
between current policies and marginally different alterna-
tives. There are rarely issues raised which bring into
question the whole range of values (benefits and burdens)
and alternatives. Policy choices are built upon a basic
and unstated accord with previous arrangements. This
accord stems from a fragmented demand structure which
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seeks to maximize certain values without reference to
other values adversely affected by policy proposals. For
example, higher minimum wages may result in more unemploy-
ment; or investment credits leading to more jobs lead,
in turn, to an increasingly inequitable tax structure.
Demands are never coordinated in order to challenge the
decision-making process of value balancing. Rather, the
individual, taking his cue from what he perceives to be
the accepted model of political action, formulates his
demands to conform to this proven pattern. Thus, incremen-
talism as practiced in our political system is not merely
a reflection of the type of economic demands with which
political institutions must cope; given the probability
that values percolate down the social system much more
effectively than they drift up, it is more likely that the
incrementalism of the decision-making process molds the
political desires of the citizen. This relationship cannot
help but be system supportive.
An incrementalist policy-making pattern, a frag-
mented social context, and a very narrowly defined politi-
cal sphere combine to foster and reinforce consensus
politics. For the most part class conflict over redistribu-
tive political demands are deflected at the initial point
of entry--the citizen's political awareness. Without a
perspective which would give structural and critical
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dimensions to personal needs and problems, an individual
can either adhere to the dominant ideological explanation
of inequality and resign himself to a lowly and deprived
state, or he can modify this perspective along very
calculative, short-range, and limited paths. The economic
claims that would consequently be offered pose no threat
to the existence of inequality because the attitudinal,
psychological and tactical context underlying these
demands does not constitute a challenge to the legitimacy
of stratification as such. In fact they reveal an
acceptance of the basic outlines of stratification and a
willingness to work within the political system for per-
sonal rather than structural amelioration. Thus it has
been argued that "the subordinate value system represents
something of a bulwark to political class consciousness,
in so far as it entails adaptive rather than oppositional
responses to the status quo.""'""^
If the forms economic demands take do not put into
jeopardy the reality of inequality, perhaps it might
effect inequality's extent. This outcome would not be
improbable, especially if demands as initially construed
and offered were supported with the passion and pressure
needed to insure its final passage. Tlie impact of many
separate expressions of disadvantage, however fragmented
and limited, may result in a net lessening of the range
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of Stratification in the United States; marginal shifts
in the rules of stratification, consciously pursued over
time, can result in substantial change in distributive
arrangements; at the very least, these demands can be the
catalyst for an escalating political battle between
defenders and opponents of economic privilege. However,
this scenario presupposes a strategic single-mindedness
of purpose which proponents of redistribution have rarely
displayed. The important point here, to be examined in
more depth in the next section, is that political strate-
gies are as accommodative to the stratification system
as are the economic demands they are designed to promote.
Those egalitarian tendencies that manage to sift
through the constraints of the demand formation process
are confronted with an equally restrictive set of ideolog
cal and institutional factors which limit the public
appeals and political strategies employed by deprived and
underprivileged groups. A type of cumulative biasing
process is at work. Inhibitions against the proposing of
redistr ibutive demands are supplemented by psychological
and political conditions insuring their eventual revision
or withdrawal. Why some economic claims, once made,
appear untenable in the context of give-and-take politics
is a result of this biasing process as it relates to the
realm of effective and allowable political strategies.
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Policy Formation
Americans, both leaders and electorate, have been
loath to acquire political support based on outright
class appeals. While the liberal rhetoric of defending
"the little man" is pervasive, the radical tactic of
organizing the working man on a class basis has always
seemed un-American. Part of this reaction is due to the
belief that there is a consensus of interests out of which
will evolve a solution beneficial to all groups in society.
Perhaps more importantly, a long-range appeal to class
self-interest is a corollary to demands for outright
economic redistribution. A fierce anticommunism moderates
both strategies and gives neither the force needed to
truly threaten the stratification system. This historical
adversion to class appeals has been augmented by relatively
recent changes in the nature of liberalism and the prefer-
ences of its spokesmen. The Democratic Party, the champion
of the underclasses (but only relative to the Republican
Party), has shifted its base to become more suburban and
elitist. Jack Newfield has noted that, "beginning with
Stevenson's two Presidential campaigns, the Democrats began
the slow process of disengaging from the needs and hopes
] 2
of the white lower middle class." They ignored the
economic problems and class conditions that were still
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important to many people. This trend has continued to
the point at which George McGovern's 1972 campaign, while
appearing radical to conservative and upper-middle class
voters, seemed almost irrelevant to the lower-middle class.
Associated with this bias against class based
political strategies is a decline in the prevalence of
moral discourse and appeals to justice. The rejection
of an ethical stance which is an end in itself stems from
a fear that the strategic commitment this stance may entail
v/ill turn politics into an all-or-nothing battle. But
conflict between competing definitions of economic justice
(or stratification's justifiability) is an integral part
of ideological diversity and structural criticism. When
we amoralize political debate we rcm.ove the raison d'etre
of a critical perspective, the contrasting of present
conditions with an idealistic and ethically desirable
alternative. Politics stripped of moral appeals leads to
strategies grounded in a narrow self-interest. David
Reisman's account of changes in popular attitudes towards
politics recognizes this point. While the inner-directed
man of the past tended to be a "moralizer," the other-
directed man of today is an "inside-dopester , " viewing
1
3
politics cynically and from a distance. Consensus poli-
tics can easily accommodate itself to such an outlook;
structural criticism cannot.
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This amoral objectivity moderating political
conflict conforms quite well with other ideological biases.
It is not accidental that Pragmatism found a very receptive
audience in our society and our political system. The
problem-solving approach isolates rather than interrelates
social analysis. Strategic appeals are directed at
narrowly defined interests rather than structurally situ-
ated classes. If redistributive policies are proposed,
they are defended by reference to the immediate problem,
not by reference to broader questions of justice. Norman
Thomas' criticism of the New Deal's pragmatic experimenta-
tion states the case clearly; Roosevelt was exhibiting
"a kind of American progressi vism which calls itself
practical because it has no general principles."''''^ Our
emphasis on pragmatic, non-ideological responses to con-
crete individual problems stems from an optimism that the
whole will take care of itself. In truth, the system is
protected as a result of the ideological context within
which piecemeal, pragmatic solutions are sought. Political
pragmatism mirrors an unconscious ideology, the general
principles of consensus politics. But the ideology goes
unchallenged because, given the strong emphasis placed on
pragmatic approaches, its impact on policy formation is
often unacknowledged. This constitutes another bias
against strategies in support of structural change.
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Another consequence of this emphasis is the depoli-
ticizing of certain social issues. The reliance on
technical expertise in garnering political support is
necessitiated by the prgamatic, problem-solving perspec-
tive. The claim is that "the problems which are pressing
for the society are of a high complexity, do not have
clear solutions, and political methods do not appear the
most fruitful means of treatment . "^^ Thus, if citizens
are ever called upon to judge on a certain controversy, '
they are forced to decide on the basis of conflicting
technical information, not on the basis of subjective self-
interest or ethical principles. Strategies which have
drifted from these personal moorings are unable to gain a
firm footing in appeals to scientific accuracy. The grow-
ing emphasis on management and administration depoliticizes
the citizen's role by conceptually divorcing his personal
situation from his political problem. The black vs. white
perspective behind redistributive demands cannot prosper
in the gray limbo of technical deliberation.
The institutional context of consensus politics
also exhibits a firm bias against strategies associated
with structural pressures and redistributive demands.
Edward Shils states what are the established institutional
expectations regarding political strategies:
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Pluralist politics is marked also by
the moderation of political involve-
ment. A lukewarm ' pol i ticiza t ion
'
is a feature of pluralist politics.
.
. .
Pluralist politics
. .
. also
prohibits emotional intensity, espe-
cially emotional excitemonl: continuing
over long stretches of time or running
on without intermission. 1^
Anticipation of the growth of a mobilized, politicized mob
underpins fears of mass participation. However, in the
process of preventing imagined revolutionary threats, our
country has tolerated, condoned, ond even fostered an
incredibly higli level of political apatliy. A style of
politics which looks the average citizen out of the deci-
sion making process stems from "an ideology which is
grounded upon a profound distrust of the majority of
ordinary men and women. The elitism implicit in consen-
sus politics is justified as the primary moans of inhilDiting
the formation of redistributive demands, moderating those
that do get presented and insuring the maintenance of
accommodative processes, all toward reducing threats to
the political and economic systems. This fits in rather
well with the redefinition of political issues; "what once
were ideological disputes have now bocome mere technical
administrative difficulties suited to the i^roblem-sol ving
1
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skills of managerial elites."" Given tlie fact that re-
distributive demands are by their very nature threats to
the status quo, the existence of massive nonpar ticipation
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and elite decision-making protects current structural
arrangements. Strategies aimed at mobilizing underclassses
in order to bring about basic change are successful within
an atmosphere of angry resentment, not one of disillusioned
apathy.
Even for those who do participa te--in elections
for instance—the passive role of the voter and the lack
of accountability of the elected combine to minimize the
utility of that arena of politics. The fragmented nature
of the demand structure mitigates against relying on
party victory as the means of achieving one's goals. In-
stead, conflict among organized interest groups within
governmental institutions tends to bo the effective
strategy used between elections. The reliance upon the
pressure group system rather than the E^^rty system has
three consequences detrimental to redistributive demands.
First, the former forum is highly oligarchical; in E. E.
Schattscheider ' s words, "The flaw in the pluralist heaven
is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent. Probably about 90 per cent of the people
19cannot get into the pressure system." Based upon class
bias alone there seems to be little chance of redistribu-
tive policies emanating from pressure group politics.
Secondly, the leader of an interest group often grows so
distant from his disadvantaged followers that he consciously
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or unconsciously ignores their interests. In an effort
to protect his own quasi-elite position, or perhaps out
of a well-intended desire to maintain his influence with
the powers that be, the leader is unable or unwilling to
act upon the economic discontent of the membership. The
interest group's hierarchical structure mutes rather than
amplifies criticisms of the system and demands for basic
change. Finally, the pressure group process of decision-
making lessens publicity, thereby further reducing mass
awareness and involvement. Questions of a political
character which can lead to periodic battles and uneasy
truces are kept out of the public's eye, relegated to
regulatory agencies or Congressional subcommittees. As
conflict is privatized, the range of values (the viable
alternatives) inherent in a specific problem is narrowed.
For the most part the decision-makers have made their
peace with the dominant groups operating in a policy area
and have come to a conclusion from among various policy
approaches and objectives. The public is kept out of this
process, often to the point of being left ignorant of the
decisions that are finally reached. Without popular input,
public policies will reflect both the ongoing biases in
the policy-making process and the established balance of
power among contending interest groups and therefore will
merely perpetuate the distributive status quo.
40
Within committees and agencies the decision-making
procedures follow a well-recognized pattern of bargaining
and compromise. This give-and-take has been labeled the
very definition of democracy: "democracy is not only or
even primarily a means through which different groups
can attain their ends or seek the good; it is the good
society Itself in operation." Viewing the system as a
specific mechanism of conflict resolution ignores the
biased ideological and institutional context within which
demands are formulated, strategies are selected and poten-
tial conflicts either gain attention or remain latent.
Only by overlooking these aspects of the political process
can we assume the democratic fairness of group negotiation.
But even with respect to the use of bargaining and compro-
mise objections are raised. Here, too, bias against
structural criticism and redistributive demands can be
found
.
If, as has been argued, veto groups populate and
police the policy-making process, then powerful interests
can defend their positions of privilege in the face of
challenges from disadvantaged groups. Compromise with
these privileged interests can only occur at the expense
of reaffirming their entrenched position and the benefits
that accrue. Once the threatening aspects of a demand are
eliminated (i.e., its redistributive intent is deflected).
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agreement becomes possible--but the resulting policy
is structurally conservative (that is, system-supportive).
The commitment of the government to compromise as an end
in itself strengthens the conservative implications of
the group negotiation process. The political system finds
it very difficult to make coercive decisions even if
agreed to by a majority of citizens (or representatives)
.
We confuse majority rule with majority tyranny. The use
of legitimate (democratic) authority is rejected in favor
of nonconflictual bargaining relationships between poten-
tial combatants. However, the nature of redistributive
policy involves the requirement that government give special
treatment for the benefit of a group or groups against the
resistance of those interests that stand to lose. Conse-
quently, the bias against political procedures allowing
for winners and losers, majority and minority, results in
the freezing of allocative arrangements and the preserva-
tion of structural continuity.
The political process has been construed so as to
guarantee the inadmissibility of redistributive demands;
elites and non-elites have joined, intentionally and
unconsciously, to make inequality a non-issue. This comment
recapitulates the analysis of the factors which enable the
system to avoid considering the topic of relative shares.
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Consensus politics is supported by the strength and
viability of this invisible counterpart to the decision-
making process:
.
- .
nondecision-inaking is a means by
which demands for change in the exist-
ing allocation of benefits and privi-
leges in the community can be suffocated
before they are even voiced; or kept
covert; or killed before they gain ac-
cess to the relevant decision-making
arena; or, failing all these things,
maimed or destroyed in the decision-
implementing stage of the policy process.^"'"
Its success in this regard does not depend upon the presence
of overt elite manipulation or a devil theory of history.
Consensus politics is maintained through the specific
behavioral patterns, political norms and power relationships
in our society, often in the face of well-intentioned but
politically naive challenges. Admittedly, this political
structure is not free from pointed and well planned
attacks. Hov\7ever, the existence of an effective level of
political pressure is itself dependent upon the ideological
context and institutional arrangements. The structure
nurtures itself, as demands and strategies lead to programs
which reinforce inequality while, ironically, responding
to the initial desire for change.
The type of conflict resolution our political system
permits can be expected to go no further than the demands
and strategies it allows. The structural bias against
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economic redistribution and political mobilization
succeeds in restricting the range of feasible policy
choices. Few of these choices can alleviate actual social
ills, though each is a response to a political want.
Policies respond to wants by " satisf icing"22--satisfying
only partially and sufficing only temporarily—and since
this is usually enough to minimize conflict and maintain
the appearance of progress, our political process need do
no more. Even radicals are aware of the ability pluralist
democracy has in avoiding structural change while meeting
specific economic desires. Note this comment by Andre
Gorz :
Certainly, capitalism is incapable of
fundamentally resolving the essential
problems which its development has
brought about. But capitalism can re-
solve these in its ov\;n way, by means of
concessions and superficia], repairs
aimed at making the system socially
tolerable . ^ ^
And these concessions also result in a low level of inten-
sity with respect to political strategies. If demands are
met to some extent, the political frustration that breeds
redistributive conflict cannot fester.
This is not to say that personal needs are being
fulfilled sim.ply because policies respond to political
demands. Indeed, the lynchpin in the demands-strategies-
policies cycle is the system's ability to isolate actual
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need from expressed political want. Unable to connect
their specific plight to the issue of inequality in general,
unable to imagine how egalitarian arrangements would bene-
fit them, disadvantaged groups are forced to rely on
system supportive formulae for relieving economic need:
narrow and nonclass perspectives, privatized governmental
power, increased expenditures for superficial programs,
security against "threats from below." The desires and
attitudes reflected in these political prescriptions do
not speak to the issue of inequality. The rhetoric of
political action advises us only that demands are satisficed,
conflicts are resolved, wants are responded to and change
held to a minimum. Regarding the real needs and interests
of those near the bottom of the stratification ladder, no
promises are made and none are kept. Consensus politics
may eliminate the system-destabilizing impact of political
frustration, but feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness
indicate that frustration has now turned inward. The
resulting attitudes of apathy, resignation, submission and
acceptance strengthen consensus politics still further.
There are a number of ways in which specific politi-
cal demands may be met. Some of the alternatives which
are eventually considered by policy makers may even have
redistributive ramifications. Among these are transfer
payment programs involving cash allotments given directly
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to the beneficiary. Such programs go against the ideologi-
cal grain of most middle class Americans; the values of
individualism, ambition and competition emphasized in the
culture of capitalist society are undermined by governmen-
tal support programs of this type. In a more general way,
policies which allow for direct transfer payments result
in a pattern of benefits and burdens quite unlike the
pattern of power within society. And if this dissimilar-
ity is recognized, then power holders will push for alter-
nate policies allocating benefits more in line with the
prevalent structures of power. As long as the stratifica-
tion system itself is not open to challenge, nonstructural
and nonredistributive alternatives will reflect and there-
fore perpetuate economic and political stratification.
Howard P. Tuckman has termed this relationship between
public policy and economic gain "the internalization of
wealth." As Tuckman puts it,
no sooner is a new program proposed
than a new method is found by which
the wealthy may benefit. Provide a
medicare program and watch doctors'
profits grow; build new schools and
observe the increasing prosperity of
large contractors; create a federal
housing program and develop a ncvj^^
class of wealthy property owners.
Policies of this sort can satisfice only because economic
demands do not stem from or are not likely hitched to a
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thoroughgoing critique of inequality. Instead, they are
usually couched in terms which allow for various means
of and degrees of fulfillment. The lack of any structural
awareness results in policies conforming to structural
requirements
.
Cases in Consensus Politics
Ideological context, institutional biases and power
relationships combine to form the general political/economic/
social structure. As might be anticipated, when we focus
on specific areas of conflict, the structures that are re-
vealed conform to the precepts and processes of the over-
arching framework of consensus politics. Its perpetuation
depends upon its maintenance and stability within arenas
of stress, not only during situations of calm and coopera-
tion. The strength of this style of politics is indicated
by its ability to keep the political peace under conditions
which would otherwise have led to divisive and perhaps
ideological clashes. The following comments on party
conflict and labor-management relations demonstrate the
practical application of consensus politics in areas most
vulnerable to the redistributive impulses that economic
stratification foments.
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Party Politics
The party arena has always been a locus of social
and political conflict in the industrialized West. It is
often during election campaigns that the tensions of a
society come to a head; privatized issues become politi-
cized by parties seeking to profit electorally from social
conflict; since party conflict is the largest political
game around, elections encourage parties to mobilize and
involve the masses, thus threatening the elitist tenden-
cies of entrenched power; the organizing efforts of
parties depend upon and help encourage high levels of
emotional involvement which make the citizen open to
appeals and arguments he would dismiss under calmer cir-
cumstances. Often analogy is made to the struggles of
war, and this is not an absurd comparison. The potential
for overwhelming victory, crushing defeat, and basic
changes in power relationships is present here more than
in the accommodative styles of Congressional, bureaucratic
and interest group politics. In a nation of great
economic disparities, the party system seems a likely
avenue for promoting redistr ibut ive policies. But the
operation of consensus politics maintains stability and
protects the structural status quo by blunting the ideolog
cal potential of party conflict.
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In other capitalist democracies, especially those
with strong labor, socialist or communist parties, politi-
cal campaigns often air egalitarian views and discuss
redistributive policies. This involves a challenge-
though sometimes perhaps only implicit, partial and sym-
bolic—to the current patterns of economic stratification.
There is consequently a parellel need on the part of
status quo forces to defend and justify inequitable allo-
cative arrangements. Whatever the actual electoral outcome,
the fact is that ideological diversity, structural alter-
natives and even moral debate enter the political arena.
Issues and perspectives are brought up in these countries
which, if raised during our party contests, would be
tantamount to political suicide. And workable policy
positions are supported by reference to general and
diverse theoretical frameworks. Pragmatic problem-solving
does not become a cover approach for unconscious ideologi-
cal unity.
Our parties and electoral processes are a far cry
from the style of conflict described above. In most
elections we have little choice in terms of the range of
viable alternatives offered. The tweedle-dee, tweedle-dum
syndrome cannot be fully recognized for what it is if the
electorate has been trained to accept slight variations
in political outlook as major differences in basic
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philosophies. To a citizenry working within a Lockean
paradigm, Edward Kennedy and Barry Goldwater appear on
opposite poles of the political spectrum. What is readily
apparent to an observer with a comparative perspective is
that the Democratic and Republican parties operate under
similar ideological assumptions, in response to similar
power holders, utilizing similar organizational arrangements.
Their actions— the appeals they make, the candidates they
offer and the policies they promote—help mold the public's
opinions and behavior with the ultimate result of insulat-
ing the party system from redistribut ive pressures and
protecting the political system from structural attacks.
The Democrats and Republicans are examples of
electoral as opposed to programmatic parties. Their
efforts are directed towards the short-run goal of gain-
ing power, not necessarily towards the more elusive aim
of changing society. Single-member districts and a two-
party system strengthens this bent; winner-take-all elec-
tions—with the Executive, committee chairmanships,
contracts and patronage hanging in the balance—discourage
minor party campaigns by making coalition government
highly unlikely. On the contrary, intraparty coalitions
and campaigns appealing to numerous and diverse interests
are decidely more common. This power- (rather than policy-)
emphasis of our election process leads to unconscious
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patterns of thought and behavior, all in line with the
dictates of consensus politics.
First, successful coalitions between divergent
groups contribute to and reinforce narrow, nonclass
perspectives. Piecemeal demands are balanced and moder-
ated in order to achieve electoral victory. The multitude
of groups and issues are not Eorged by party leaders into
an alliance with a common campaign promoting shared
structural objectives. Groups remain isolated and narrow-
ly defined, and each party can realistically attempt to
form a pragmatic (non-ideological) majority coalition by
appealing to all. Without an obvious class enemy, class
consciousness and ideological perspectives are inhibited.
Consequently, so is the desire for redistributi ve change.
Second, emphasis on immediate electoral success and
the subsequent need for intraparty coalitions lead to
the politics of the middle. The argument is familiar and
deceptively practical. Public opinion, seen as a boll-
shaped curve on most issues, treats any sort of extremism
harshly. Find the golden mean before your opponent does
and the voter will reward you with victory. The dominance
of this view of campaign strategy results in the vague,
indeterminate, even two-faced oratory so typical of our
election politics. But more importantly, it forces a
moderation in economic demands which eliminates any
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realistic redistributive impulse. Institutional arrange-
ments of give-and-take predominate; economic redistribu-
tion is extremism. Demands which threaten income groups
go against the need for a broad-based moderate and
successful economic coalition (funds as well as votes must
come from nonworking class groups). In addition, economic
demands face the multitude of non-economic issues with
which parties and candidates must contend. At the very
least, the cross-pressures of numerous overlapping
interests and issues, coupled with the conventional wis-
dom's definition of campaign strategy, prevent a concerted
emphasis on inequality as the central social problem.
The formulae for effective political strategies in consen-
sus politics preclude one-issue candidates, however
critical that issue may appear to be.
Third, admittedly there are some class loyalties
determining voter preferences. The Democrats receive
their major electoral support from the lower-middle and
lower classes and labor unions. However, this loyalty
is not a reflection of class interests in the same way
that a labor party represents the interests of labor.
The aim, let us not forget, is to gain political power,
and as long as Democrats can count on working class votes
without treading on the interests of the wealthy and
powerful, there is no motivation to promote redistributive
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policies. The liberal rhetoric of the Democratic Party
has become a substitute for substantive recommendations
and structural challenges; it is thus a functional
attempt to gain electoral victory with the minimum of
ideological friction within the party and within society.
And if the rhetoric sometimes is not enough to satisfice,
it does not matter. After all, in consensus politics
where else can the v;orkingman go?
The final consequence of electoral parties is
strongly suggested in the preceding analysis. Political
parties are elitist and political campaigns are manipula-
tive. The increasing emphasis on public relations in
insuring the election of a candidate attests to this
latter claim. While some manipulation is conscious and
planned, some is unconscious and regretted. Both types
are outgrowths of an elitist mentality pervading voter
and leader roles. If the electoral success of the indi-
vidual candidate is seen as the major goal, thrust ahead
of his constituency and his program, then he personally
becomes elevated above supporters and principles. Elitism
is legitimized in the eyes of both leaders and voters
because we elect a person rather than a representative
of certain policy positions.
Compounding these psychological supports of elitism
is an organizational separation between party leaders and
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party identifiers. A highly hierarchical structure
with little chance for building rank and file input
between elections encourages a sense of distance between
representatives and those represented. Indeed, this
distance receives justification in the notion of buffer
institutions (i.e., groups) insulating and protecting
elected officials from the demands and pressures of the
masses. Values and interests diverge, giving vent to the
feelings of frustration so typical of the average voter.
But despite these feelings, despite the unrespon-
siveness of the Democratic Party to the economic pressures
experienced by the working class, party loyalties remain.
Party voters still respond to the periodic appeals of
office-seeking cliques, but they remain unorganized,
unmobilized, inactive and, therefore, ignored between
elections. This limited and temporary nature of party
loyalty is a reflection of the types of demands made upon
the party and upon the political processes generally.
Because few long-range structural objectives are seriously
entertained, there is little need to maintain a mass-based
grass roots, permanently active organization to push and
politic between elections. Once the campaign is won (or
lost) the potentially powerful electorate has served its
primary function, the filling of elective offices. The
party's supporters are not consulted any further in their
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role as party supporter. Instead, the narrow band of
party spokesmen presume to speak for the followers until
the next surge of organizational and electoral fervor.
The manipulative and elitist character of party politics,
stemming from the nonideological pragmatic nature of our
political parties, shores up consensus politics by defus-
ing the potential for structural change inherent in
election campaigns.
We cannot underestimate the impact party organiza-
tion has on muting electoral threats to consensus politics.
Many critics of our political system have pointed towards
the fragmentation of power in the party as a major
obstacle to political, social and economic change in our
country. The debate over party responsibility (by which
is meant both ideological unity and central discipline)
is revealing, but it seems to be one step removed from
the realities of American politics. The weakness of
party authority, the diverse positions of party spokesmen
and the subsequent independence of elected officials are
quite in line with other aspects of consensus politics
previously mentioned--fragmented demand structures,
emphasis on electoral victory rather than long-range
political change, policies based on bargaining instead
of authoritative decision-making. The party system shapes
and is also shaped by the operation of consensus politics;
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critical evaluations and political activity must be
focused on this more general level.
Whatever the causative factors, the lack of party
responsibility is a crucial aspect of our political
system. Its consequences affect the viability of redis-
tributive electoral strategies in very detrimental ways.
The notion of voting cues provides a case in point. VJith
the plethora of candidates, issues and offices involved
in any election campaign, the individual voter cannot be
expected to make separate determinations on each contest.
Party labels provide voting cues, simplifying the numer-
ous options and making the ultimate choices rational in
light of an individual's own desires and problems. That
is, a party claims to support certain groups and interests,
and those groups give their electoral support and hold
the party generally accountable for the protection of the
groups' interests. But this thread of reasoning and the
validity of party labels as voting cues break down in our
party system. The lack of a coherent party position and
the organizational inability to deliver on policy promises
impel the voter to look for other guidelines. Often
elected officials are chosen because of the personal
characteristics they seem to exemplify; thus, campaigns
are increasingly becoming personality contests, with the
individual candidates produced and directed by public
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relations firms. This voting appeal, supplemented by
other common cues (ethnic background, regional loyalty)
undercuts and ignores whatever ideological and policy-
oriented potential party conflict has. Class orientations
are less important to the voter because the party-class
relationship is loose. Therefore, in terms of voter
perceptions, the lack of party unity undermines class
appeals and forces the voter to rely on cues having little
connection to redis tributive demands.
Organizationally, the lack of party responsibil-
ity prevents the coordination of forces needed to push
through structural or redistributive programs. The out-
right opposition to change on the part of status quo
groups is magnified by the institutional bias of consensus
politics. The political obstacles to attacks on inequal-
ity necessitate determined, persistent and coordinated
activity. Only unified effort can bring policy promises
to fruition in the face of these obstacles. But party
leadership will not gain this unity if it cannot draw
upon common ideological motivations. The upshot is that
individual representatives must either conform to the
formulae for political action within government or they
must seek change on their own, as individuals. The
futility of this situation for a well-intentioned official
is obvious. Elected on the basis of a host of extraneous.
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minor and sometimes mistaken reasons, he finds these
factors inhibit orderly policy-making and coordinated
governmental action. Redistributive strategies cannot
succeed without the discipline and practical focus on the
issues that responsible parties bring.
Futility is not solely the prerogative of the
sincere, elected representative. The public sees that
the connection between their vote and governmental policy
is at best coincidental. And, more critically, the lack
of responsible parties clouds the issue of blame, for no
one accepts failure while everyone claims to deserve
credit. Under these circumstances, feelings of
'
powerless-
ness, hopelessness and withdrawal are understandable
and frequent. Structured apathy of this sort is just one
aspect of structured nonparticipation which closes elec-
toral politics off from those groups most likely to demand
and press for redistributive policies. The low level of
citizen involvement in our electoral processes is justi-
fied by system apologists in terms of the anticipated
consequences mass participation would have. To be sure,
among these consequences would be increased class conflict
and the potential for structural changes. Nonparticipa-
tion protects the system from these "threats." The price
we pay in terms of the democratic ideals of citizenship
is supposedly minimized in light of an updated descriptive
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definition of democracy. The lack of mass involvement
in election politics, stemming in part from the lack of
responsible parties, maintains the stability of consensus
politics even as it restricts the meaning of democratic
politics
.
The ongoing disintegration of the party system, a
result of many of the factors mentioned above, gives rise
to compensating trends. In the beginning of this section
I described the possibilities of political decision-making
through party conflict. In the absence of this type of
party conflict, there is increasing reliance on another
focus of demands and pressures—the pressure group system.
As has been previously indicated, this arena offers even
less chance for redi str ibutive policies and structural
change than the party system. The biases that surround
conflict between organized narrow interests moderate
demands and blunt disruptive strategies. But more impor-
tantly, the pressure group system is seen as the legitimate
alternative to the frustrating and ineffective party sys-
tem. Failure in the latter field of battle means dependence
on the former. The structure supplies this choice, but
the related biases against redistributive policies and
strategies in both systems leave the individual citizen
at a loss on how to formulate and fight for his economic
demands. Most groups remain in the boundaries of consensus
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politics, working through the biasing structures of both
political arenas. Those few who cannot be satisficed via
either of these alternatives have by definition gone out-
side the sphere of consensus politics and are justified
targets of political repression.
Labor-Management Relations
We might tend to think that in comparison to elec-
toral contests, conflict arising out of union-management
differences is potentially a more fertile ground for
redistributive demands and class-based strategies. It
would seem that the clear nature of the "economic enemy"
should bring out a sharper awareness of class divisions
than possible in the arena of party politics. Indeed, in
some respects this is the case. "The United States has had
the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any indus-
25trialized nation m the world." But this militancy has
been directed towards system supportive paths. Just as
there is a set of structural constraints affecting the
thoughts and behavior of people as voters, so there is a
parallel set which influences people's beliefs and actions
in the sphere of labor relations. While the restraining
impact of modern trade unionism has been felt by other
industrialized nations, it is probably most evident in our
own country. Despite the militancy, violence and bitterness
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of labor history in America, the labor movement still oper-
ates within the narrow bounds of consensus politics.
Descriptions of trade unionism in the United States
usually take the European labor movement as a point of
reference. The absence of a socialist-oriented party
ideologically (though perhaps not actually) devoted to
egalitarianism and working class interests is only the
most notable symptom of divergent orientations. "The
American V7orker
'
s lack of class consciousness is most
often singled out as the characteristic that distinguishes
him from his foreign counterparts." Many view this
mindset as a sign of trade union maturity, as an indica-
tion that trade unions have chosen to spend less time
crusading for political/economic Utopias and more time
involving themselves in the practical goal of bettering
their members' lives. However, the lessened awareness of
class in industrial relations is not the result of con-
scious and autonomous decisions by workers. Rather, the
ideology and institutions shaping the working class in
America conspire to limit labor's economic demands and
thwart its economic power. The result is that the types
of union-management contracts agreed upon do not seek to
redistribute corporate wealth or workplace authority.
The clashes that do arise, however intense the posturing
by the combatants, are over nonstructural differences.
61
thereby leadinq to system supportincj resolutions. This
segment of social life conforms very closely to the
patterns, norms and expectations of. consensus politics.
Chief amonc, the ideological supports for consensus
politics in American trade unionism is the desire for an
interdependent, symbiotic relationship between labor and
management. The corpora t is t ideal held by the early
American Federation of Labor spokesmen is the exact anti-
thesis of class conflict. Its aim of achieving "industrial
stability, order and social harmony" goes completely
against the notion that v\?ithin capitalist society there
is an unbridgeable clash of interests between workers and
the corporate elite. Instead, the direction trade unions
have taken is toward making unions a partner, albeit per-
haps a junior partner, in the political economy and the
entire productive function. Tlius, tlio labor movement seeks
to strengthen rather than overturn existing economic
institutions, to integrate the role of unions within these
institutions. William Apploman Williams has argued that,
despite ideological rhetoric, even the "radical" C.I.O.
sought corporatism, a conservative form of syndicalism
which would insure labor's place in the economic status
2 8quo. In this way we can view the c)rowing acceptance of
unionism as the result of a growing realization of its
accommodative nature; it is an alternate to, not the
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manifestation of, a socialist and class-oriented ideology.
One of the consequences of this general attitude
that pervades American trade unionism is the clouding
over of issues of power and responsibility. Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" still seems to hold sway in economic
decision-making. If both labor and management are part
of the same productive function, then both are subject to
the operation of immutable economic laws. Supply and
demand, not power and exploitation, determine wages,
prices, products, profits: "... the domination of man
by man no longer appears an injustice but a biological or
legal necessity. The power of the employer over the worker
has the force of economic necessity and its human substance
2 9is entirely suppressed,"
Corporatist ideology also has the effect of creat-
ing alliances which impede the development of class con-
sciousness. Daniel Bell has pointed to the fact that "a
trade-union, operating in a given market environment,
necessarily becomes an ally of 'its' Indus try ." Attitudes
of "my company first" or "my industry first" are the result
of and in turn reinforce the narrow perspectives of trade
unions. Unlike the I.W.W.'s "One Big Union" approach, the
labor movement is divided into functionally competing
units. Improvement for one segment is not coordinated
ideologically and organizationally with the impact such
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changes have on other sectors, and, indeed, often this
seeming progress for part of the working class is made at
the expense of other workers. Besides undercutting the
leveling impact of some labor-management agreements, this
institutional arrangement, having its roots in the corpor-
atist ideology of labor leaders, divides workers conceptu-
ally from each other and foments a form of internecine
warfare that prevents class consciousness.
Another aspect of the ideological context that has
conservative impacts is the consumerist orientation of our
society. This affects the types of demands made by
workers and their leaders and also provides the criteria
with which to judge the success of union efforts. The
emphasis has always been placed on the "bread and butter"
aspects of unionism. Thus, George Meany's quote, "Ideology
is baloney," signifies the unconscious acceptance of the
dominant ideology through the labor movement's support of
"pragmatic" trade unionism. In addition, our mass society
has increasingly weakened and restricted that nexus of
working class values and personal relationships out of
which social movements can emerge, a development that is
also occurring in other industrialized countries but to
a lesser degree.
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Capitalist development duriny the post-World War II period has transformed the
character of everyday life for the work-ing masses of the VJestern nations
[by] the replacement of all the tradi-'
tional forms of proletarian culture and
everyday life--which gave working class
communities their coherence and provided
the underpinnings for the traditional
forms of proletarian class-consciousness--
with a new, manipulated consumer culture
.
The social potential for redistributi ve strategies has
been reduced and undermined as a result of the filtering
down of upper middle-class values on to the not-so-middle -
class worker.
One additional aspect of our social ideology as it
pertains to labor-management relations is the belief that
politics and economics are or ought to be separate.
Government's actions in the many clashes between unions
and companies is limited to a referee role. The sanctity
and integrity of the collective bargaining process in
the face of potential political interference is a value
held by workers and managers alike. The European contrast
model indicates the relatively narrow sphere encompassed
by one form of trade unionism, given these ideological
inclinations.
. . . v/e can distinguish a trend toward
the development of two different types of
unions: those in which the main emphasis
of union work is on the bargaining pro-
cess and those which tend to exert their
main impact at the level of legislation
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and administration [the continental
model] .... The first group is pri-
marily concerned with the arrangements
that affect the union member directly at
the vrork place--not only wages, but also
work loads, working conditions, senior-
ity rights, his right to a particularjob, and so on. The second type places
• heavier emphasis on the factors that
determine the general economic and so-
cial conditions of the country, leav-
ing the determination of a good deal
of the detail of industrial relations
as it arises in the work place to non-
union organizations . 32
Thus the bulk of union power in this country is devoted to
influencing the minor and peripheral aspects of worker
well-being. The major decisions are left to political and
economic elites, beyond the ken of the collective bargaining
process. This attitude blunts the power of organized
labor not only by creating self-imposed limits on the
influence which unions can have on major economic decisions.
There is also a bias against using political pressure in
order to place government on labor's side in the bargaining
process. That management has never been reluctant to
accept governmental support (e.g., troops) is proven by
any reading of labor history. In effect, unions foreclose
the use of one of their major resources, numerical superi-
ority, when they reject spreading the conflict into the
political forum. Ideological restrictions, among them the
artificial and biased distinctions between public and
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private and between polity and economy, go a long way
towards making redistributive strategies unworkable.
Institutional factors add another protective layer
surrounding consensus politics. The organizational
hierarchy of trade unionism, as it has grown in complexity,
has become less a promoter of the interests of workers
and more a mechanism for their integration and control.
Unions have been transformed into elite-run big businesses,
handling huge pension funds and huge memberships with the
same manipulative techniques. In order to protect and
strengthen their position in the union and with other
groups in society, union leaders have sought to suppress
militancy and initiative from the rank and file. An army
of experts (lawyers, accountants, economists, etc.), with
little or no contact with working class life, seem to
function as professional obfuscators, insuring that
important matters (the true nature of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, the explanations of union investment policy,
etc.) are beyond the comprehension of most workers. Aided
by these experts, union leaders are further insulated from
workshop problems and grow increasingly sensitive to the
needs and expectations of their supposed economic adver-
saries. In addition to these purely social aspects, the
union hierarchy functions as an arm of the government. It
is legally responsible for enforcing the contractual
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agreement by which labor is sold for a prearranged price.
For the workers to assert themselves against this prior
arrangement-through wildcat strikes, for example-threatens
not only the company's but also the union's leaders.
Given this state of affairs it is no wonder that many of
the rank and file union members feel as alienated from
their union spokesman as they do from their plant managers.
This situation, the result of the structured elitism of
trade unionism, conforms to the elitism of the political
system generally. There is no doubt that it has conserva-
tive and inhibiting consequences on labor's ability to
effect redistributive change through union activity.
The fragmentation of society into competing groups,
and the division in the union hierarchy between leaders
and members has its counterpart in a similar institution-
ally fostered fragmentation of the working class. Racial,
religious, ethnic and, until recently, linguistic distinc-
tions divided workers and impeded the creation of a common
labor awareness. These divisions were either supplemented
or replaced by differences in craft, trade, or level of
skill, leading today to an economic and social hierarchy
within each union as well as within trade unionism as a
whole. The v;age differentials which evolve out of this
hierarchy of functions are forms of privatized power and
class distinctions the protection of which cannot help but
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create hostilities and barriers between segments of the
labor movement. And a divided working class insures
the continuation of class inequality.
Add to these internal inhibitions against class
conscious unionism the external limitations of social and
political realities. Primary among these is the low level
of union organization in the United States. Only 22 per
cent of the workforce is organized into unions, a much
smaller proportion than is found in other industrialized
countries. And the bulk of the work occupations are in
the less class conscious, more difficultly organized
v;hite collar sectors. While the limits of industrial
unionism have not been reached—witness the battle over
organizing farm workers--it is plain that even with further
growth the movement would still include only a minority
of working class groups. More importantly, organizational
and ideological solitarity would be a rhetorical rather
than an actual characteristic. So, except for the marriage
of convenience between organized labor and the Democratic
Party, unions tend to operate as separate entities within
the political system. When we remember how the bias of
the pressure group system works in favor of big business,
we realize the extent to which the working class has been
boxed into and has boxed itself into a politically
ineffectual position.
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What does all this imply as to the style of
labor-management conflict? As stated previously, a
political system, broadly defined, has a bias not merely
with respect to which policies and perspectives will
emerge victorious and which will be defeated. It not only
shapes the system's conclusions (winners and losers); it
shapes the issues as well. The structure will not allow
issues to be raised which bring forth antistructural
alternatives. Thus, with respect to current trends and
perspectives in the American labor movement, proposals of
a structural, redistributive nature are not seriously
entertained. Indeed, they may not even be considered
legitimate demands. Labor movements in other countries
are interested in challenging and ultimately sharing man-
agement's authority position by sharing in responsibility
for administrative decisions which effect both sides. In
the United States demands of this type would be rejected
as socialistic. More limited challenges to the workplace
authority of management (e.g., on safety, pace, conditions)
are given a very low priority in the bargaining strategy
of negotiators since a plea for more money is invariably
substituted for these more structural concerns. The power
orientation of European unions is in marked contrast to
the limited short-range perspectives of our material-
benefits approach.
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Of course/ demands for higher monetary benefits
can have enormous structural implications. Discussions
over how the corporate pie is to be split might bring up
issues of personal need, economic justice and social
priorities. Instead, these demands have arisen from a
consumerist mentality; they are a reflection of corporate
advertising rather than a means toward egalitarian change.
More importantly, unions have allowed such demands to be
tied to price rises and productivity campaigns. These
ties represent the union's admission that collective
bargaining arrangements cannot and will not be used to
upset current distributions of corporate income and wealth.
Moral rejections of inequality are out of place in the
amoral bargaining relationships of industrial confronta-
tion. Worker demands for "more" are objectified and made
contingent not upon fairness but upon the success of his
firm, his industry, his nation. Ultimately the decision
resolves around the means by which corporations can main-
tain and expand their economic position. Unions which
demand higher wages while going along with and countenancing
these "means" (productivity and price increases, governmen-
tal subsidies) are giving tacit approval to the perpetua-
tion of inequality.
It is on this level that intraclass divisions are
most effective at inhibiting redistributive thoughts and
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actions. There is, in the final analysis, a critical
division of consciousness within each worker. Trade
unionism does not enable him to see the connections
between his roles as worker, consumer and taxpayer. With-
out a framework and an organization coordinating his
thoughts in these disparate roles, he is forced to concern
himself with one, then the other role. He cannot succeed,
he cannot improve his relative position, on this treadmill
of divided consciousness.
The classic strategies of trade unionism in this
country (collective bargaining and job actions) can be used
either to subvert or to further worker interests. In many
respects our deification of the collective bargaining
process has been detrimental with respect to the most
efficient use of labor's political power. "It is the
preoccupation of the U.S. trade unions v;ith collective
bargaining that has tended to keep their attention away
3 3from broader social goals." But even if we focus in on
the more limited scope and more immediate concerns of the
labor movement, we should be av;are of the conservative,
elitist and regulatory nature of collective bargaining
and strikes. An excellent case study by William Serrin,
The Company and the Union; The "Civilized Relationship"
of the General Motors Corporatio n and the United Automo-
bile Workers, makes the point that the strike is used to
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coerce worker compliance, not to gain corporate conces-
34
sions. As for collective bargaining, it is difficult
to see, except with the presence of other critical factors
how one side would peacefully reduce its share of corpor-
ate wealth without the expectation that immediate develop-
ments will bring a large return on that investment. After
all, the process of bargaining occurs within a context of
unequal power relationships. Indeed, bargaining is
expressly designed to reveal and reflect these differences
Stratification is safely protected by this strategy of
conflict.
The labor union hierarchy has succeeded in convinc-
ing its membership of the union's limited role for the
worker and the worker's limited role within the union.
This lowering of expectations and participation augments
and is in turn encouraged by the general social outlines
of consensus politics. Economic inequality and the struc-
tures which support it constitute the silent partners in
labor-management agreements. In this forum of conflict,
inequality remains unattacked, undefended and therefore
unacknowledged as the formative context motivating both
sides. It is safe to say that unions have become part of
the supportive structure of the status quo:
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.
.
.major unions in both advanced anddeveloping countries serve as an inte-
grating link, helping furnish political
and organizational support for govern-
ment, union, business bureaucracies.
.
. .
[Ulnions help to preserve the
system and the established power and
status relationships within it.35
Like the Democratic Party, trade unionism presumes to speak
for the disadvantaged without ever speaking against the
advantaged
.
The conservative consequences of American trade
unionism are due to the fact that unions and union leaders
have found a niche in the social order. Thus, the social
order is now beyond serious (structural) challenge. The
pitched battles that we sometimes witness might convince
us that basic changes are in the offing. The rhetoric
and maneuvering however are not that of real combatants;
the ritualistic posturing and symbolic reassurances are
aimed at persuading a constituency, the workers, that its
interests are being protected. While debate may rage over
the extent to which the workers are being improved due
to union action, the relative political peace in industrial
relations indicates that a primary aim of union leaders
has been largely successfully accomplished. The workers
are persuaded of the legitimacy of the forms of conflict
operative within the framework of consensus politics.
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Conclusions
While the existence of consensus politics is
generally acknowledged , its legitimacy is an object of
debate. And this is to be anticipated. Consensus politics
implies the tacit rejection of structural criticism and
the tacit acceptance of the stratification system on the
part of most working class people. The understanding of
this attitude, its nature and source, is a point of sharp
disagreement between establishment apologists ana radical
critics of the political system. Do lower middle and
lower income groups operate within current political and
economic arrangements out of a true appreciation of their
self-interest, or is their complacency the product of
manipulative socialization and institutionalized repres-
sion? The answer depends in part on how we evaluate the
costs and benefits of the status quo.
Defenders of consensus politics claim that the
majority of lower class people consciously support the
system, and this is so because the system "delivers the
goods." The creation of a welfare state has raised minimum
standards of living for most Americans. In addition,
political procedures and social mobility have insured that
economic growth is distributed to all major sectors of
society. This commonly shared affluence has given all
groups a stake in preserving the institutional, ideological
75
IS
'ass -
and political components of our economic system. Indeed,
with respect to redistributive issues the argument
made that we are in a post-politics era. In short, cl.
based politics is declining, and rightfully so, due to
among other things the fact that we are solving the prob-
lems caused by inequality by the economy's overcominc} the
problems of scarcity.
Critics are not quite as quick to see consensus in
consensus politics. The benefits of society are not fairly
distributed. Thus, support for the system, or even
acquiescence in its operation, is the result of a structural
cooptation of the underprivileged. Even the touted reform
policies of Western democracies do not substantially
improve the lot of the average worker. However, they do
have the cooptive effect of securing "the dependency of
larger segments of the underlying population on state wel-
fare measures ." '^^^ Countering the claim that we need to
move away from the outdated class-based conflict of quanti-
tative liberalism (i.e.. New Deal) toward the non-economic
concerns of qualitative liberalism, Jack Newfield and Jeff
Greenfield plead for a return to those issues and divisions
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which accurately reflect the interests of middle America.
The eclipse of class conflict and redistributive demands--
if, in fact, they were there to be eclipsed—has been
imposed unnecessarily on a poli. tical system now blinded to
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the tensions and pressures underneath the "consensus."
And worse, middle America has blinded itself to economic
explanations of its plight. False consciousness is the
critical concept in radical analyses of public acquiescence.
It is in the nature of establishment explanatory
frameworks to interpret apathy as acquiescence, complacency
as consent. There is no hesitancy on the part of apologists
to point to increases in the general living standard as
proof of the authenticity and legitimacy of working class
support of stratification. Such an admission would not
sit well with critics of our political and economic sys-
tem, but radicals have been forced to come to terms with
affluence. The theory of absolute impoverishment— that
the internal contradictions in capitalism will lead the
working class into increasing misery and increasing class
solidarity— is no more than a museum piece. However, it
does have the effect of tying the strength of false conscious-
ness to the economic conditions of the non-elites. Be-
grudgingly it is becoming clear even to some radicals that
material conditions for the lower strata of society have
improved. There is little perceived need for a class-
based mass movement or ideologically oriented political
conflict: "immediate economic demands no longer suffice to
express and to make concrete the radical antagonism of the
rking class to capitalism. . . .[They] no longer possesswo
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an urgency great enough" to result in questioning or the
mounting of a challenge to the economic system. For
many leftists then consensus politics is a consequence
of a perceived satisfaction--false perceptions perhaps,
but maintained and strengthened by an economy which has
shown the capacity to "deliver" even if only partially.
Thus there is a measure of agreement between critics
and defenders on a major support for the continuation of
consensus politics. However much they may differ with
respect to the justice of relative deprivation, they both
realize that inequality can be a source of anger and
resentment which can spread into the political sphere.
What is preventing these emotions from breaking througli
the mechanisms of conflict control described in this
chapter is the economic growth with which this country
has been blessed. Exactly how economic growth has
ameliorated conflict and how it has softened the anger
and resentment mentioned above are subjects of the next
chapter.
CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MODERATION OF CLASS
Introduction
It is not merely fortuitous coincidence that our
political and social systems are generally insulated
against the potential strains of economic inequality.
Though a person's economic class is perhaps the paramount
factor in determining his life style or life chances,
the stratification system seems impervious to challenge,
either from a viable egalitarian movement or from a well
publicized ideological position. The mechanisms of
consensus politics have successfully thwarted the creation
of social or conceptual alternatives to inequality. Even
the confrontation possibilities in labor-management rela-
tions have been defused. The pervasive impact of
consensus politics is responsible here as well. Indeed,
in analyzing the basic thrust of the VJomen ' s Liberation
and Black Power movements of recent decades, we cannot
help but be impressed by the way in which opposition to
"The System" takes the form not of "change the rules"
but, rather, of "deal me in." Egalitarian rhetoric not-
withstanding, the tremendous social forces unleashed by
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these movements constitute a major threat neither to
the privileged nor to the system of privilege' generally.
In John Kenneth Galbraith's words, "Few things are more
evident in modern social history than the decline of
interest in inequality as an economic issue.
The lack of general opposition to economic stratifi-
cation is a source of interest to political analysts on
both ends of the ideological spectrum. Most conservative
and liberal social scientists find working class accep-
tance of inequality to be a predictable reflection of
working class support for most established political,
social and economic values. Social critics, however,
view public acquiescence as more of an anomaly; therefore
it necessitates a more complex explanation than consensus
theorists require. The paradox is amplified by two
central questions: why have disadvantaged groups toler-
ated vast differences in material standards of living; and
why have they continued to participate within a political
system which distorts their economic demands and misrepre-
sents their individual interests?
Radical analyses cite the role of the formative
structural context—institutional processes, power rela-
tionships, a conservative ideological environment— in
repressing class consciousness and political unrest. What
passes for tolerance of inequality is more probably
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complacency, a result of the system's ability to sap much
of the resentment and cloud much of the accountability
for deprivation. In addition, it is easy to overstate
the actual level of class acquiescence by misinterpreting
signs of anguish and bitterness. Yet, we cannot attribute
all popular toleration of inequality to the manipulative
features of our political economy, to structural repres-
sion or coerced compliance. In leaving open the possi-
bility that feelings of deprivation and resentment may
increase, we acknowledge a voluntaris tic element in mass
acquiescence
.
The lack of overt antagonism between the classes
is in part genuine, an authentic though unstated admis-
sion that, despite the real costs of inequality, on
balance the economic system delivers. The frustrations
experienced in the political realm are softened and can
be accepted if the benefits arising out of economic
activities appear as fair compensation. An extreme
statement of this position was offered by Werner Sombart,
writing about the America of 1906:
as the material condition of the wage
worker has improved—and the increasing
comfort of his way of life has enabled
him to savor the corrupting effects of
material wealth—so he has been impelled
to love the economic system which has
shaped his fate and to adajot his spirit
to the characteristic operations of the
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capitalist economy.
. . . All socialist
Utopias have come to grief on roast
beef and apple pies.^
Even radical opponents of the stratification system, who,
unlike Sombart, have no facile adoration of our nation's
economy, begrudgingly admit that the low level of working
class consciousness and the depoliticization of the issue
of inequality reflect popular belief
, whether well-founded
or not, that improvements in one's economic condition can
and will occur within the present economic, social and
political framework. This optimism undergirds consensus
politics. The vision of a materially better future for
oneself and one's family helps justify a conscious tolera-
tion of stratification. This vision and optimism is fed
by the economic growth that has noticeably improved the
living standards of each generation of Americans. Its
subjective consequences are dampened resentment of one's
subordinate position in the economic hierarchy, lessened
class consciousness and class antagonism, and acceptance
of nonredistributive conflict-resolution mechanisms regard-
ing the allocation of material benefits and burdens. In
short, the patterns of economic and political conflict
described herein as consensus politics are maintained in
large part through the substantial benefits obtained from
economic growth.
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The moderating influence of economic growth is
also Characterized by the popular attitudes engendered
in a growth environment. The role of our frontier experi-
ence in shaping our national character has been passed on
to growth, industrial expansion and technological develop-
ment. These factors set the ^nn^. r.f .^e-r n tone of a society, encourag-
ing a set of values, goals and behavior patterns in
conformity with current political and economic realities.
Of primary importance in this regard is the recognition
and acceptance of the established means by which one can
attain one's economic objectives. The prescribed paths
for the eventual gratification of material desires-
individual economic mobility and mutual prosperity through
group accommodation-are proven (if far from perfect) non-
redistributive mechanisms for economic advancem.ent
. But
both are dependent upon high rates of economic growth in
order for them to remain as viable and realistic aspira-
tional possibilities. Their effectiveness as a means to
higher living standards helps deflect attention away from
more class-oriented, political, redistributive strategies
and towards those patterns of conflict associated with
consensus politics. Noam Chomsky clearly summarizes this
theme
.
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The idea that economic growth willcontinue without limit has been a verv
^mT^'"""/""'"^" controlling andlimiting demands for redistribution of
"^^^Ith.
... The notion of limitlessgrowth could be employed to bring aboutconsensus instead of conflict by over-coming the demands for redistribution
of wealth, which would certainly beheard if one could not look forward to
ot^e^Lthod.?' '"'^'^ —
Economic growth provides the disadvantaged with outlets
for directing their energies which do not require redis-
tributive adjustments. Indeed, by working through these
outlets, lower-middle and lower class individuals help
legitimize the institutions of inequality, the positions
of the higher classes, and the processes of consensus
politics.
The following chapter will flesh out these intro-
ductory comments. Initially, the fact of material progress
must be established; some of the criticisms and caveats
leveled against exaggerated claims of growth will be
explored. Next I will examine the two principal means by
which economic growth bolsters support for the system or,
more likely, stems resentment of its inegalitarian elements.
This involves an analysis of the impact economic mobility
and shared prosperity have on our consciousness of and
attitudes toward stratification. To the extent that public
support of our economic system depends upon economic
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growth, the future of consensus politics and, with it, the
future Of great material inequality are likewise dependent
Growth: Perceptions and Reality
Growth and Material Pro gress
"The idea of economic growth has long been a basic
part of American thinking. Our politics as well as our
economic system are largely products of the material
abundance with which this land has been blessed. The
ideological victory of Lockean liberalism and the forms
of political conflict it portended were definitely
"helped forward by the magnificent material setting it
[Lockeanism] found in the New World. True, industrial
expansion is not unique to America. Nevertheless, cross-
cultural comparisons indicate a remarkable qualitative
difference between our average style of life and that of
citizens in almost every other industrialized nation.
This comparative affluence is readily translated
in the minds of most people into more sel f-evidently
worthwhile goals.
For many Americans, the pursuit of
happiness and the pursuit of money
come to much the same thing. More
money means more goods . . . and thus
more of the material benefits of life.
. . . National economic growth . . .
means, it is supposed, greater well-
being and a happier society.^
85
The expectation and assumption is that economic growth
promotes happiness by continuously widening the scope
of personal freedom. By raising living standards above
subsistence levels, growth releases workers from the
demands of economic necessity. A multitude of purchasable
goods and services frees man (and woman) from many types
of everyday drudgery. With time for leisure and options
for use of that time, the anxieties and constraints
imposed by survival are replaced by the choices and secur-
ity of affluence.
Economic growth also promotes an uplifting of the
collective spirit, a mood of confidence and pride which
permeates the social and cultural atmosphere of a nation.
Our humanitarian impulses are given more room to flourish
when economic life is not a permanent, brutish struggle
with life-or-death stakes. We can afford to consider
others. Ironically, economic growth promises to solve
the problem of poverty without our having to become
humanitarians, without our having to sacrifice. Increas-
ingly, the answer to absolute deprivation in the United
States is perceived to be growth, raising the minimum
living standards of those most deprived to levels above
the poverty line. The poverty programs of the welfare
state depend upon growth, not redistribution, for success.
Specific policies aimed at helping depressed areas--tax
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incentives for investment, ,ob retraxning, education
upgrading-assume general expansion in order for these
programs to bear fruit. It might even be argued that
the growth of the public sector (e.g., welfare policies
such as health care, mass transportation, low- and mxddle-
income housing) can only be financed, or financed with a
minimum of political pain, through the government's
utilization of its share of the economic surplus, its
increment of the growth over the previous year's revenue.
Admittedly some of these claims are more public relations
than description. S Yet, the statistics regarding growth
do make a strong case for the reality of economic progress
and hint at its influence on class consciousness and
conflict
.
Caveats, Qualifiers and Doubts
The above argument is not without its detractors.
There are critics that dispute the degree, direction and
depth of our assumed affluence. One set of attacks has
taken aim on the nature of our growth. Our affluence is
viewed by some as imbalanced, supplying a surfeit of
material goods and consumer services and a scarcity of
less measurable outputs of affluence and well-being.
"Development goes beyond economics, politics, and tech-
nology. It raises basic questions about the quality of
life in society, the relation between goods and the
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good. "9 There are doubts as to whether certain exten-
sions of technology, certain efforts to produce more and
different products, have in fact increased the public's
welfare, or even individual welfare. The imbalance
between our obvious quantitative progress and our equally
obvious qualitative failings undermines the meaningful-
ness of our growth rates and statistics on living stan-
dards. John Curtis Raines puts it this way: "While
moving up in things, we have not moved up in spirit.
In a book entitled The_American^Ju^^
the authors demonstrate that the business elite slants
its self-evaluation of capitalism's successes by ignoring
or playing down the qualitative side of economic develop-
ment
.
The creed
. . . concentrates on the
material and the practical in its
enumeration of achievements. Claims
that the business system has yielded
significant cultural or esthetic
gains are almost completely absent.
Spiritual and moral achievements are
limited largely to Freedom.
H
Traditional economics reinforces this materialist ethos
by emphasizing measures of national wealth and personal
income levels. This "preoccupation with the production
and consumption of material goods and services contributes
to an increasing imbalance between the satisfaction of
material and nonmaterial human needs. ""'''^ In effect.
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as
our
material affluence has been a partial substitute for
those needs not met withrn our economy. The psychologi-
cal and social disamenities of advanced corporate capital-
ism (perhaps indicative of noncapitalxst industrialism,
too)
-rises in mental illness and violence, a breakdown
of family and community ties-are justified by some
temporary costs of a productive economy against which
increased material benefits should be weighed. Perhaps,
as these analysts would contend, this presumed trade-off
of nonmaterial for material benefits is consciously made
(e.g., union contracts with sizable pay increases but
no mention of safer working conditions). Yet, it is
undeniable that such considerations qualify our glorifica-
tion of affluence by offering a set of needs that our
material abundance does not satisfy. To the extent that
nonmaterial factors have not improved apace with material
factors, quantitative measures of growth and living stan-
dards overestimate the overall improvement in personal
well-being.
A related form of imba lanced economic development
is in reference to expenditures in the public and the
private sectors of our society. While the latter is very
impressive, the so-called envy of the world, the former
is often ignored. In three distinct areas of public spend-
ing our collective interests have suffered as a result of
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the lack of
,
governmental effort. Public services such
as mass transporta tron or support for the arts pale in
comparison with private expenditures for parallel services
(i.e., automobiles; mass culture records, books, and
television). Public policies aimed at broadening the scope
of citizenship welfare rights (broad health care coverage,
publicly subsidized housing, education) are ineffective,
inadequately funded, and often diverted to benefit power-
ful political interests. Finally, programs designed to
raise the standard of living of the most underprivileged
strata, to alleviate the worst consequences of economic
inequality, have not prevented the formation of an almost
caste-like underclass. Somewhat redistr ibutive in its
idealized conception, the lauded (and feared) welfare
state does not supply very much well-being to its clients;
"the main beneficiaries of services are those who fill the
jobs of service provider s ." ^ ^ The public-private imbalance
IS especially stark v/hen we examine our own efforts in
light of the more effective and better funded public wel-
fare programs in other industrialized nations. We must be
suspicious of claims of affluence which rely primarily
upon measures of private consumption. We should modify
once more our description of economic growth insofar as pub-
lic goods and services have not expanded in like proportion
to expenditures for private material needs.
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Another caveat to the statistics on economic growth
attacks the conventional wisdom's claims that an increase
in real disposable income necessarily involves a correspond-
ing increase in living standards. Perhaps we should not
be too quick to :jump at the assumption that, because of
economic growth, poverty and deprivation are becoming more
relative and less absolute, a matter of subjective percep-
tion rather than of objective condition. Simple state-
ments about comparative purchasing power or relative
affluence ignore "the historically specific support sys-
tems within which each family strives to meet its needs
for food, shelter, work, health, education, transportation
and recreation." Christopher Jencks' observations on
the styles of life and consumption patterns demanded of
individuals in a given time and place illustrate this
point.
The goods and services that made it
possible to live on $15 a week during
the Depression were no longer avail-
able to a family with the same "real"
income (i.e. $40 a week) in 1964.
Eating habits had changed, and many
cheap foods had disappeared from the
stores. Most people had enough money
to buy an automobile, so public trans-
portation had atrophied, and families
without automobiles v/ere much worse
off than duriiig the Depression. The
labor market had also changed, and a
person without a telephone could not
get or keep many jobs. A home without
a telephone v/as more cut off socially
than when few people had liolenhones
and more people "dropped by. "IS
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This is especially significant for society's lowest
Strata
.
The cost of participating in a social system may
go up faster than increases in one's income (measured in
constant dollars). The available goods and services to
meet unavoidable biological and social needs are not
fixed; they change with changes in technology and culture
Options once purchasable when real income was lower are
priced or structured out of the market. One's higher
salary now must be applied to a new and more costly set
of alternatives. The conclusion some have reached is
that "the workers' social standard of living tends to
stagnate, to worsen, even if their individual standard
of living (expressed in terms of monetary purchasing
power) rises. "^^ A related observation concerns the
hidden labor costs in achieving present levels of real
income. Very often a family's life style depends upon
the availability of overtime or part-time work for the
chief breadwinner and a separate job for another member
of the family. Wives are entering the labor market not
out of choice but out of necessity. Crude statistics on
family income hide the increasing time working class
people must allot towards maintaining their position;
the fifty to sixty hour week has returned (if it ever
left)
.
So I conclude with a warning against simplistic
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analysis. At the very least, we should be aware that,
irrespective of trends in real income levels, the
effect of economic growth on average livrng standards
remains an issue for separate study.
The Argument Restated
In light of these points a straight-forward connec-
tion between economic growth and consensus politics is
somewhat open to debate. The previous objections, precisely
because they have so little currency in people's aware-
ness of their economic condition, serve to illuminate
those values and interpretations which are screened out
of the public's consciousness in shaping its attitudes
toward growth. The following discussion will explore
the biases of ideology and structure that maximize the
moderating impact of economic growth on class conflict.
This analysis is imperative since it is not merely high
economic growth but also the perceptual context within
which we view that growth that explains the role of afflu-
ence in deflecting redistributive demands.
Part of that perceptual context concerns the
definition of concepts used in evaluating our social and
economic life. Criteria such as efficiency, affluence,
progress, and success are conceptualized primarily in
quantitative, materialistic terms. The social structure
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fosters this bias because the resulting set of percep-
tions and expectations tends to implicitly justify the
operation of the economy. Quite understandably, the
system encourages the application of supportive criteria
in the public's evaluation of the system. Economists
and commentators overemphasize aggregate measures of
growth (i.e., GNP), leading to a likeminded public obses-
sion with productivity statistics. This is the heart of
the following comment by E. F. Schumacher:
I-laving established by his purely quan-
titative methods thaL the Gross Nation-
al Product of a country has risen by,
say, five per cent, the economis t-turned-
econometrician is unwilling, and gener-
ally unable, to face the question of
whether this is to be taken as a good
thing or a bad thing. He would lose
all his certainties if; he ever enter-
tained such a question: CrowLli of GNP
must be a good thing, irrespective of
what has grown and who, if anyone, has
benefitted. The idea that there could
be pathological growth, unhealthy growth,
disruptive growth is to him a perverse
idea which must not be allowed to sur-
face. 1^
The fact is that such quantitative definitions of growth
are the most publicized and accepted. While there may be
serious deterioration or stagnation with respect to other
less quantifiable facets of our life (social justice,
community)
,
these failings are played down by the ideology,
and therefore are more than compensated for within the
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mass consciousness by real arowi-i^ ^g owth m private and tangible
consumption.
There is an important auxiliary consequence in
our conceptual bias towards "tangible" outputs. The so-
cial structure encourages a range of material demands
that is in keeping with the strengths of the economy,
that is, with its ability to provide a relative abundance
of consumable goods and services. m our society, style-
of-life symbols have an immense effect on self-esteem.
Advertising creates desires for these newly produced and
marketed symbols, playing upon the self-images of the con-
sumer. By persuading the public to demand those outputs
which the economic system is prepared and capable of
delivering, advertising diverts attention from lapses
with respect to the intangible aspects of our political
economy. Issues of power, authority, participation,
etc. are difficult to deal with in typical union-management
negotiations, difficult to resolve amicably within the
procedural confines of consensus politics. They represent
values which highlight perhaps the ultimate imbalance in
capitalist development. Thus, the materialistic ethic
is critical for the stability of the economy and the
dampening of class consciousness.
Ideological biases also influence one's self-defini-
tion, and this has ramifications for the way we perceive
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the economys success. How an individual views hiraself
is increasingly as a consumer, not a producer. The
growing role of consumables in shaping our psychologrcal
make-up partially explains this shift.
Our way of consumption necessarily
results in the fact that we are never
satisfied
. . . [since] our craving forconsumption has lost all connection
with the real needs of man. Originally,
rne idea of consuming more and betterthings was meant to give man a happier
more satisfied life. Consumption was
a means to an end, that of happiness.
It now has become an aim in itself. 18
Economic growth emphasizes man as a consumer. The hierar-
chy and authority lines that are ever present in the
productive sphere accentuate traditional class differences
and may lead to class resentment. But the consuming side
of individuals clouds those distinctions. Robert Lane
has speculated along these lines: "The more emphasis a
society places upon consumption—through advertising,
development of new products, and easy installment buying—
the more will social dissatisfaction be channeled into
intraclass consumption rivalry instead of interclass
resentment and conflict.""''^
This consumerist orientation, directed by culture
and structure along rather individualistic paths, encour-
ages a distorted sense of self-reliance. The availability
of goods and services which augment one's private life
96
enhances the conviction that collective problems (e.g.,
pollution or crime) can be successfully evaded. Consumer-
ism and the ideology of self-reliance it spawns also make
one indifferent to the fate of autonomous others. After
all, they couM take care of thcmse 1 ves-unless they are
stupid or lazy.
The criticisms of economic growth examined in this
section might weaken positive attitudes toward growth only
if people could conceptually step back and evaluate
economic results from a broader perspective (with an
alternate set of values and criteria). Yet, given the
ideological screens through which Americans perceive
economic expansion, this is quite a difficult undertaking.
The dominant point of view predisposes most Americans to
minimize the importance of these criticisms and to rely
on future economic growth to rectify whatever imbalances
and deficiencies past economic growth has caused.
We must, therefore, restate the hypothesis with
somewhat more sophistication. It is not economic growth
per se, but rather the kind of economic growth wo have
experienced, coupled with the cultural values and social
structure of the society, which makes us receptive to the
appeals of consensus politics. Consider for the moment
that in many socJeties industrial expansion had exacer-
bated class conflict by intensify.! ruj demands and increasing
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expectations. Past growth ".ade people
.ore aware of
their misery or at any rate of the gap between actual and
potential living standards ^ ^ perceptions of
deprivation and the politicization of economic grievances
have enabled economic development to become a catalyst
for a revolutionary consciousness among middle and lower
classes. But not in our society. in the United States
growth promotes not anxiety but confidence in the future,
and thus the patience to wait for future rewards. Peter
Jenkins has discussed this point.
Growth is favourable to the democratichabit because it makes it less neces-
sary to insist upon instant gratifica-
tion of wants or needs at the expense
of others. The prospect of things
getting better confirmed by a consis-
tent experience of things having gotbetter helps to contain relative de-
privations within a more general social
expectation of progress. 21
The ideology which has shaped this response to economic
growth is strengthened by the two principal mechanisms in
our economy by which individuals seek economic achievement
They help exploit the moderating side of expansion and
repress its potential for social disruption. The remain-
der of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of
economic mobility and shared prosperity.
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Th^^pportuniti^j^
One of the major underlying assumptions of this
study is that inequality is a source of social instabil-
.
ity Which functioning societies are more or less capable
Of submerging as an issue. within our society the notion
of equality as an ideal has been not so much submerged as
conceptually reshaped into a system supportive goal. The
resulting redefinition is a direct outgrowth of abundance
on our way of thinking. The ideal of equality has been
operationalized so as to mean the same as equality of
opportunity. This has entailed an imm.ense reduction in
its critical and normative content; "equality came to
mean, in a major sense, parity in competition. ... The
term 'equality' acquired for most Americans exactly the
same connotations which the term 'upward mobility' has
for the social scientist . "^^ This terminological shift
allowed people to speak of a society of equals without
having to prove equality of condition. There evolved a
fusing of ideal and description.
The myth of equality held that equality
exists not merely as a potentiality in
the nature of man but as a working actu-
ality in the operation of American
society--that advantages or handicaps
are not really decisive and that every
man is the architect of his own destiny.
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An image of a fluid class structure beca.e our definition
of classlessness.
Because this image pervaded our descriptions of
society we tended to ignore class distinctions. To point
out such distinctions, to deny the belief in an open
society, was almost un-American. Indeed, the "American
Dream" is built upon the assumed opportunities of an open
society. The opportunity to succeed, to be wealthy (for
that is what "success" has come to mean) is theoretically
present for everyone. The Horatio Alger rags-to-riches
stories provided the model for the hero of our social
mobility passion play.^-^ And the happy endings of most
movie and television story lines simply update the theme,
reinforcing our striving for success. ftovements built
on sharing the wealth found it difficult competinq with
the well-cultivated belief that personal success was
always possible. In effect, equal opportunity became
America's ideological egalitarianism, with the strong
cultural supports a cherished national symbol acquires.
Economic symbolism has a role to play as well;
"the ideal of freedom of opportunity depends upon a free
market to establish comparative value. "^^ To the job
market is attributed all the sanctity, givenness, immu-
tableness of the consumer price market. Laws of supply
and demand (Adam Smith's invisible hand) are responsible
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for the distribution of positions and the rewards that
accrue to them. Thus, if equal opportunity is inter-
preted more as description than prescription, then
challenges to stratification are irrational in addition
to being un-American.
The impact of the cultural em^brace of the success
ethic upon the collective attitudes and behavior of dis-
advantaged groups is not difficult to gauge:
Class consciousness and class mobility
are the fundamental concepts of class
theory. They refer to the two chief
dynamics of class structure. They are
also antithetical: while consciousness
is the indispensable condition for the
formation of classes as politicized
groups and hence serve an associative
function, mobility keeps the classes"
demographically open to each other,
thereby promoting the diffusion and
fragmentation of internal ideologies
—
hence, mobility serves a dissociative
function in the evolution" of class
phenomena
.
^ "
Seymour Martin Lipset has statistically demonstrated the
validity of this statement using the hard data of voting
studies: "perhaps the most important effect of mobility
on politics which should be noted is that the bulk of
the socially mobile
. . . vote for the more conservative
27parties." Actual advancement is not a necessary pre-
condition for conservative tendencies. Often, perceptions
of a reasonable expectation of upward advancement (or
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the belief that one has in fact advanced, whatever the
reality of that belief) is sufficient cause for political
caution. Stated in general ter.s, "There is an inverse
relationship between the degree of openness of classes
and the intensity of class con fl ict . "
The degree of openness in a society is a function
of economic growth. Stagnant societies tend to distribute
positions by se 1 f
-recruitment (that is, from within the
same class) but a dynamic economy creates new industries
and requires new skills in greater proportion than can
be acquired in a static class system. r n America, the
processes of an expanding economy
. .
. have provided
a constant supply of advantageous positions to which
enterprising people could advance from less favorable
... 29beginnings." New leadership positions attract middle
class competitors while their places can be offered to
aspirants from still lower strata. (Wo should not mini-
mize the effect the rhetoric of opportunity and growth
has in encouraging individuals toward greater occupational
achievement.) Lipset and Reinhard Bendix have pointed
out that "a high degree of social mobility is a concomitant
of industrialization and bureaucratization"; these two
developments (related directly to tlie extent of economic
growth) are the structures through which economic expansion
increases social molri I i ty . There aclmittodly has occurred
102
a major change in the primary path of upward mobility.
The rise of the salaried, dependent, white-collar middle
class has altered the imagery of mobxUty, from capitalist
entrepreneur expanding a privately owned and operated
company to underling climbing the bureaucratic institu-
tion ladder. 31 Nevertheless, economic growth continues
to aid aspirants in the corporate hierarchy as it had
opened business opportunities for embryonic industrialists
one hundred years ago.
This is not to claim that the class system is as
fluid and opportunity as available as the dream images
suggest. It is at least partially true that most mobility
takes place within "a social and cultural 'buffer zone'
between the middle class and the working class proper. "^^
Marginal class fluctuations within this buffer zone tend
to insulate each group and protect the advantages of the
'
middle class while giving some appearance of mobility.
Statistics indicate that our levels of mobility do not
greatly exceed those levels in other industrialized
nations. At the heart of the issue is not differential
rates of opportunity. Rather,
it may be necessary to account for
political stability by . . . the cul-
tural value attributed to social
mobility.
. . . [Because] social mo-
bility receives positive encouragement,
the existing opportunities for upward
mobility probably help to sustain the
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acceptance of the social and politicalorder by the lower classes. 33^
The proported existence of great opportunity in our
economy legitimizes the economic order. Thus, public
perceptions of opportunity are the focus of efforts by
those wishing to create support for redistributi ve poli-
cies. But while the left seeks to unveil the truth behind
what to them is the myth of opportunity, the weight of
the culture influences perceptions in the opposite direc-
tion. Pause upon the impact of publicizing modern day,
real life Horatio Alger stories. The humble beginnings
of a handful of our business leaders are proudly heralded
as examples of the reality of the American success dream.
In England, the probability is that such a background
for its elite, equally as uncommon, would be hidden in
the family attic. In the same vein, the existence of
the frontier as symbol of opportunity chances had more
to do with relieving the mobility pressures of Eastern
laborers than did itsactualuse as an escape route. Aware-
ness of its existence allowed it to have the same psycho-
logical function as a safety valve. Despite the presence
of comparable rates of mobility in other, more class
divided nations, mobility has had a uniquely moderating
effect in the United States. This is because of the
unique ideological context through which we interpret and
104
respond to mobility. For most, the ideal need not be
proven for the M^erican Dream to influence our conscious-
ness. "People care less about equality of opportunity
than about the availability of some opportunity ... for
all, however unequal this distribution may be."^^ However
far from the ideal the true mobility figures are, they
provide hope enough for most people in their desire for
a materially better life.
Mobility and Political Attitudes in Three Cases
Different individuals might be expected to react
to mobility perceptions differently. The irony is that
rather diverse experiences of material success in America
will mold quite similar attitudes regarding political and
economic arrangements. For three broadly disparate types
of people the existence of economic opportunity provides
a strong basis for collective support of consensus poli-
tics. First are the aspirants, the hopeful and expectant.
Next, we will look at the partial success stories, those
who settled for much less than the dream promised. Third,
there are the economic failures, for whom opportunity
and mobility promises are threats to self-respect. In
what ways does social mobility modify the economic demands
of these groups (dampen class consciousness) or prevent
the collective expression of those demands (inhibit class
conflict)?
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Th£__A^pirant£
We are all touched by the Midas dreams that the
success ethic spawns. Yet, rational (and politically
relevant) aspiratxon goals are not of such fanciful dxmen-
sions. Aspiration for the working.an means raising himself
occupationally into the middle class (through small busi-
ness ownership, educational upgrading in night school,
achieving supervisory or white collar advancement withxn
the company). This dream necessarily diminishes conscious-
ness of group interests and the utility of group actions
at redressing economic grievances.
It [opportunity] breaks up solidaris-
tic opposition to existing conditions
of inequality by holding out to the
ablest and most ambitious members of
the disadvantaged groups the enticing
prospect of rising from their lowly
state into a more prosperous condition.
The rules of the game remain the same:
the fundamental character of the social-
economic system is unaltered. All that
happens is that individuals are given
the chance to struggle up the social
ladder, change their position on it,
and step on the fingers of those be-
neath them.^o
Economic groups are fragmented into competitors striving
to do better than others in the group, often at the expense
of these others. The debilitating effect this attitude
has on class or group consciousness is obvious. Anselm
L. Strauss claims that the divisive individualism fostered
by the standard American success story is not in accord
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with the actual nature of mobilxty in the United States.
Americans tend to forget, or neverknowthat much of our mobility is col-lective rather than simply individual
• \: "movement. . . . Analytically, oneought not to regard those individual
rises and falls as merely individual,because the respective units [industry
region or town, profession or occupa-tional group] have acted collectivelvm behalf of their members. 37
Nevertheless, mobility aspiration weakens class loyalties
because there is no realization of the collective nature
of most mobility-women and minority group members to the
contrary notwitlistanding
.
For those who do substantially move up the career
ladder, changes in life style, attitudes, leisure activi-
ties and residential areas result in total or near total
breaks with the past. The individual has been coopted
and within his new setting is taught (socialized) to
accept the values and behavior patterns of his new equals
The saga of the nouveau riche has its complement with
new entrants at each step of the economic hierarchy.
Because the individualistic mobility ethic is stronger
here than in Europe, the loosening of community and class
ties becomes an accepted sign of personal success. Thus,
mobility has a far greater effect at weakening working
class loyalties in the United States than in other
developed economies with similar mobility rates. Just as
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important, the skilled and ambitious who become upwardly
mobile thereby are removed as potentially gifted leaders
of the groups they left. Lipset and Bendix refer to
this point in discussing the ability of an elite to
absorb qualified newcomers without undermining its own
privileged position. Obviously this element of social
stability depends upon the degree of mobility (and there-
fore economic growth) within the system.
In an expanding, dynamic societv, suchbarriers to mobility as inherited rank
can be a fundamental cause of instabil-ity, since expansion calls for an in-
crease in the number of qualified lead-
ers. As long as the ruling group is
flexible it will allow ambitious and
talented individuals to rise from thelower strata; yet an ever-present ten-dency toward the formation of an aristo-
cracy tends to restrict such individual
mobility in any society. If the re-
striction is sufficiently tight, it can
provoke discontent, which may result
in efforts by members of deprived groups
to achieve collective or group mobility,
sometimes through a struggle to supplant
the dominant group.
Mobility effectively removes many of these leaders from
contact and identification with the underclasses. But,
as the above quotation indicates, adequate levels of
cooptation (without massive and dangerous downward mobil-
ity) depend upon the existence of economic expansion to
create a certain rate of growth in the absolute number
of middle-and upper- level positions.
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Yet, to re-emphasize my concern with perceptual
as opposed to purely factual descript rons
, this real and
Objective form of cooptatron rs not the only type which
weakens class consciousness and, thus, prevents class
conflict. Individuals who feel relatively deprived but
aspire to higher station often identify with the groups
they hope to someday join. The dominance of middle class
values in the working class consciousness attests in part
to the expectation that advancement has or will soon come.
Such distorted self-images are the subsLance of claims
of false consciousness. "We are in danger ... of iden-
tifying with the dreams beyond us and so voting against
the place we really are."^^ Social mobility contributes
to two types of false consciousness: that of an individual
who identifies with a higher class to which he unrealis-
ti^ly aspires; and that of a skidder who identifies with
the class from which he has irre\^sjJ3ly fallen. It is
the nature of an economy like ours, which effectively
merchandises hope, that the words " unrealistically" and
"irreversibly" used above are subject to intense debate.
Misrepresented class position is almost a certainty in a
dynamic growth-oriented society. A careful assessment
of one's true status is psychologically difficult for
those who are not self-evident successes; all the more in
the United States, a nation v/hich preaches the gospel of
classlessness and opportunities for all.
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This cooptation of the ambitious and optimistic
effects not only class consciousness but also support
for redistrxbutive demands as well. m Louis Harz • words,
"the dream of new and greater wealth doubled the desire
to protect wealth rn general. m a society that prides
itself on the opportunity all indiyiduals have to achieve
riches, the lure of this promised reward is often suffi-
cient to impede attacks on those who have previously been
rewarded (the wealthy). if people are willing to accept
the probability of deprivation in order to preserve the
admittedly slim possibility of enormous wealth-a life-as-
lottery mentality-then the resulting distribution of
rewards, while not popular, might be considered fair.
Aspirants implictly acknowledge the validity of this line
of reasoning through their political and economic biases.
For them, mobility appears to offer a more immediate and
a more realistic route to securing personal economic goals
than class unity and the possibilities of redistributive
politics.
Partial Mobility
For those who feel partially successful in the
opportunity race, who believe they have achieved some
upward mobility in exchange for their ambition and abili-
ties, who contend that the system has delivered for them,
though perhaps incompletely, support for consensus politics
-.o.e soliaiy foundea. This
..oup.s support is
..sed
upon gratitude and a sense of obUgation, not unli.e the
,
emotions of „any i™igrants who, coding to ^„erica penni-
less and Often persecuted, were appreciative of any job
they were given. Consequently, they have been among the
most supportive of the economy
• s mobility/opportunrty
ideology. Those who have had limited success in advanc-
ing themselves have not been coopted in the same sense
as the aspirants have. They have not been raised to a
new class or strata; the mobility they have experienced
will not dramatically break down past ties or cause them
to reject past values. Their perception of success and
advancement stems from basic evolutionary changes in the
job structure which have made certain forms of mobility
more possible and which simulate mobility for those in
a basically static class condition. The ability of the
system to deliver in the eyes of these individuals is
also a function of rates of economic growth.
Industrialization that has proceeded beyond the
initial stages (i.e., those stages which Karl Marx thought
typified capitalism) results in transformations in the
job structure conducive to the expectations of the oppor-
tunity myth. In terms of occupational categories, this
development takes the form of more white collar and ser-
vice jobs and less rural and assembly line positions, the
Ill
-
tne 3ove„.entaX sec.o. as a .a,o. e„plo,er, a„athe differentiation of the iabor fo.ce „„.eh increases
the n™.er of ,o.s re.u.rin, so.e tecHnieai and profession-
skiils. occupational and income changes have brought
a vast heterogeneity to the labor force.
.
.
.
.^vanced
specialization has „ade for finer drstinctions of status
and a multiplication of occupational worlds, '"l
One result of this development is to complicate
the Claims of inheritance in the face of the training
these new positions de„,and. 'The process of specialisa-
tion makes exact occupational inheritance increasingly
unlikely..« Much more importantly, advanced specializa-
tion makes partial mobility more Ukely, and this will
engender almost the same deleterious impact on class
consciousness as results from the full mobility sought
and experienced by aspirants. Cued to be aware of mobil-
ity, we become sensitive to it and tend to inflate the
true value of even minor occupational improvement. Because
the range of one^s expectations is narrow and tied to
one's original place on the economic hierarchy, these
slight indications of personal progress have much of the
psychologically gratifying effects large advances would
have. The creation of minor career ladders within a much
larger hierarchy postpones frustrations and extends the
mobility expectations of individuals. Opportunities for
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advancement increase while at the sa.e ti.e the rewards
for each advance become less meaningful. Morris Rosen-
berg summarizes the political consequences of this develop-
ment
:
It has been very plausibly suggestedthat a large number of minute rankdifferences in a bureaucratic hierarchyIS likely to discourage unity among
workers for two reasons: first, mem-bers tend to view one another in termsof superiority-inferiority instead of
equality; and second, workers on an
equal level feel antagonistic and com-petitive toward one another on thebasis of their struggle to obtain the
next slightly higher position. In both
cases consciousness of class unity
among these people is undermined.
Rather than feeling united against a
common class enemy, they feel mutualdistrust on the basis of their strug-
gle against one another.
The actual extent of advancement is small, but the impact
on class consciousness is substantial. The attitudes
and behavior of those individuals climbing this attenuated
career ladder exhibit the same divisiveness as would be
expected from the fully upwardly mobile. In addition, the
probability of some advancement ensures that the ambitious,
now rewarded, will hold a sense of obligation towards
the system as it is presently constituted. After all, so
the feeling goes, "If I can make it, so can you."
To some degree, partial mobility of the sort
described above is simulated mobility. It is the magnifying
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of this Slight amount of improvement whrch makes the
position attained seem more prestigious, higher on the
authority hierarchy (but not nearly as much progress
.n
terms of the measurable quality of income) than it really
is. our economrcally dynamic society has various means
of simulating mobility, thereby inflating one's true
class and station. An often cited example is the raxse
in title whrch implies an upgrading in position without
any commensurate difference in career chances, income
levels or work responsibilities (e.g., private secretary
reclassified as administrative assistant). The upgrading
of manual into non-manual occupations simulates mobility
into the middle class and thus moderates loyalties to
working class groups. A parallel development is the
professionalization (through degree programs, professional
associations, technical journals) of previously nonprofes-
sional job categories. ^5 But with this trend has also
come a proletarianization of many white collar occupations.
The assembly line operation of large offices (rows of
desks, routinized work) attests to the blending of white
and blue collar— the "buffer zone" discussed above.
Mobility is often built into the job itself. "Age
phasing" for middle class posi tions , and the promotional
privileges of seniority for factory workers (as well as
school teachers) artificially induce mobility expectations.
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IS nor-
More deserving aspirants are somehow delayed as others
Slowly rise to the top (or what is assumed to be the'
top) of their respective ladders without competition
from newcomers. Slight mobility, even that which
many expected as a result of institutionalized recognition
of increased experience and skill, is mobility neverthe-
less, with all its psychological ramifications. Also
to the point, advancement through a bureaucracy rather
than through business entrepreneurship creates vague and
undetermined signs and steps of progress. Uncertainty
about career lines allows people to confuse dead-end
positions with "grooming and seasoning" posts. Blocked
mobility is often given other rewards which belie the
actual prospects of the individual. When the signs of
stagnation can be misinterpreted as improvement, then
mobility perceptions will invariably outdistance reality.''^
Finally there are other forms of mobility which
can substitute for or give the appearance of actual
advancement. Basic changes in residence— farms to cities,
cities to suburbs, Europe to the United States—or even
geographic movement in and of itself can easily be misun-
derstood and inflated. The assumption that change equals
progress works here as well, with consequences on the
potential of class unity; "in . . . blue collar occupa-
tional groupings (v/here geographic mobility is not
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intrinsic to the job,, such mobility is probably a ,ood
xndxcator of the weakness of class co^unity . "^8 The
most frequently cited surrogate of mobrlity is education
Hrgher educational opportunity sustains the beliefs in
increased social and economic opportunity. However, higher
educational attainment does not guarantee upward mobility
more likely, the stress we place upon education tends to
justify the superior position of the educated. To some
extent, therefore, the belief in education acts as an
intermediary obstacle, insulating class divisions while
diverting lower class strivings towards
.system supportive
processes. Educational success becomes not only a neces-
sary condition for economic success, but quite often a
substitute for it. "Thus, many mobility studies based
on a set of broad occupational categories probably under-
estimate the extent of psychologically and socially rele-
vant mobility. "''5 For the partial success stories, the
structured simulation of mobility and opportunity (itself
a result of economic growth), while not reflected in
statistics, is a major source of support for the economic
system and, therefore, for consensus politics.^"
The Failures
In discussing the attitudes of the partially success-
ful we are also confronting the issue of the political
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consequences of partial failure. Gratitude is easy
enough to understand, but why have these drea.ers not
been highly frustrated and highly animated wrth the
.eager
lengths their an.bitxons and str.vrngs too. the.P „ow can
a society, which emphasizes opportunity so .uch in legiti-
mizing its drstribution of material rewards, deal effec-
tively with the feelings of those who have had hardly any
gains from the opportunity promised them? The first
reaction to this critical question is that a large number
of aspirants feel, justifiably or not, that some improve-
ment in their relative situation has or will inevitably
occur. Admittedly, this is not equivalent to the rags-to-
riches stories of Horatio Alger, although th_at dream dies
hard for many Americans. However, more feasible and
attainable goals eventually motivate our conscious behavior;
one's position and life chances modify one's expectations.
Not surprisingly, achievements within these reduced
parameters may elicit magnified feelings of accomplishment
and therefore mobility. Reference groups for skilled
workers are most frequently other groups within the working
class, not relatively better off mid-level office person-
nel. Continued comparisons with less affluent members of
the same class result in heightened satisfaction for those
at the top of the manual working class ladder. Obviously
it is more satisfying to meet traditional aspirations, to
] 1 7
nevor to b. atta.inod. Relative
.l.pri v., t Lon is Ko,n ot
.""derate, stable
.levels due to the selective perceptions
and narrowed ranye of comparisons disadvantaged individu-
als employ.
Simulated mobility, lowered aspirations nnd non-
threatening reference groups do not soften the pangs of
failure for many An.ericans who have nc^vor known even
partial achievement: and mobility. Ironicany, it is the
emphasis on the success ethic which insures that these
feelings are not transformed into anger towards and i-ejec-
tion of the economic promises (and mechanisms) oT mobility
"the American culture tells its members: 'achieve,'
•compete,' 'be better, smarter, c,uicker, richer than your
fellow men'; it short, 'be unegi.,,! . • " ''^ This appeal tor
individual achievement operates in conjunction wi t li the
belief that sufficient opportunity to succeed is available
within the present economic system. Consequently, when
expectations are not met, individuals hold thcMiiseives
responsible in account incj tor lack of mobility. The
anxieties, sol fr-doubt s
, frustrations and humiliation
associated with tailure are the distorted mirror images
of those emotions (gratitude and obligation) associated
with upward mobility. "The notion of equality of opportun-
ity
. . .
places rcsi)Ousi lii 1 j ty on t lie individual tor
118
socxal failure while attributing successes to the institu-
txons." Because the psychic and social price of failure
is so high, people tend to inflate their own success and
clai. „ore self-satisfaction with their position than is
actually experienced. The attempt to deceive others as
to one's own real econc.ic condition leads people to
believe the rhetoric of opportunity more and thereby to
place blame lor failure more scjuarely on their own
shoulders.
To avoid the emotional traumas of failure a whole
host Of excuses, rationalizations and psychological out-
lets are employed. Upset and Bendix point to two common
patterns which help soften the pains of internalized
blame
.
(1) transvalucit.iona] rc-litnon, which
teaches thah the rjood rathc^r t.han the
rich will be rewarded in an afterlife;
and (2) a high degree of chil d-center-
edness that encourages parents to seek
satisfaction in higli aspirations for
their children when their own personal
goals have not been achieved. 54
As to the former pattern, many individuals minimize the
importance of class distinctions. The belief in social
equality allows the disadvantaged to take refuge in the
well-refuted myths that the rich are not happy or have
more ulcers and mental worries or have a less satisfying
homelife. The playing up of working class satisfactions
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and the minimizing of benefits associated with wealth
are attempts to shift vaiue priorities, although not in
so institutionalized a fashion as a transvaluational reli-
gion. The minimizing of the importance of class differ-
ences reduces frustration by claiming that the prize is
not always worth the effort.
Lipset and Bendix' referpnrp -t-oj-ej-erence to the promise of
intergenerational mobility is vital in understanding how
failure is dealt with in system supportive ways. The
promise of success, indeed the whole American Dream it-
self, has never been denied
-merely delayed and then
renewed. Through one's children, hope breathes eternal
for the American Dream ^s dreamers. Whether stressing
educational attainment, artistic or sports talents, beauty
(which improves one's chances of "marrying up"), or busi-
ness sense, the parents' raising of a child expresses
those qualities which are thought to be translatable into
economic success. The impact of this form of mobility on
class consciousness may be less tlian that of other more
directly (personally) experienced forms; but as a mechanisn-
for perpetuating the sense of opportunity, even after the
final distribution of positions and rewards has occurred,
it is effective enough.
Resignation, in one of a number of disguises, is
the most common reaction to failure for those who have few
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realistic defenses and strategems to fall back on. Many,
recognizing their relative economic situation, try to
gain maximum psychological advantage out of their accep-
tance. The most typical reflection of resignation is
apathy ("the race is over, the pressure is off"). Another
related attitude stems from the admission of individual
responsibility for one's disadvantaged position; the
corollary notion to this admission is that wealth and
high station are earned. Thus, workers who accept a
paternalistic relationship toward their superiors take
comfort in being guided by a seemingly natural elite."
Identifying with upper class life styles and personalities
is a vicarious substitute for real mobility. In addition,
the economically and socially disfavored can participate
in the spirit (if not the substance) of national growth
and power, gaining satisfaction through identification
with the perpetually victorious home team—the United
States. The hope for intergenerat ional mobility is also
a form of vicarious mobility. While these reactions may
be less than adequate personal substitutes for real advance-
ment, they are nevertheless effective politically in
inhibiting resentment and moderating frustration.
An additional aspect of the resignation-acceptance
response to failure, one that is the most telling of all,
is the prevalence of gambling as a means of achieving
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upward
.obxlity for those with no other realistxc possi-
bilities. Gambling is, of course, a method of reKindl.ng
hope in the success ethxc, but it also reflects a view
many people have towards their economic fate.
a^m^r ^t^^^I
inclined to think thatman gets what he deserves, that
rewards are primarily products of one'stalents and industry, secondarily theconsequence of luck, and only in'smallpart the function of properties of thesocial-cultural structure. 56
A:.other's economic success, if interpreted as the result
of chance happenings, is less threatening to our self-
respect than if it seems to be an indication of his merit
and, therefore, our relative lack of merit; "the goddess
of chance, as of justice, is blind, "^^ By dera tional iz ing
the processes of mobility operating within society, by
minimizing the rule-governed nature of the opportunity
contest, the public also depoliticizes mobility, putting
the "rules" beyond the bounds of human understanding or
collective control. This final psychological strategem
is perhaps indicative of all the mechanisms by which
individuals deal with economic failure within the confines
of consensus politics. "It is this tendency for the under-
class to throw up symbolic systems which explain their
life situation in secular, non-political terms which is
perhaps the most important of the 'safety-valves' [main-
taining stability in an inegali tarian society]. "^^ For
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the vast majority of A,„erlcans unable to fulfill the
promises of the American Drea., some combination of
resignation, rekindled hope, and psychological defense
e^lains the generally moderate nature of their reaction
to their disadvantaged condition.
All this is not meant to deny that unrest exists.
Ideological claims of opportunity and mobilrty unbounded
inevitably conflict with the awareness of upper class
privileges and a partially closed class system. Expecta-
tions evoked through the culture's socialization process
are never totally met, and the gap between prom.se and
the perceived reality represents potential political ten-
sions. AS long as the gap is not too large, as lono as
economic growth ensures certain "adequate" levels of
class fluidity or partial advancement, then the ideologi-
cal supports wiJl be effective in lessening these tensions
By enlarging perceptions of mobility, the society tries
to align aspiration to achieveirent
. Failing that, numer-
ous factors protect the legitimacy of the economic system
by diverting blame, providing personal outlets and psycho-
logical defenses to deal with failure, and, in general,
promoting attitudes and behavior patterns which depoliti-
cize failure and insulate inegalitarian distributive
arrangements.
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Vet, it is undeniable that the rhotoric cannot
totally explain or excuse the reality; the gap is too
Wide to be fnliy bridged. Por ,„inorUies, especiaUy,
the syste.
.s ri„ed in very transparent ways. Speeches
proclaiming equal opportunity and the rewarding of n,orrt
can^t cover over the obvious ease with which people iron,
upper Class backgrounds can n^intain tl.eir position or the ob.dous
Obstacles confronting disadvantaged individuals
.n their
guest of higher station. „e „ight therefore expect ,„ore
instability in consensus poUtics were it not for an addi-
tion mechanisn, supplementing the moderating influence of
Ability. Chapter III now turns to an analysis of this
factor and of the means by which it, too, bolsters the
Stratification status quo.
Shared Prosperity
gjlM£dJ^£2sperjJ^y_an^^ Deprivatio n
The ability of economic growth to mitigate class
consciousness and thereby to preserve economic inequality
is not solely a consequence of the effects of growth on
levels of economic opportunity and social mobility. The
American Dream of economic affluence continues to dominate
working class consciousness even after expectations of
mobility have been dashed. Economic growth
provides the disadvantaged with another alternative route
1 2/1
syste.. in «-„„„„,i„,
-
a substitute for
..uallty or inco.o. So lony as there
growth, there is hope, anc, that
.a.es larcje i„co,„e
differenbials tolerable
.
"^^^ iiniii-r w.."•'-c. Unl Ko mobiUby aspirations,
wh.ch Offered possibilities of afiluence only to the
extent that individuals struggled as individuals to n.ove
fro. their wor..n, class or .uMle class situations, the
alternative path to a bettor material existence evolves
out Of a person's self-definition as part of tho wor..n.
or middle class (or at least a clear se.n-cnt of those
classes). Optinn.sm about the future stems from the hope
that, as a member of an economic qroupinq, one will gain
in real wages and living standards as the nation grows;
being part of the whole, one will bo able to share in the
general prosperity of the economy. Expectations of
shared affluence, as with expectations of individual
mobility, are somewhat overstated. But conceptually and
concretely these expectations operate to minimize class
consciousness and mitigate class conflict. The high stan-
dard of living enjoyed by most Americans, coupled with
belief that the nation's economy and therefore their own
economic situation will improve over time, helps deflect
'
attention from the inequities of the stratification system,
thus preventing Lhe presentation of redistributive demands
which threaten consensus politics.
12.
There is
.
basic objection u,
.oasurinc, national
weu-.einc by reteronce to increases in average liv.n,
standards. The "economic abundance thesis" is "based on
the notion that absolute rather than relative deprivation
,
-
the primary source of labor radicalism."" Thear.u-
-nt raised against this assumption needs to be explored
and in son,e way refuted in order to continue to maintain
the connection between growth and acquiescence.
While economic growth promises to meet our physi-
cal and psychic needs, it may be the case that only red.s-
tributive policies can truly deliver. Richard A. Easterlin
examined data fro. thirty separate surveys relating happi-
ness and income." within all societies, as individual
income rose so did measures of individual happiness.
However, raising the income level of all had little or no
effect on happiness levels. For example, between 1940
and 1970 the united States experienced a 60 per cent
increase in real income, but according to Easterlin 's
surveys, there was no appreciable change in overall levels
of perceived contentment, security, satisfaction, etc.
one explanation of these findings is that evaluations of
one's material well-being arise in a cultural context of
expectations regarding what is the norm. Admittedly,
Americans in the 1950 's through 1970 's have generally
enjoyed higher levels of real wages than past generations
ha ve
.
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But this IS no consolation at all,for their needs have been shaped inthis society today. There is no
'
forhn^.r^^^^^"''"^ standard of adequacyhousing, diet, medicnl care, edu-cation, entertainment, etc. Whatfeels adequate is inescapably depen-dent upon what is available to othersm the society. o3
The fact that deprivation is comparatively and contextu-
ally determined does not make it any less grating. The
connection in the public's mind between relative income
or position and images of worthiness (or worthlessness)
is not erasable through the mechanism of shared prosperity.
One can make the argument that
, even within a context of
increasing general prosperity, inequality will inevitably
foster envy, frustration, humiliation, and deprivation.
It is significant that high rates of economic growth tond
to inhibit the achievement of equality oE condition— that
is, it widens the absolute gap between income groups—even
as it promotes prosperity among society as a whole. Thus,
relative deprivation has been increasing. The import
of this line of reasoning for consensus politics is clear:
to grievances arising out of stratification, only economic
redistribution can respond.
This argument, powerful in its logic, tends more
to implore than to explain. The truth is that, within
the context of a consumerist, materialist, individualist
perspective, imj^rovemen ts in living standards and real wages
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do have a moderating influence on class consciousness
and Class conflict. Relative deprivation
.ay affect so-
.
cial and personal happiness, but the reality of material
abundance as discussed above and the ideological supports
for our economic system prevent the easy transformation
of unhappiness into social discontent. The perception
of affluence, like the perception of mobility and oppor-
tunity, is in large part the consequence of the conceptual
screen through which we interpret our economic situation.
To understand why feelings of relative deprivation have
not led to redistributive economic demands we must examine
the way in which members of the working class view their
economic circumstances relative to those of other groups
in society.
The relative deprivation thesis ignores a form of
mobility which is perceptually meaningful for low and
lower-middle class people. The accumulation of savings
and possessions, even if in conjunction with a similar
development by one's neighbors, is not without its benefits
"Entry into the propertied sector of the working class
was ... an important form of social mobility. "^^ Clearly
what is occurring is that the worker is using his economic
situation at an earlier stage as his current reference
point. This comparison implicit in "goods mobility" leads
us to believe that individuals might sense an improvement
in their situation over time and gain satisfaction from
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such progress, the Easterlin data notwrthstanding.
"a
'
man who can buy his own house, or a new car, will feel
that he has moved up in the world even if he has not
changed his occupational posi t ion . " ^
An additional factor often overlooked by those who
belabor the relative deprivation argument is the unclear
nature of most material inequality. Differences in con-
sumption styles have to a great extent been narrowed due
to overall increases in wealth:
the emergence of mass production dur-ing the past half-century has caused
such a redistribution of highly valuedprestige symbols that the distinctionsbetween social classes are much lessimmediately visible than they were in
nineteenth-century America.
. .
.
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Qualitative differences aside, the distribution of, say,
automobiles or television sets is egalitarianizing in
its impact on people's perceptions of injustice, plenty,
hope, etc. In effect, the idea of "goods equality" in
an affluent society—by this I do not mean to imply that
such equality actually exists— is a second aspect of the
classlessness myth as introduced in the discussion of
social mobility. A leveling of the ownership of material
possessions, consumption equality of a sort, is compensa-
tion to the working and lower-middle classes for a contin-
ued lack of political and economic leveling. Karl Marx
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might be correct in predicting the £roletariar^^
(downward occupational mobrlity) of the independent
middle class. However, he was obvxously wrong in antici-
pating the paui^ation (downward consumption mobility)
Of the working class. And it rs our self-xmages as con-
sumers, not producers, that are most dominant on our
.
consciousness. The reality of inequality and relative
deprivation must be placed in this context.
A further point on the goods mobility argument con-
cerns the distinction to be made between types of goods
and services. The drstrrbut ion of the latter (health,
education, recreation) and some elements of the former
(the quality of food, clothing and shelter) is highly
inegalitarian. But it is also relatively invisible.
'
Upper class luxury items (jewelry, multiple dwellings,
numerous high-priced automobiles) lack relevance and
function for most Americans. Such expenditures appear
frivolous, to be envied without resentment.
The relative deprivation that does surface is deeply
felt. However, its structural roots are not apparent.
Jealousy, rising expectations and demeaning comparisons
are interpreted not as products of our economic system
(via inequality, advertising, etc.) but as elements in
human nature, the signs and pains of striving and ambition:
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average people are not able to trans-late their personal problems into pub-
lever''?r
to discuss then at thatvel. iheir world of complaints andenthusiasms is denied the means by
woiTd the interpersonalrl and place that world within thewider structures of society. 67
The unhappiness that relative deprivation gives rise to
is directed away from displeasure with the economic system
and instead is transformed into frustration with oneself.
One final qualification of the relative deprivation
thesis alludes to a point made earlier. The reference
group we use to evaluate our own level of affluence in
large measure determines how we view our economic circum-
stances. Thus, control over our perception of which group
to compare ourselves to is a critical factor m maintain-
ing economic and political stability. Promoting the use
of lower class reference groups (e.g., comparing our
standard of living with citizens in India) helps to heighten
our perception and appreciation of goods mobility and
thus encourages a false consciousness of the true range
of wealth and income levels in our economy. But we need
not go out of our national borders to be confronted with
reference groups worse off than the average American.
The Negroes have formed a distinctive
American proletariat, with I: he lowest
incomes, the most menial and subservi-
ent tasks, and the lowest social pres-
tige ... of any group in American
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r.TJ^'. ''u^ existence of this large,elatively homogeneous, easily identilfiable and exploited group has meantthat every white American, even thelowest paid laborer, possesses a cer-tain social prestige which raises him,at least in his own view, above thelevel of a proletarian . 68
As has been often demonstrated, the concept of relative
deprivation is intimately and inseparably associated with
the concept of reference group. Society can minimize the
former through careful manipulation of the latter.
The relative deprivation thesis states that shared
prosperity does not mitigate against redistr ibutive poli-
tics because it does not solve the problem of invidious
distinctions. This argument has merit, but, stated in
its extreme form, it ignores the ideological supports and
perceptual screens which have successfully defused the
class issue in American politics. The mass of Americans
have long ago been denied the conceptual resources neces-
sary to understand and evaluate the social morality and
personal consequences of stratification.
It became difficult for workers and
farmers to define their opposition
to elites, for the separateness of
elite and mass was obscured rather
than clarified by ideological develop-
ments.
. . . [Thus] the philosophy of
economic expansion had entrenched it-
self as the popular answer to American
problems [of inequality and depriva-
tion] . 69
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Most people, products of
. very effective socialization
process, do not possess the ability to evaluate their
personal circumstances fre^^ r>f + k •du t ee of the biasing influence of
the dominant ideology. m fact, the ideology of shared
prosperity not only minimizes the disruptive impact of
relative deprivation upon our attitudes toward the strati-
fication system. As the next section demonstrates, it
also creates a highly system-supportive framework for class
interaction while at the same time encouraging working class
compliance with economic arrangements.
The Ideology of Sha£ed__rrospf^r ity
The continued strength of consensus politics
hinges on the continued prosperity of the nation's economy.
To the extent that this prosperity is more reality than
rhetoric, there exists the possibility of labor's progress-
ing within the boundaries of the existing social and
economic structure, "thereby lessening the attraction of
those political appeals propounding the inevitable deteri-
oration of living and working conditions under capital-
ism." Given this perspective, a good dose of political
caution is quite justified. The worker who believes that
he has a stake in the future is not a ready target for
redistributive politics and the unknown consequences such
a change may entail.
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of ba^i^
worker has won a positions c economic security and reason-able expectations he has cons3derab?vmore reason to be conservative on so-cial issues than the middle-class
executive or professional man.
.For the workingman, everythinq couldbe jeopardized by radical change. 71
The national goal of economic growth dampens class con-
sciousness while the behavior associated with gaining
one's share of the growing economic pie mitigates against
class conflict. The remainder of this section explores
each of these tv;o themes.
Our cultural and social obsession with economic
expansion plays a major role in inhibiting the growth
of class consciousness. The following discussion examines
the highly conservative implications of our concern with
growth. While I do not want to yaply that this position
has totally persuaded the disadvantaged sectors of
society into acquiescing in their fate, it has had and
continues to have an impact. To the extent that the fol-
lowing line of reasoning influences class attitudes and
perceptions, it serves to diminish the ability of deprived
groups to think in terms of group antagonisms and redis-
tributive demands.
Tlie primary assumption in the shared prosperity
thesis is that economic growth is a social goal which
unites all economic groups, a national project that ought
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to consume our collective energies and loyalties. Economic
growth has historically led to economic integration and
interdependence. The trends of economic rationalization
(e.g., division of labor, large-scale organizations, hier-
archical authority structure) cause a blending of talents
and functions for all groups in society. Each segment,
so the argument goes, is part of a larger organic unity,
the economic system, and must be dedicated in function
and attitude toward one common goal, the preservation and
growth of the economy. m operating with that objective
in mind (or in being constrained from obstructing that
objective) we improve not only the whole but also its
parts. Like the mutually beneficial relationship between
parts of an environmental system, the economic system
profits from its own, naturally evolved symbiotic processes
of interaction. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guides as
well as legitimizes the economy. The doubters of this
American Business Creed need only look at the outcome-
affluence and opportunity— in order to reinforce their
wavering loyalty. "Both the material and the non-material
achievements are explained by a rigid cause-and-ef fect
link with the System: the achievements flow from and
validate the System, and the tv/o are inseparably bound
72together." The normative implications are obvious. We
praise the shared affluence stemming from our growing
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lon-
an
economy, thus unavoidably suDoorfino ^-i•jx pp t g the economic relat
ships which supposedly contribute to and are such
integral part of economic growth.
In accepting the collective goal of economic growth,
working class groups co^ait themselves to the economic
givens upon which future prosperity is premised. inequal-
ity may not be wholeheartedly embraced as part of the
natural way of things, but it is a central aspect of the
economic order and, as such, probably is indispensable
to the overall functioning of the system. if, as is
claimed, American business is responsible for our growth,
then to successfully attack business privileges, including
of course the wealth that accrues to business leaders,
is to somehow weaken the ability of the economy to con-
tinue its climb. Likewise, such sacred economic tenants
as property rights, the free market, minimal government
involvement, and managerial authority are accepted, if
only in part, as sharing credit for past and future
economic growth.
Belief in this ideological framework carries with
it the perception of very conservative class interrelations
as part of the economic givens. A survey among New Jersey
textile workers revealed a surprising tendency to invoke
the standard defenses of social stratification in explain-
ing the inevitability and desirability of the class system.
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in reviewing so.e of the responses to their questionnaire,
the authors concluded that "The members of different
Classes are thus seen to serve complementary needs of the
society and of each other. This almost feudalistic
acceptance of inequality parallels a highly paternalistic
notion of class roles. Dichotomous views of society,
long thought to be connected to levels of class conscious-
ness (i.e., the rich vs. the rest of us), also reveal a
strong paternalistic streak (smart vs. fools, the intelli-
gent or educated vs. the masses^^). Feelings of obligation
and inferiority toward the economic elite (or its corpor-
ate representatives) undermine the growth of radical class
consciousness by offering a more conservative self-defini-
tion of economic roles and responsibilities.
Partnership rather than paternalism describes
the class relationship for others seeking the shared gains
of economic growth. This aspect of the American Business
Creed is a central theme of corporate public relations.
For example:
How have we achieved all this [progress]?
Through the American kind of teamwork! And
what is teamwork?
American teamwork is managers that pays
[sic] reasonable wages and takes fair
profits.
. . .
Our teamwork is labor that produces as
efficiently and as much as it can—that re-
alizes its standard of living ultimately
depends upon how much America produces--that
expects better wages as it helps increase
that production.
. . .
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The •teamwork" theme stresses the common interest both
labor and management have in the goal of growth. In the
process, this appeal overtly tries to minimise class
consciousness by ignoring the reality of economic antagon-
isms and conflicts of interest.
Continuing this argument, workers are said to have
a stake in and responsibility for the economy through
their partial control of a major element of economic
success
--productivity.
The rise in real wages in the last fewdecades
.
. .
has not been due to anydirect influence of labor unions on wages.
•
•
IS the rise in the total productItself, however, especially the productper man_.
. . which has been the majorfactor in the long-run increase in real
wages . ' o
Productivity and teamwork explain a beneficently function-
ing economy. Politicizing the system by demanding gains
over and above productivity increases may result in
specific victories but with deleterious consequences on
long-range class unity. "While the power to strike can
redistribute income in favor of the members of particular
unions, it cannot redistribute income in favor of labor
in general at the expense of capital in general. "^^ The
claim is made that such gains as are vv?on by that method
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undercut the viaMl.ty and future growth of the industry,
occupation, factory, region, etc. Thus, worKer concern
with wages is often rightfully directed at improving the
employer's ability to pay.
An additional consequence of the ideological per-
spective presented here has to do with the prevalence
Of the work ethxc. Work at all levels of the occupational
hierarchy is ennobling, performing a necessary function
for the economic system. We should take pride in that
function and do the best job we are capable of doing.
More importantly, we should remain loyal to the larger
unit upon whose success our own success rests. The work
ethic evolves out of expectations of mutual progress,
paralleling the success ethic 's expectations of social
mobility. The implicit promise is that if we do our job,
we will grow with the company, region, industry, nation,
etc. The extent to which this promise mitigates class
consciousness is a function of the actual economic improve-
ments that have been experienced. The recent decline in
the effectiveness of the work ethic is a sign of disillu-
sionment. Hard work seems to go unrewarded while others
succeed despite a seeming lack of worthiness. Even so,
the ethic has a conservative impact on the class conscious-
ness of segments of society.
Acceptance of the goal of economic growth tends to
force an acceptaiice of conservative decision-making
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processes. Once the coi^itn.ent has been made to the
goal, the values of technical effeciency and rationality
provide the means by which the ends can be achieved.
But these values depoliticize the conflict.
"Politics
and rationality are considered antithetical to each other.
The developmental process is characterized by the replace-
n^ent of politics with technology ^8 Deference to expertise
becomes the order of the day. Consequently, worker in-
volvement in the carrying out of economic growth policies
is discouraged as counterproductive interference by
untrained layman; it signifies the threatened interjec-
tion of conflict in what is basically an issue of objec-
tive technique and scientific administration. However,
this view, if conceded by disadvantaged groups in society,
is not without an important impact on the possibilities
of class conflict and redistributive policies. The
engineering approach to the goal of economic growth is
inherently biased in favor of consensual strategies. As
Clark Kerr observes,
The experts help settle the inevitable
conflicts of interest on the basis
of facts and analysis, and also with
an eye to preservation of the existing
system, rather than on principle except
for a general attachment to the concept
of a reasonable and balai\ced society.
In this regard any structural criticism of the economy
which would spawn redistributive demands is rejected; such
14 0
an analysis is ideological and Utopian (not objective
and scientific) and thus dangerous
.n its potential i.pact,
The working class, not privy to the "knowledge" of the
experts and denied the conceptual tools to challenge
their biases and assumptions, defers its judgment. Once
again the vision of a mutually beneficial prosperity has
impaired the class consciousness of disadvantaged groups.
They have been led to believe that class considerations
are irrelevant to certain areas of decision-making. As
a result they have in effect disenfranchised themselves.
Teamwork, an important aspect of the ideology of
shared prosperity, is more a slogan than a statement of
interclass relations. The actual substance of this rela-
tion is predicated upon the ability of economic growbh
to provide mutual benefit. In the absence of common
interests, the ideological invocation of the teamwork
theme is a screen to cover actions beneficial to an elite
and harmful to most others. The following statement by
David Potter compares European and American perspectives
on the appropriate moans by which improvements in one's
standard of living can be achieved. With not surprising
bias he notes the effect of economic growth in shaping
the American proclivity toward class cooperation. Afflu-
ence and abundance has
given a characteristic tone to American
€Xjualitarianisin as distinguished from the
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ment of others; but TNmerica has conceived
without taking from others. Hence EuronP
b^tren'thf the relatlonsh?retwe he various levels of societywithout assuming a class struugle- but
rela^Ho 'h' ai?er' theseti ns ips without necessarily treat-ing one class as the victim or even in
othei"'"?,'^ r^"^' ^-^ntagonist of an-
imnll\-^T .f'^^^P^^^ "^^"^^ °ften assumes
fixed; that most of the potential wealth
^T.^ti''^ft^.^^^'^ converted into actualweal h; that this actual wealth is al-ready in the hands of owners; and, there-
ornnA I """^^ '''^'^ P^^^On org oup to secure more is to wrest it fromsome other person or group, leaving thatperson or group with less. TheAmerican mind, by contrast, of ten' assumesimplicitly that the volume of wealth isdynamic, that much potentia.l wealth still
remains to be converted; and that diversegroups— for instance, capital and labor-
can take more wealth out of the environmentby working together than they can take out
of one another by class warfare. ^0
We may object (I do, at least) to Potter's descriptive
accuracy— the comparison is not as clear-cut nor as non-
manipulative as the above quote implies. Yet, an important
point has been raised regarding the mechanism by which
mutually beneficial arrangements are reached. A standard
analogy is often made comparing the situation in which two
individuals fiercely battle over division of a fixed
economic pie with the situation in which conflict over the
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PXCS division <the
.ssue of relative shares, is subsumed
by cooperation in enlarging the pie (economic growth,,
thereby ensuring a larger absolute piece for each. This
conceptualization of the above distinction in Potter's
statement is the gist of most arguments favoring the
n^oderation of redistributive demands. The potentiality
Of Shared prosperity via economic growth makes class con-
flict counterproductive.
"A politics of compromise has
flourished in this atmosphere as one person's gain has
not been another's loss.-^l
^he next section I want
to examine this theme from the point of view of game
theory to see what light such a perspective can shed on
the stability of the stratification system and the lack
of redistributive politics.
gM!eJ2lgory_^s_j^monstration^^he Theory
of Shared Prosper ity
The dichotomy in perspectives which formed the
basis of Potter's quotation above is explained in game
theory as the difference between two types of game situa-
tions. In two-person, constant-sum (also called zero-sum)
games the sum of the payoffs going to both players is
always the same, and what is at stake is the shares or
proportions of the total each side will receive. Conflict
of interest is inevitable, cooperation is useless. An-
tagonism is built into the game. An example follows:
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Player li
a b
^ -I'+l +1,-1
Player I
B +1,-1
Each player chooses a strategy, player I a row and player
II a column, and the cell that is selected from the con-
junction of these strategies determines the rewards or
penalties for that round. The first number in the cell
represents the payoff for player I, the second for player
II. Obviously, in this game, indeed in all zero-sum games,
when one player progresses the other by definition
regresses. Potter's perception of European class politics
takes this form. Classical Marxian analysis also believed
that the interests of the classes (players) were diamet-
rically opposed.
Therein lies the problem for radical theorists.
They have been forced to admit that productivity increases
have allowed advances in real wages. Economic growth
has enabled capitalism to avoid the potentially explosive
antagonisms inherent in constant-sum games. The ability
of the system to legitimately promise gains for everyone
"is precisely the aspect of capitalist economics emphasized
by those who wish to direct attention away from the
8 2
'class struggle.'" The social and economic flexibility
possible in an expanding economy reflects a partial
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coincidence of class interests Th« ^i-cres . e two-person, positive-
sum (non-zero-sum) qame is thorc.Fr.v-j c IS erefore more appropriate as
a descriptive tool.
The positive-sum game can be structured to become
conducive to a search for collective strategies (behavior
preculuded by constant-sum games)
. Maximizing one's own
return often involves an awareness of the other player's
interests. Therefore, the strategies of bargaining,
negotiation and compromise, so prevalent in the political
system, are integral aspects of games of this variety,
making them useful lenses through which we may analyze
class interaction. The following example demonstrates
the point:
Player I
Player II
a b
A
-1,-1 +3,0
B 0,+3 +2, +2
Player I will prefer outcome A,b while Player II desires
B,a. If each aims for his most advantageous outcome,
the result. A, a, would leave both worse off. However,
the players can reach an agreem.ent to accept B,b, maximiz
ing their total pay-off and insuring a fair reward for
each. The process of reaching a satisfactory agreement
is abetted greatly if certain conditions are absent and
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others are present. Por instance, while pure cooperation
not a necessary goal for the par ticxpancs
, it is
undoubtedly true that intense feelrn, of envy and spite
are irrational and inappropriate attrtudes. Ga.e players
must somehow curb their rivalist mentality in order to
profit from the game's cooperati vist structure. Also,
assuming the ability to communicate wrth an opponent, the
possibility Of making binding agreements lessens problems
of distrust and greatly facilitates the recognition of
complementary interests and the search for accommodative
strategies. Sociologically speaking, tension is reduced
by the existence of both a community of interest and a
mutually beneficial outcome.
It is possible to solidify this relationship (and
to make the game more realistic in terms of the analogy
I am developing) by introducing a third perhaps hypothe-
tical player against whom the original players align in
order to maximize their total pay-off. if nature-the
physical environment in which the economic system oper-
ates-is viewed as the third party, then a coalition of
labor and management (or capital) vs. nature for the
purpose of increasing material growth as much as possible
would cloud still further the perception of distinctive
antagonistic economic interests. For theorists seeking
to explain the low level of class conflict in an environment
Of high economic growth, the accommodative strategies
associated with two-person, posrtxve-sum games offer a
touchstone from which an explanation can evolve.
Such an explanation must also take into account
the inaccuracies and omissions found in the theory of
shared prosperity, deficiencies whrch game theory is
quite adept at reflecting. What we need to understand is
the mechanisms of game play in a less idealized context.
Inequality, among other factors, ought to somehow be in-
corporated in the game in order to determine the extent
to which the theory of shared prosperity is merely a
justificatory ideology or an idea with descriptive merit.
What first must be examined is the game's schedule
of pay-offs. Those used in the previous example are not
indicative of the actual game-like situation between
labor and management. Look at the following as an illus-
tration of a rather different two-person, non-zero-sum
83game.
Player II
.
.
a b
A 1,2 3,1
Player I
B 0,-200 2,-300
The usual assumption behind most games is that the power
to follow a rationally chosen course of action eliminates
the factor of coercion. The above example, however.
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demonstrates that bargaining leverage and. therefore
power considerations, are a function of pay-off possiMli-
ties. While Player II would prefer outcome A,a, the
threat of Player I selecting strategy B forces II to
comply With his opponent's demand that be agreed uoon
The potential of such a threat will lead to an exploitive
rather than a fair division of the spoils; feelings of
injustice and resentment could potentially arise as if a
zero-sum game were being played.
In terms of real-life examples of similar types of
interaction, labor's demand for a fairer distribution of
the total product may lead management to institute counter
strategies (factory lockouts, strike breakers, capital
investment directed to other regions or nations) wluch
harm the workers much more than management. Redistribu-
tive demands handled in this manner deteriorate the
union's position, encouraging labor strategies in keeping
with consensus politics and economic inequality. m point
of fact, the labor movement has gained in strength as it
started to gain respectability and "play the game." The
best possible labor strategy, the path of compromise and
bargaining within the context of economic inequality, still
may not be a pleasant option. Yet. the institutionaliza-
tion of conflict, often singled out as an indication of
consensus politics, might best be interpreted as the
14 8
bearudaing acceptance labor of the ..^rn^ skewed
^^^^ Piy_-^f PossibiUties. ror other „,ore disad-
vantaged segments of the economy, businesses bargaining
leverage is even greater and thus the relative rewards are
even .ore i.nbalanced. At this pornt the psychological
distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum games is
highly blurred. The basic form of a positive-sum game
can in this way hide elements of coercion and exploitation,
belying the oft-stated accommodative nature of the game.
The concept of bargaining leverage is critical in
understanding how the rewards of the game and of prosper-
ity (economic growth) are shared. This factor is not
simply a reflection of pay-off possibilities; other elements
of the game situation enter the picture. Witness this
example.
Player II
a b
.
A
-2,-2 4,1
Player I
B 1,4 3,3
If each player aims for his most advantageous personal
outcome, they both will end up with the worst collective
result (A, a). The anticipated compromise solution (B,b)
.seems to be the most rational and fair choice if communica-
tion and negotiation are normal procedures of the game.
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However, imagine that Player I is nni^o ki1 IS qu te able to afford
pay-offs Of
-2 While Player II is equally unable to
tolerate that outcome for any extended period of ti.e m
economio terms. Player I is wealthy while his opponent is
poor. This set of circumstances (discussed under 'utility
theory, in the parlance of game theorists, allows Player
I to continually choose strategy A, forcing II to play
strategy b or face the "financial" consequences. In
Short, the context of inequality allows the economic elite
to maintain its strategy, even at a temporary loss, in
order to force the working class to comply with a less
desired outcome. The issue at hand is not so much the
maximization of one's rewards as it is the long-run
conflict over power, dominance and submission.
Other elements of the economic game help clarify
the actual role that differential power plays in deter-
mining the "sharing" in our shared prosperity. The vast
interdependence of the economy has effectively removed
games with nature (i.e., farming, fishing, extraction
industries) as viable personal options. For all intents
and purposes you must play within the economic system for,
as the saying goes, "it's the only game in town." Once
you have decided to play, the possibility of side payments
represents a means by which seemingly redistributive
results can be transformed into nonredistributive ones.
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unions Who conclude favorable „a,e agreements with manage-
ment rarely protest the corporation's raising of prices.
Finally, games rn which one player does not know the actual
pay-offs give major advantages to the other player.
A union may hesitate about being too militant in its
demands upon being told that the company will fold (or cut
back on personnel) if those demands are not moderate.
Business, knowing the true size of the economic pie, can
underestimate its ability to pay, thereby giving the
appearance that some union goals are unattainable. The
power of information is one of a number of factors putting
^
into question the inherent justice of the positive-sum
game
.
How, then, can the theory of shared prosperity main-
tain its validity? The reason is that these games and
their real-life counterparts do represent means by which
opposing groups in society seek to benefit from economic
growth, if not in equivalent amounts, then in proportion
to their relative leverage in the game situation. Once
the rules and context have been formulated, play proceeds
according to plan; the outlines of the game fairly well
determine the long-run behavior of the players. Yet, the
style of play (accommodative) is as much a tribute to the
perception of the game as it is to the game's true nature.
If the structure of rewards becomes skewed even further
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toward economic elites, if the gains from playing the
game do not compensate for the felt injustice that may
be brewing below the surface, then non-accommodative
behavior will become the norm rather than the exception.
The game will approach the zero-sum ideal type xn terms of
the psychological attitudes it engenders. What prevents
this escalation of antagonism is the fact that economic
growth has provided a large enough pay-off among deprived
groups to justify continuing to play the game.
It is important to realize that the rewards, in
game theory and in real-life, are individualistic and
quantitative. Our consumerist cultural biases allow the
game analogy—and the processes of economic growth-to
function as I have described. Giddens makes the same
point in summarizing this section:
union-management clashes involving
[issues of economic distribution] arem principle reconcilable in a way in
which those over control fof the work-
place] are not. For v/hilc at any given
point in time there is only a fixed
amount on the income 'cake' to be divided
between wages and profits, over an ex-
tended period the size of the 'cake' can
be increased, and hence wage increases
can be exchanged against productivity
agreements, etc. In the long-term, such
a process can only operate ... if
there is a continuous rise in real in-
comes; but this is exactly what has been
achieved by the capitalist economies in
the 20th century. 84
Economic growth evokes a spirit of shared prosperity and
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promotes a set of procedures which institutionali.e
conflict within the bounds of current distributive
arrangements.
Conclusion
Most people recognize the central role economic
growth plays in molding our spirit as a nation and our
outlook on its future. "Every optimist speaking about the
future of American society, heralding its potential if not
its actual accomplishments, assumes some version of national
P£ogress."85 merchandising of hope, as with most
products on sale today, is directed toward filling basic
structural needs along with personal desires. A 1975 New
York_^imes survey sought to measure "confidence, expecta-
tions and aspirations" during a major economic downturn.
The results revealed that the lessening of previously high
levels of optimism had a marked impact on the acceptance
of traditional ideological supports for the economic
structure
.
The survey
. . . showed that a growing
segment of the public had doubts about
the doctrines it grew up with--that
things will get better, and that, if
they v/ork hard, they will get the things
in life they want: new home, a betterjob or other things deemed necessary
for a completely fulfilled life. 86
The maintenance of belief in these and similar system-
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supportive
"doctrines" rec^hc r.r. mx c sts on the continuation of
economic qrov/th Thic n c- 4-i
^
wrn. s IS the pivotal feature in our
nation's make-up.
But is all this history? it may be argued that
we can no longer take for granted our ability to sustain
the growth rates consensus politics requires for stability.
This self-doubt reflects an expanding sentiment in the
society, but it is still a m.inority position. A report
published by the Committee for Economic Development
succinctly summarizes the dominant attitude among those
endeavoring to perpetuate current arrangements:
"Factors
which promote growth should be encouraged. Policies
and activities that can be identified as retarding growth
should be opposed. "^^ The tone of security that we sense
behind this statement harkens back to an earlier era in
American political, economic and social life. Hew research
along with domestic and international developments have
undermined that security for many Americans. Now as
never before, a cloud hangs over the economic future of
the United States. While confident spokesmen may propound
the inevitability of permanent prosperity, an increasing
number of social and physical scientists, interest groups,
critics, and economic and political leaders, equally
secure in their evidence, envision a different fate for
our nation: "Ahead lies the . . . formidable problem of
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a world in which growth
.ay encounter ecological bar-
rxers on a worldwide scale, bringing the need for new
political and economic arrangements for which we have no
precedent. "^^
The conflict is thus joined. The issue then bccc.es
Which side has the weight of evidence. But that analyses
oversimplifies the matter. m a debate so crucial to
the social and political future of the United states we
Should be made aware that a mere weighing of evidence is
insufficient. The risks are too great, the consequences
too immense, for us to ignore the possible in a quest for
the probable. The following two chapters will examine the
limits-to-growth controversy. Their aim win be to see if
there is enough merit in the no-growth or slow-growth
predictions to warrant an examination of the potential
impact such a plausible development might have on the
future of our political system. To err on the side of
optimism (continued growth) rather than caution threatens
to do a disservice to future generations who would have
'
welcomed our thoughtful handling of their world.
CHAPTER IV
THE LIMITS TO CROWTH DEBATE: THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
introduction
Limits to growth-the concept is as current as
'
todays headlines but has a tradition of relevance that
goes back to the droughts, floods, epidemics and wars of
primitive societies. The notion of limits to growth has
flourished and faded in every era. Ours is no excep-
tion. The image has been reformulated and updated by
numerous writers, the most widely quoted of which are
the authors of Th^_LinutsJ^^^^ They state their
position succinctly: "if the present growth trends in
world population, industrialization, pollution, food
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged,
the limits to growth on this planet will be reached some-
time within the next one hundred years. This conclusion
seemingly sanctified by computer print-outs, is not with-
out its detractors. The cry of "wolf!" has been heard
many times before. Yet, this flippant and oft-stated
retort to the limits to growth position does not confront
the issue on its merits and, therefore, does not effective
ly dispel the modern-day Malthusians. After all, in the
fairy tale the wolf did eventually arrive. So the
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intellectual confrontation n,u3t take pU.ce anew in each
era to see whether thrs ti„,e, unUke the past, the warn-
ings and fears are justified.
Chapters iv and V review the various aspects of
the limits to growth debate. After sketching the outlines
of the controversy, this chapter explores the evidence
regarding the two
.ost frequently cited threats to future
industrial expansion. These are the li.its to our supply
of necessary raw materials, especially energy resources,
and limits to our (and the environment's) tolerance of
industrial effluents. in effect tvemi<=ci.j.fc;i.r, Li nds v/ith respect to
some of the phy,sicai xnputs (natu.ral resources) and
physical outputs (pollution) of our economic engine are
causes of concern. Chapter V focuses on other major
elements of the limits position which bears examrnatxon.
Developments in the human environment take the form of an
evolving complex of economic, social-psychological and
political-managerial problems that also may have a nega-
tive impact on long-term growth rates. Thus, in five
specific areas the battle has been ioined.
My organization of the material into five distinct
areas of study should not obscure the inter relatedness
of the topics addressed. A full analysis can be achieved
only by examining each aspect of the debate in its rela-
tionship to the others and by appraising their collective
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influence on economic growth. Dennis Pirages alludes to
the connections among these separate concerns:
-Political
conflict is conditioned by both physical and social
environments. The physical environment
. . . places
constraints on economrc and, indirectly, political possi-
bilities.
. . .
Physical environmental conditions establish
parameters within which social developments take place.
The physical context structures our social development by
biasing our options and eliminating certain alternatives.
In a similar manner, the human environment-economic,
political and social decisions and behavior-will influ-
ence developments in the physical environment. Funding
of energy technologies is a case in point. In short, the
fate of our nation's economy cannot be adequately dis-
cerned without systematically integrating the diverse
elements of the debate. The conclusion of Chapter V will
take up that task.
The Outlines of the Controversy
Extremist Rhetoric
First we must define the primary elements of the
controversy. But this is a difficult task given the ever-
changing nature of the subject matter. The issues get
recast with each book, each teach-in, each television
special. The strategies employed by the debaters further
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Cloud the top.c. While scientific vindication beco.es
the stated objective of the combatants, in reality
.any
proponents and opponents of the limits to growth thesis
stereotype their oppositron, present stacked alternatives,
and then portray their own position in terms of cliches
and aphorisms. Doomsday paranoia battles growthnv-..ia,
blind faith balances out blind fear, leaving the public
both anxious and unenlightened. There is some inner
need on the part of those scholars most involved in the
controversy to establish or refute every point of the
thesis and to do this with a degree of self-assuredness
not in keeping with the evidence or the topic. The appeal
to pessimism based upon the by-now shop-worn phrase of
environmental protectionists, "if current trends
continue," is as subject to doubt as is the professional
optimist's claims of inevitable salvation through tech-
nology. Few seriously feel that this nation can and
should blithely ignore current environmental, social and
economic crises; "full speed ahead" is the slogan of the
lemming. Yet, on the other side, zero economic growth
(ZEG) is an equally narrow slogan, equally without vision
or realism. The preliminary goal of clarifying the issues
is thus obstructed by the extremism and overkill of the
debaters' rhetoric.
And yet, there is method in the madness of this
style of confrontation. Extremism provides some tactical
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advantages in spite of its factual inaccuracies. Environ
mentalists are wary of the low social and political
impact Of less strident or sensationalistic presentations
The supporters of increased economic growth receive the
public's attention every single day. Politicians, cor-
porations, advertising firms and our public ideology con-
tinually extol the material success of our economy. The
costs of such growth are rarely mentioned or are grossly
underestimated while the more tangible benefits invari-
ably get more than their share of publicity. In this
context, extremist rhetoric can instill the social aware-
ness and create the political clout needed in the battle
for a moderate but effective policy response from govern-
ment. This has been a common approach in the formation
of other political movements.
There are, however, disadvantages to this style of
political confrontation which may outweigh its tactical
benefits. It stifles rational deliberation, offering
policy makers no guide to the subtlety and complexity of
the issues. Doomsday predictions of the future are coun-
terproductive in other respects, too. They tend to
overwhelm many listeners, undermining people's ability and
determination to deal with specific and curable problems.
Excessively gloomy forecasts also deflect our attention
toward long-term obstacles and away from more immediate
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opportunities. Environmentalists de-..phasize the poten-
tial positive impact of sub^ectxve factors such as human
ingenuity, cooperation, social and psychological flexi-
bility, thereby foreclosing possibilities for improvement.
On the other hand, their opponents tend to take the
adequacy and benificence of these variables for granted.
Finally, ecological hyperbole plants the seeds of dis-
illusionment if "bad science" by some analysts weakens
public faith in the many valid and well-substantiated
points of the general hypothesis.
The common justification [of thedoomsday rhetoric] is to say that itIS necessary to exaggerate to get oeople
stirred, to get things done. But people
are easily anesthetized by repetitions
and there is a danger that, in spit^^ ofIts achievements so far, the environmen-tal movement could still find itselffalling flat on its face when it is
most needed, simply because it has pitch-
ed its tale too strongly,
3
Thus, even in terms of its political utility, extremist
rhetoric is suspect. We have to go beyond the popularly
-
held half-truths, to cut past the rhetoric, and approach
the central issues in the limits to growth debate.
Crisis Perceptions and the Need for a "Futures" Awareness
One way to grapple with the issues presented in the
controversy is to explore the conception of "crisis."
Although the word "crisis" is much abused, in this context
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it is far from meaningless. The perception of a crisis
situation in the human environment
„U„ht be well-founded
on evidence, but at heart i i- i
»
t is a subjective evaluation,
very much dependent on one's time perspective. Most
people cannot think very much beyond the problems in^e-
cliately facing them. Their identification with generations,
to-come is weak. There is, therefore, a limit to the
degree of •'anticipatory decision-making" they can be
expected to make. Crises telescope our time framework by
bringing the risks and options of the future closer to
the present. Crises shock us out of the parochialism of
routine existence.
In noncrisis circumstances we have a highly short-
term perception of the future, demonstrated by our under-
standing of growth, sacrifice and investment. In general
terms economic growth involves sacrificing present
consumption by diverting resources toward investment in
order to increase future consumption. Thus investment in
new power plants, automobile assembly factories, roads,
and the like are expenditures for growth. Yet, benefits
from such sacrifices are not long in coming; our invest-
ments promise relatively quick dividends, and these
dividends usually imply an advance in living standards,
not merely the maintenance of current life styles. A
radically different view of growth requires a longer time
162
•now
perspective. PoUow.ng this new U„e of reasoning
„e
would continue to sacrifice present consumption-
defined in ter,„s of decades or even c,e„erations-by
y-l^^ in the Ereservatron of ou_r enistina stoo. o_f
£--i£ces in order to guarantee
..ini.al levels of future
consumption. Yet, since „e consistently discount the
long-run future, we are unable to pursue the type of
sacrifice that is inherent in such a conservationaUst
understanding of investment. The crux of this difference
is differences not in time perceptions but rather in
perceptions of a crisis regarding future levels of consump.
tion. Examrning the historical record, most observers
can anticipate that future generations will be materially
better off than „e currently are; thus, long-range sacri-
fice involves an inegalitarian redistribution of wealth
(and well-being) from the poorer present to the richer
future. Yet, intergenerational redistribution of wealth
can be justified as egalitarian if we envision a drastical-
ly reduced living standard for the citizens of the 21st
century. As I have implied, the objective of our invest-
ments may be not only to increase future consumption
levels but also to insure that future economic decline can be
averted. This is what the time framework is all about—the
plausibility of the limits-to-growth argument and the
realization of the crises which surround that argument.
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Progrowth advocates see lif^i^t-fc^fa ttle unique in our
present predicament. The calls for intergenerationa
1
redistribution as discussed above
.est on very uncertain
grounds and, given past trends, the likelihood is that
the future will be better, not worse, than the present.
What environmentalists see as i.m.ediate threats to soci-
ety, growth advocates perceive as vague and very distant
constraints on permanent industrial expansion. It would
be foolish to turn our car to the left now because a
passenger suspects that there might be a bend in the road
three miles hence. Yet, we can use the same analogy to
make the opposite point. It would be wise to slow down
'
now in response to our rider's warnings, especially given
(1) the high and increasing speed of the vehicle (rate
of growth and pace of change), (2) doubts regarding our
ability to handle any necessary shift in direction
(complexity, interdependence, limited knowledge), (3) the
wobbliness of the car as it currently moves (environmental,
social, economic and international problems), and (4) the
high risks associated with a lack of caution (disaster).
It is still possible for people to recognize a crisis
even though there is little immediate and personal contact
with the crisis events. We need not wait to see the mush-
room clouds before we comprehend the dangers of nuclear
warfare.
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a
A "futures" awareness and the realization of a
crisis situation will orf-m- t,k^ccur when people seriously perceive
a connection between the short-run concern over the
.uality
Of their l.ves a„a the lon,-ran,e un.erest rn the survi-
val of their society and species.^ We are involved 1,
a series of events any one of which can be vrewed as
crisis-point for any nu.ber of individuals. without at
least some elements of a crisrs mentality, we would not
be disposed toward the positive actions which crises
encourage. m such a case, we would be heading further and
faster down the road, fearing t.he hypothetical turn
instead of watching and perhaps preparing for it.
Narrowing the_Jdea_o£j^lniUsj^^
The preceding examination of crisis perceptions has
served to clarify some of the issues arising out of the
limits debate. Further understanding can be achieved
by interpreting the crisis of growth as a matter of
definition. This interpretation is not self-evident at
first glance. Certain limits-to-growth spokesmen are
quick to condemn growth as such. Garrett Hardin's formula
brings things down to basics: Population X Prosperity =
Pollution. Others have refused to label our ecological
problems as an avoidable by-product of the growth process;
rather, the assumption is that increased growth will
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invariably worsen the pUys.oal ana social environment
Many have accurately countered this stance by noting
that zero economic growth (ZEG, or the so-called station-
ary state is no solution because it does not assure us
Of ecological balance, the real goal of growth's critics.
The general attack upon growth per se is part of the
extremist rhetoric and strategic maneuvering that were
discussed previously.
The posturing of pro- and anti-growth forces hides
the real question we must face, a question which is at
the same time more complex and more personal than we may
have anticipated. Does OUR current mode of growth maxi-
mize the potential of our economy, our society and our
environment, or are we in fact systematically minimizing
that potential now and for the future? The limits-to-growth
debate should be viewed as a search for the answer to that
question, as the following quote makes clear:
The cutting edge of the environmental
movement today is
. . .a demand for
change. People are opposing what we have
called "growth" and "development" becausethat IS the only way for them to expresstheir concern at this stage. It is aholding action, yes; but in reality it is
a demand for new goals and new directions.^
Directions and goals are at stake, not, as some might imply,
the existence of the economic, productive side of life:
"the issue of growth vs. no-growth is a sterile debate
166
that distracts attention from the more important-luuj (_ ortant concerns
of 'what kind of growth?'"^'
The focus of tho controversy, the object of so
much ridicule and do£pn=;o ; „"a <ictense, is economic growth as defined
and sought in the United States. Being the „K,st prosper-
ous nation on tho earth, we exemplify both the promises
and fears of growth. in i-m^-h ^J Tin m trut , our reputation does not
fully accord with the facts, at least as to recent his-
tory, other nations, notably
.apan ar>d the Soviet Union,
come closer to the paradigm case than we do. m many
respects they are more willing than the United States
to sacrifice their mineral, ecological, and human
resources in order to promote industrial development. •
However, our reputation is deserved enough. When critics
decry growth they are nob denying the desirability of
growth in social amenities (e.g., feeling of community,
social justice, excellent health care); they are not
ignoring the broad range of economic arrangements which
allow for material prosperity at various levels of environ-
mental impact. Limits-to-growth proponents see the
American model as synonymous with the dominant productive
mode of industrial society. It is growth in this sense,
in perhaps the only sense we have come to understand,
that requires limitations. Likewise, defenders of growth
are implicitly using that same model, or else they would
be demanding the institutional and ideological
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transforations long advocated by the other side. Crowth
has proceeded in this country as a result of a co.b.na-
tron of factors and forces which for all intents and
purposes prevent any major reversals of form. So it is
quite realistrc to initially define growth in terms of
the American example, knowing that alternative definitions
do exist but that their present economic, political,
social, and ideological viability is highly questionable.
Within the confines of our political economy, the separ-
ate ideas of limit_s to growth and a radically dif_ferent
dMil^ition Of growth are equivalent. Economic growth as
exemplified by United States industrial expansion will
be the focus of study for ttese chapters, the lens through
which we can evaluate the many facets of the limits-to-
growth hypothesis."'"^
Central Themes of Cliapters IV and V
Three major factors weave through the following
analysis. Together they constitute the primary themes
of the controversy. The first stresses the impact of
technology on the strength and direction of economic
growth. Besides examining the promised potential of
technology, broadly defines to include economic and
political-managerial skills
, I discuss limitations on
its successful application, including the conceptual
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biases-the tech„o,.„gical
.3 oppo«c., to the ecological
Porspective-which reduce the full utLM.ation of tech-
nology in ..olvin, the Uilem.as su,:.„„,ku,k, cjrowth.
The second overarchi,,, element, the EolU_ical variable,
also has been broadly defined. It encompasses the atti-
tudes and activities of a multitude of .roups, institutions,
individuals, and nations in the exercise of political,
economic, or social power. Poliiir-- 11 "i-x . i i.itj.cs can bo viewed as botli
a resource and an obstacle. Thus, we can note the pos_si-
ble contribut.i.on of public policy toward maintaining
current growth rates, and also the p robable impact it may
have given the constraints of ideology, institutional
procedures, power relationships, and the various circum-
stances surrounding the policy-making process. The final
theme, the role of time, provides the drama to this issue.
If we afford ourselves the luxury of endless deliberation,
we will have discovered that events have overtaken us.
The quickening pace of change--geome trie or exponential
growth—allows us little opportunity to pause. Time for-
ever threatens to turn problems into crises, to transform
remediable harm and danger into i rreversib.1 e damage and
disaster. It therefore creates extreme pressure on our
technological, politicaJ. and psychological capacity to
cope with new and ha^^ardous circumstances. Tlic working
out of these three themes in our society will help create
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the context for Dolif-lo-,ip litical change. The direction we take
as a nation in confrontinq the thr^^fc. ,T:n eats to growth will by
and large be the consequence of th^4 c c r e intermeshmg of these
elements
.
Natural Resources
The most easily conceptualized element of the
limits to growth argument is the depletion of natural
resources, especially those resources involved in energy
production. The 1970's have made us aware of the increas-
ing use (and waste) of nonrenewable raw materials. Even
hard-nosed progrowth economists admit that there inevitably
are limits to resources in our finite world. Yet, that
truism skirts the important questions of what those limits
are at a given time with a given technology and within a
given political context. The issue is basic, for natural
resources are the food our economy needs to sustain our
life style. This is no more true than in our appetite for
energy. The signs of our affluence, the consumerist
dreams of our future, are somehow plugged into our energy-
intensive econom.y—clothes dryers, color televisions, second
and third cars, and the single-family dwelling.
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An nbundance of energy has bornmo
synonymous with a hi^^ sUltrTlf
inaced, a correlation between thegross national product and total u Senergy consumption is often ci^ed as'
arpenSr'on"' econon,if g^^^th
energy?7 ^'^^'^'^'^ supplies of
The correlation has remained strong because, until recent-
ly, energy costs have risen more slowly than labor costs,
thereby encouraging technological developments which
substitute „,achines for workers. However, in gearing our
economic growth to energy production and resource consump-
tion, we have become more vulnerable as a nation to one
of the physical constraints of our environment, the finite
supply of raw materials.
Recent events underscore our vulnerability. Cut-
backs, dislocations and general hardship followed the
1973 Arab oi] boycott. The absence of self-sufficiency
in this vital area of our economy had a debilitating
social impact on our national confidence as well as marked
the start of a seemingly long-term drag on growth. Higher
prices for the necessary imports of oil and natural gas
and the resulting huge trade deficits reconfirmed what one
observer had pointed out a year before the boycott: "The
Energy 'Joyride' Is Over."^ Additional verification was
provided by the harsh winter of 1977. Natural gas cutbacks
and massive worker layoffs revealed that imbalances in our
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distribution system can ] ead ^-u^l to the same harmful conse-
quences as actual resource shortages. Our energy economy
operates without a large energy cushion, and thus we are
quite unable to deal with temporary unexpected events.
Our dependence on foreign suppliers for natural
gas and low-sulphur oil (the most environmentally sound
fossil fuels) as well as for many other crucial raw materi-
als is a primary source of such unexpected events.
Economic growth requires security of supplies and of prices.
However, the vagaries of international relations, potential
cartelization and price increases on specific resources,
and the political weakness or unfriendliness of the govern-
ments of raw material supplying nations work against
needed economic stability. Such artificially-induced
shortages can also be attributed to the market power of
multinational corporations over the availability of raw
materials, especially fuel. In either case we will suffer
from the uncertainties of resource supplies. Assuming the
adequacy of global reserves, we still must address ourselves
to the separate issue of domestic sufficiency.
Technological and Economic Responses
The general fears of resource depletion discussed
above have not dampened the optimism of many analysts.
Scientists of assorted disciplines, but most notably
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economists,
.eadily see solutions wh.ch would avert and
postpone, until the indefinite future, li.its to growth
based upon thrs problem. indeed, the mechanisms to
initiate these solutions are for the most n.r-^ .un part automatic.
They are (l) the desires for tn-nf-i^ ,i • i-t-o r pi o It which inevitably encour-
age certain economic actions
-^nria d discourage others, and
(2) the cues supplied by the price system which change the
direction of profit-seeking activity. Scarcity in the
face of increasing demand can best be handled by raising
the cost of the item, thereby distributing it to those
who desire it sufficiently to pay the higher price. More
importantly, other actions are then promoted which would
help alleviate the problem further.
In the real world, rising prices act as
an economic signal to conserve scarce
resources, providing incentives to use
cheaper m.aterials in their place, stimu-lating research efforts on new ways to
save on resource inputs and making renew-
ed exploration attempts more profitable.
^
Thus, the flow chart of economic adaptation to resource
scarcity is quite simple. Price increases prompt develop-
ment of technological mechanisms to reduce costs. Techno-
logical feasibility plus economic profitability of new
scarcity-avoiding processes will result in either increased
supply or reduced demand for the resource. Inevitable
technological advance, private market incentives, and the
allocative function of the price system insure that the
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impact of resource scarcity wd 1 1 ho +-^J- -y iii be temporary adjustment
and long-term sufficxency. The followrng optxmrstic
projection is the consequence of the above analysis:
come Tn"'-^^^''^
^''^^ '-''^ millennia towe can continue to develop themineral supplies needed to maintaina high standard of living for thosewho now en,oy it and to raise it ?orthe impoverished peoples of our coun-try and world.
... Our experiencejustifies the belief that these pro-
dL'.en^^/"' ^^^"^^^^ expansionrhav^imensions beyond our knowledge andeven beyond our imagination aranvgiven time. 10 ^
Yet, in light of the well-publicized concern expressed by
i^any over the threat of resource depletion, such an opti-
mistic forecast and the economic analysis which supports
it ought to be seriously examined. Specifically, what is
the effectiveness of the scarcity-alleviating activities
which are encouraged by higher resource costs?
Conservation is the most immediate response to
higher prices. it implies not only doing with less of
the metal, fuel, etc., but also making less do the work of
more. We are all too familiar with the calls for energy
conservation directed towards consumers: home thermostats
set at 60-65°, gas-efficient automobiles, turning off
unnecessary lights. Industrial conservation efforts are
equally important. The usable-energy-to-waste-heat ratio
of most electric generating pov^er plants is 40:60. For
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the average auto.nobilo the ratio is 10:90. such ineffi-
ciencies are indicative of the waste existing in our
economy and the opportunity for effective conservatron
efforts. Stretching the usefulness of natural resources
is common practjcp Tooo +. ^P Li c. Less tm is needed in the tin plat.ing
process; equal levels of structural support are achieved
with less steeK There probably
...s enough flexibility in
living patterns and productive processes to reap sizable
cutbacks in the use of scarce raw materials without signifi-
cant reductions in living standards.
There is some doubt regarding the extent to which
short-term, voluntary and individual conservation steps,
taken in response to the continual pressure of high energy
prices, can lead to more basic changes in living patterns
and consumer demands. Can there be a transformation to
an environmentally sound life style without recourse to
collective-that is, political-actions? According to a
recent study, Sweden uses 60 per cent less energy than the
United States in producing one dollar's worth of GNP.
Standards of living are comparable, but conscientious use
of public policy (subsidies, taxes) has brought about a
different, more energy-efficient mixture of goods and
services in Sweden. Americans have more appliances, cars
and television sets, and eat more red meat— all indices of
a very energy-i ntensj vo economy. Swedes, on the other hand.
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:ion
,
have
.ore second ho.es, better public transportat
health and education systems, and
.ore efficrent energy
otilrzation rates for productive processes and consumer
durables (e.g., resource extraction and refinement pro-
cesses, the paper industry, electric power generators,
gas mileage of cars, ho.e insulatron). The authors of
the study confirm the point made rn the preceding para-
graph: "The most important variable affecting energy use
'
and energy efficiency is the relative price of energy •
with respect to other resources ."
However, the study also emphasized "the institution-
al and social factors" which direct the economic and
technological response to higher energy costs. Higher
prices alone will lead to individual conservation (or, xf
you will, increases in individual energy efficiency), but
only collective action can promote the life style changes
and conservation-conscious culture which would maintain
living standards in the face of increased resource scar-
city. In order to encourage the most economical use of
energy in the society as a whole, we must recognize the
political along with the technological elements of conser-
vation. But our economy and our ideology are geared to
high levels of resource consumption. Imparting a conser-
vationist mentality onto our "cowboy economy" will be deeply
resisted as President Jimmy Carter has discovered. The
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conservationalist aspects of his energy proposals have
received the roughest treatment. Thus, we are limited in
the technological adjustments to scarcity which we can
expect given the sociril -.nricia a d economic constraints on politi-
cal change.
conservation is only one of three types of activities
encouraged by higher resource prices. Another is the quest
for additional sources of the scarce material. This takes
three forms-exploiting known but previously uneconomical
ore deposits, searching for new reserves, and recycling
the resource by reprocessing it from various waste products.
Economists make much of the effect of price increases on
the application and effectiveness of each of these approaches
Low grade ore would be an economically viable reserve if
a price rise covered increased extraction and processing
costs. Likewise, even though more sophisticated equipment
is being used to search for new ore deposits, with propor-
tionately less success (more exploratory wells drilled for
each productive find), demand and price trends still make
these efforts fruitful. Research has been directed toward
better discovery methods, improved mining and metallurgical
processes and, in general, increased cost-effectiveness
of resource production. flis tor ical ly in our country
resource depletion has not been an inhibition on economic
growth. "Techniques for exploration for and extraction of
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.etals see. to have Kept ahead of scarcity.
'^^^he promises
Of future advances cannot easily be discounted given the
degree of past successes. Yet, however
.uch the economists
and technicians underscore their achievements, it would
do well to restate a .a,or truism of the limits-to-growth
thesis: mile price increases and new technology can
transform unavailable (offshore oil) and unprofitable
(low yield deposits) mineral concentrations into useful
reserves, they cannot increase the deposits themselves.
TO those interested more in maintaining the world's
stock of resources rather than in promoting a growth flow
of goods and services, the natural response to resource
depletion would be recycling. The fact is that, excepting
for fossil fuels which are burnt, most raw materials are
not used up or destroyed. Rather, they are transformed
into a new form and transported to a new place. The
economics of recycling concerns the effort we wish to
expend to reconcentra te the resource. Many industrial users
of raw materials are attracted by the savings recycling
offers. An especially significant incentive is the increase
in profit to be achieved by reducing energy costs; it
takes 40 times more energy to process one pound of aluminum
from buried ore than from recycled material. Again,
economic feasibility is the necessary signal for an expan-
sion of the recycling industry. Tlie usefulness of the
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-rap iron ana steel ,atheri„,
...t .„ the nation's ,un.
yards is another case in point. Xn the event of scareUy-
rnduoed price increases of foreign and domestic ores
recycling offers a readily available alternative supply
Of needed iron and steel. The eKa.ple of viewing junk "
yards as potential reserves of raw materials highUghts
an ironic element of the n^7o•r:3^^Ln overall environmental problem.
Pollution can sometimes be defined as "a resource out of
place. For instance, commercial and residential wastes
can be reprocessed to help generate electricity, produce
synthetic gas, provide fertilizer for agriculture, and/or
become a source of metals, glass, paper pulp, etc. As
refuse and sewage treatment costs rise and the prices
paid for these alternative uses increase this form of
recycling will become more cormnon. Yet, despite these
examples, recycling has severe limitations on its ability
to solve the scarcity problem. Its utility varies from
resource to resource, and it cannot deal with increasing
demand except in a secondary way. Most importantly, it
does not d_irectly address itself to our most pressing con-
cern—energy supply.
The third means of avoiding resource scarcity is
through the substitution of a more plentiful material for
a less abundant and therefore more expensive one. Substi-
tution technology does not merely buy time; it seeks to
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solve, for t.e
..o.U-te..
,utur.
,east, t.e p.o.Xe„
Of depletion ana risin,
.00.0.,.,, Justifiably
critxcal resource and tl>e wheels of industry will there-
upon grind to a lialt:
materials do not 'run out' for all
out for ^^'-y
'^-
maLfn^i "marginal use, and the
^or^wh^ih'^'^ precisely the one
can bp ?o
'\^^tisfactory substitutee f und as the cosb of the or-iginal material goes up. 14
Plentiful aluminum can replace copper wxring as copper
becomes too costly. still further down the technologxcal
road, even more available silicates (refined from common
sand) are being tested for use in electronic circuitry.
The preservation of a given resource stock for xts own
sake-that is, above and beyond the incentives for hoarding
provided by the price system-may be more wasteful than
rational in light of this technological response to scar-
city. The growth of the petrochemical industry is in
large part the consequence of the growing substitution of
oil-based synthetics (fabrics, plastics, etc.) for goods
based on metals or animal and plant products. Other such
developments can reasonably be expected to continue. We
should not quickly dismiss these anticipated fruits of
technology, for to do so ignores historical precedent and
overlooks our most precious and unlimited raw material—
liuman ingenuity.
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Resources don't exi q+- nm-ni
then.
. . .
What':.rca 'rf 41ou"cl"'
learns Lo extract and to use
usTno^t^"'-''
needlessly aboit'
robCina ?hr?^°' °" '^<^-=°">-ces andb g the future. i think that ifthe future is not capable of inveniinqthen the human Odyssey is over. 15 ^'
This observation, from a committed environmentalist, is
meant to minmuze expectations of social and economic
collapse sterling from this concern. it is not intended,
however, to deny any and all economic consequences of
resource depletion.
The Specia l__Case of Enercfv
A special case-indeed the most important case-of
substitution technology has to do with energy. with
enough of it we can mine the seas, desalinate water, purify
our effluents-cheaply and painlessly. But without enough
energy, we face an enormous problem of economic and psycho-
logical restructuring. Energy is the lynchpin of our
life style. The insecurity of relying on foreign supplies
forces the United States to look inward, to find domestic
sources of fossil fuel. if, as projected, world oil
production will peak around the year 2000, we will be under
intense pressure to develop alternatives as quickly as
possible. Indeed, increases in oil and natural gas prices
are even now having a disproportionate influence on a
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host Of .elatea industrxes-the so-caUed ripple effect,
in our energy-oriented economy the prices of so many
goods and services are tied to the cost of this basic
commodity. Obviously, our present as well as future
economic well-heina r-oi-i^r.L mg elies on a resolution to this most
central of problems.
The factor of time places our efforts in sharp
relief. Because of a fast doubling time in energy use
(e.g., electricity demand doubles every seven years), time
delays in formulating and implementing responses threaten
to make our technologies obsolete as soon as they are
initiated. We need to buy time via conservation, new
sources and more efficient conversion ratios until we can
develop the energy resources of the future-fusion and
solar power (in its many forms). However confident one
may be about our technological ability to develop these
alternatives (and I personally am quite confident)
, few
claim that either energy source can become a major con-
tributing factor for at least 50 to 100 years. Thus, the
possibility of a generation or two of great sacrifice is
very real. We all must recognize that the hardships of
the short-term future (the next 50 to 100 years) might be
severe enough to bring on a permanent political reaction
to what is perhaps only a temporary physical condition.
The issues then become (1) the technological and political
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prospects of domestic substitutes fo. foreign oil and
.as, and
,2) the variables that w.Ul determine the severity
Of the co„,ing economic dislocations brought on by the need
for stop-gap measures.
Three alternatives present themselves, each one
with serious flaws which wUl l...it its effectiveness as
an energy source for the immediate future. The first is
our oil Shale reserves in the mountain states. A great
deal of research has gone into creating an economically
feasible method of extracting the tar-like petroleum
product, but two problems remain, probably on a permanent
basis. First, for most probable extraction methods, pro-
ducing one barrel of oil requires the processing of one and
one-half tons of rock and the use of large quantities of
water. The localized reclamation costs of utilizing this
resource, if added onto the investment capital (as it
would have to be if huge tracts of land were to become
possible vast wastelands), would make the price of the
fuel prohibitive unless other sources became equally
inflated. The second and related reason is that local
constituencies from shale-oil states, seeing what resource
development did to Appalachia, may band together and resist
environmentally unsound extraction techniques. At the
very least, resistance would delay commercial plans, raise
reclamation and side-payment costs, and block the availability
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The
of some Shale oil deposits for political reasons
second alternative energy source, sur face-nuned coal
reserves found m n,any Western states,
.s prone to exactlv
the same objections as is the exploitation of shale oil
deposits. These objections notwithstanding, the above •
mentioned resources might very well be utilized. Never-
theless, there will be a social cost that might make the
Whole project unprofitable to the nation but lucrative for
the extracting corporation.
This dichotomy between natioi-ial and corporate
interests is no more appearent than in the present conflict
over our third temporary energy resource, nuclear (fission)
power using breeder reactor technology. By being able
to create its own fuel from previously unf i ssionable
uranium isotopes, the fast breeder reactor appears to
solve the resources problem in much the same mystical way
as alchemists sought to overcome the gold shortage, and
with the same mesmerizing attractiveness. It is true that
this method of producing energy is not cost efficient in
comparison with present generating plants using fossil
fuels. This will probably change, however, as technologies
are developed to improve heat-to-energy ratios, to reduce
down time of nuclear power plants, etc. Yet, four strong
objections to "going nuclear" remain:
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threat of sabo?^r '^"<^l»ding the
Of atomic weapons)? o°n3truotion
«di^:etiereas::fofi!: ''^^^--^ °^
generation process. ^"^1
Each of these objections represents serious, highly complex
and perhaps unmanageable risks. As to probabilities, even
a supporter of the breeder reactor is forced to admit that
•There will, no doubt, be accidents with radioactive
materials; there may even be occasional major accidents,
perhaps even disasters To fully handle the four objec-
tions listed above (some of which are beyond our techno-
logical and social capacities presently) would require a
major increase in capxtalization and operating costs. If
the nuclear power industry could buy adequate safety for
its plants, the impact on energy prices would drastically
reduce the economic viability of such a power generation
process. Government support (e.g., taking responsibility
for waste removal and storage) would improve the corporate
profitability of the venture by merely passing on costs
to society as a whole. Perhaps, as some would say, it all
depends on how much safety the consumer is willing to
purchase or the taxpayer is willing to subsidize. This
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choice ignores the fact that we will have to pay for
inadequate safety eventually; given the dangers posed
by nuclear technology the cost „ay be .any times the
benefits achieved if we mini.i^e or ignore the above
objections.
5^1^_l2litical Variabl.
Our three short-term energy sources are not truly
adequate to the task. We can expect some level of hard-
ship over an extended period of time due to fossil fuel
scarcity and rising energy prices. And whatever the hope
of the future, the development of fusion and solar power
are too distant to diminish the psychological and politi-
cal impact of long-term economic dislocations. This is
not to claim that the limit to growth position is accurate
I have discussed only in passing the political dimension
to the problem of resource scarcity. I want to conclude
this section by reviewing the political variable, its
ability to soften or accentuate the anticipated disloca-
tions, to direct technology down certain paths while
foreclosing the pursuit of other options, and to lengthen
or shorten the lead time for the development of a safe,
clean, and economical energy source.
Economists and other technicians generally believe
that the adjustments the economy will be forced to make
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can occur gradually, allowin, us adequate ti.e to evalu-
ate our present policies and plan for the future. The
price systen, is the
.ost effective
„,echa„rs„, for prevent-
ing collapse. Resource scarcity, as reflected in higher
prices, encourages attitudes and behavior patterns
(discussed in this section, which insure the next genera-
tion of its share of raw materials. m this v.-ay the clain,
of the future can be weighed against the demands of the
present. However, the price mechanism is at best an
imperfect defender of the future's interests. We have a
highly self-centered time orientation, a now" mentality,
which seriously overemphasizes current consumption and
production. Our private desire for the good life, whether
we can afford it or not, prompts us to downplay the conse-
quences of actions as they will affect us five to ten
years hence. Therefore, we really should not be expected
to sacrifice consumption dreams for generations yet unborn.
The corporate sector is no less guilty of chronological
myopia. It may be economically wise to exploit a resource
for immediate and certain profits and then to reinvest
those profits in other ventures. Appalachian coal is a
tragic case in point. The clash between private and public
interests is not fully rectified by the price system.
In addition, the sensitivity and elasticity of prices is open
to question. Can prices respond soon enough, or is there
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)rni-
an inevitable and costly ti.e lag which leads to
spasmotic dislocations rather than gradual adjust-
n^ntsP unaided, the price syste.
.ay faulter in perto
ing the prophylactic function growth's advocates envision
for it. Observers such as economist Henry c. Wallich have
proposed a set of public policies which will "strengthen
the price system for its job of conserving resources.
It would contribute to internalizing the resource-depletion
cost Of growth. governmental programs can
be designed to promote recycling, tax wasteful technolo-
gies, protect selected ore deposits against present use,
or in other ways counteract the effects of our tendency
to stress present demands above probable future needs.
Prudent politicians and administrators, after weighing
the costs and benefits of these suggestions, might very
well initiate policies along these lines. Yet, prudence
is not the forte of our crisis-prone policy-making process.
We have promoted the discovery of new sources at the
expense of other options-recycling, conservation, etc.
We are now even more dependent on fossil fuels, more unable
to ease into a non-energy-intensive mode of living. As
this section has attempted to demonstrate, price increases
will encourage various social and technological responses
to resource scarcity, but this says Uttlo about the
degree of scarcity, the size of the price increase, and
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the
.a.nituae of the saerlaces that alX those responses
entail. v,e shoola not assume that poUt.cs „ni suceeea
" -^-"9 the pains of adjustment, especially
,iven
the faot that publxc policy, attuned to a gtowth economy,
had helped to shape the current dilemma.
In fact, politics, through its selection of alter-
native policy approaches, will most probably allocate
rather than reduce these adjustment pains. Political
solutions to resource scarcity may demand une^u^ sacri-
fices, reflecting the unequal distribution of political
power. For example, governmental efforts to raise raw
material prices directly, in hopes of encouraging society-
wide conservation, continues apparently voluntarrstic
decisions regarding consumption patterns. The ideals of
consumer sovereignty and managerial prerogative (as to
investment and product design) are preserved. Yet, this
legally noncoercive approach ignores the coerciveness of
the marketplace; the cost of fuel for heating forces some
families to endure home temperatures of 50-55 degrees
while more affluent individuals have little economic impetus
to change their energy usage habits. Pricing policies are
inherently unfair because they require the lower classes
to sacrifice more than the wealthy (in terms of marginal
utility) in order for the nation to conserve resources.
An alternative tack might seek to prohibit certain typos
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of goods and services rather than Merely
.ake such pur-
chases more costly. ^on, the vast array of electronic
gadgetry we can find so.e ite„,s that are clearly wasteful
even though such waste is affordable by a segment of the
population. TO ban these and srn.ilar goods and services
would address the notion of cffrcient resource utiliza-
tion in a more direct way. But more importantly it
limits the privileges of wealth and thus allocates social
sacrifice in a different way. m its balance between
different policy alternatives, the political system will
determine which groups bear the brunt of the negative
economic consequences we can expect from resource scarcity
problems
.
Another possible role for government is to promote
investment in resource-related ventures. The economy
is being encouraged to do three things in response to
scarcity: conserve, increase sources and develop substi-
tutes. These efforts are contradictory in the sense
that success in one area (substitution for instance) will
have a negative impact on the economic viability of the
others (recycling, new discovery techniques, conservation).
It is evident that a corporation will be very hesitant
to make a large financial commitment in a promising tech-
nology if the possibility exists that parallel develop-
ments elsewhere will prevent it from turning a profit.
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in order to maintain a broad attack on the scarcity
problen, the federal government will be required to guar-
antee investment and create a climate of security withrn
Which corporations may pursue their research and develo.-
n-ent free from financial risk, without this governmental
help (and assuming that the government does not shoulder
the task itself) the lead time for technological develop-
ments will be greatly lengthened, and consequently the
dislocations which we endure will be longer and more
severe. The need for financial support is most clear in
the technology surrounding fusion power. The government
is forced to support almost all the research in this area
because its vast expense makes investment prohibitive
for the private economic sector. Obviously, without such
help we would have little hope for a long-term energy
source.
Our final political variable is the most difficult
one to anticipate. What are the international implications
of resource scarcity, especially as it applies to our
economic prospects? What factors are relevant to our
global economic position vis-a-vis the energy crisis? In
terms of our economic strength compared to other capitalist
industrialized nations v;e would be in a far better posi-
tion to withstand the pressures of the energy crunch. We
have alternative domestic energy sources while other
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nations are „,uch ™„re dependont upon foreign supplies.
This is true not only with respect to Eossrl fuels but
cnlso concerning basic raw materials generally.
Yet, xn three respects we would be hurt by a general
tightening of the resource
.arket. Pirst
, while domestic
substitutes can be found, foreign reserves are presently
cheaper and purer. To extract and refine our own would
entail increased energy use and increased social cost, m
effect, we have exported the social costs of resource
acquisition. There would be intense political battles
and price inflation resulting fro.n being forced to become
more self-sufficient. The second and related point con-
cerns our own special dependence on a resource-intensive
econoin.ic system:
The American economy, b,y virtue ofits havinq become accustomod to more
spend l.hri ft ways than .uiy ot-lior coun-try m the world, may \yv. in for a more
extensive and uncom f or ta h 1 o revision
of its life stylo than those whose per
capita consumption of oil and mineralshas been more modest.
We will suffer less than others in absolute terms, but the
economic hardsiiips we do experience may be more severe
relative to past level of adequacy or expectations of
future affluence. Finally, we should consider the inter-
dependence of the developed world's financial structure.
National economic catastrophe cannot be easily localized
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w.thin natxonal boundaries s.nce the
.nter.elationship
ar^on, the Western economies has „,ade every natron „,ore
"
vulnerable. The bankruptcy of Italy, the weakest Western
economy ,not altogether unUkely If oil prices continue
their Clin*), would expose the internatronal monetary
syste. to severe financial strarns. Political responses
to these concerns could take many different forms. Per-
haps the most dramatic scenario is resource imperialism-
insuring the availability of adequate and economical
supplies of resources via military means. Even without
so extreme an eventuality, it is still true that the
actions of other nations and our foreign policy reaction
to the evolving international situation will be influen-
tial factors on the limits-to-growth issue.
On balance, what does the factor of resource
scarcity contribute to the debate? To what extent does •
it validate the limits-to-growth position? It goes with-
out saying that the unknowns in our analysis (especially
regarding the crucial factors of technology, time and
politics) allow for various possible projections, but I
believe that some cut-back in our growth rate, some
economic belt-tightening, is the most plausible conclusion
that can be reached. Economists hope that price increases
on raw materials can avoid this outcome but they are
ignoring an economic truism: "in the absence of other
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events, a rise
.n the prices of depleting resources acts
to reduce living standards throuc,,, a rise in the cost
Of Xivin,...^0
„^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
<3-posable incce, or inflationary deficit spending s.nce
federal
.oney will have to be funncled to methods of
alleviatrnc the drslocations of scarcity (e.g., subsidies
for investment rn research on substitute energy sources,.
Finally, investment funds will be increasingly devoted
not to consumer-oriented enterprises but to goals and
services related to our resource problems-more money
for reclamation of the land, for discovery, extraction
and refinen.ent technology research, for recapitalization
to transform the United States into a less energy-intensive
-society, and for energy as a more expensive factor in
the productive process. It is also reasonable to assume,
based on past precedent, that government action will
Intensify the negative impacts of resource scarcity for
n,any people in the United states, if not for the nation
as a whole. We are facing choices regarding the nature
and depth of the adjustments that we must make. Perhaps
most significantly, we also are facing a gnawing insecurity
about our future and our ability to cope with it.
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•an
sea ses
Environmental
gig^^^g the Ar gumpn_f
Sharing the headlines with the energy crisis is the
increase in poliution. The expansion of the industrial
sector Of our economy is the source of „,any contaminants
Of the air, water and food. Admittedly, the connection
between growth and pollution is not so unicausal-
undeveloped society can suffer from water-borne di,
and an affluent society can direct its growth toward
improving the quality of its environment. However, the
connection between level of industrialization and environ-
mental deterioration has some historical credence, giving
Plausibility to the warnings of dangers ahead if current
t£ends_ continue. Extrapolation of trends which forecast
environmental disaster place the burden of proof upon
those who seek to deny the causal relationship between
growth and pollution.
Yet not so long ago pollution was an excellent
example of a non-issue, and not without good reason. The
environment has a natural capacity to cleanse and regener-
ate itself, to break down wastes and dissipate them harm-
lessly, to incorporate man's activities into an ongoing
ecological balance. The air and water are renewable
resources (as is the soil with a longer time cycle) and can
theoretically be used without ever being used up. Cybernetic
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our
self-regulatory mechanisms
.i„l„,ize the effect of
intrusions onto the environment by encouraging corrective
responses.
"The system js -i-;.hni.- , . •-Y ^ IS stabilized by its dynamic
self-compensating prot^ertiPQ "21 mvP perties. This comforting analysis
-
not totally true however-not for all types of pollu-
tants nor for all levels of pollution nor for all areas
Of the nation and world. Our reliance on the regenerative
capacity of the environment can lead to overreliance
, for
the cybernetic mechanisms are not infinitely effective:
"In general, sel f
-maintaining systems are self-adjusting
only within limits. Once outside these limits, pathologi-
cal possibilities exist
.
"^^ Effluents m high concenLra-
tions or of a type that cannot be safely absorbed by the
environment threaten to bring us to these limits all too
quickly. we will be forced to endure an obvious deteriora-
tion in the quality of our lives and/or be forced to
tolerate reduced growth rates in order to reverse the
worsening pollution situation.
The most serious pathological possibility concerns
hazards to our health. A proponent of economic growth
arrived at the following analysis of the health effects
of air quality.
A comparison of the death rates in
American cities in 19G0 has shown that
with a 10 percent decrease in pollution
and jujrticles in the air we reduce thedeath rate as a whole by more than one
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half of a pGi-cont. Decreasina m.^
rea^^-,
five years, ta""' three and
^et, while this sounds quite o.inous i„ itself, „,any
environmentalists sense even broader health dangers. A„
overconcern with immediate economic rewards at the expense
Of ecological values win lead to behavior which reduces
the carrying capacity of an area by for instance ruining
the fertility of the soil or destroying the available
freshwater sources. Different forms of pollution pose
different threats, some of them easily remediable and some
of them not nearly so. In the absence of action to reverse
pollution trends, the situation win worsen (very quickly
with respect to certain areas and certain types of contam-
inants)
.
Our desire for basic environmental amenities
will eventually force us to come to grips with pollution
in more effective and perhaps in more growth-inhibiting
ways than we previously have. That awareness may come in
response to visions of imminent ecological catastrophe or
as part of a gradually evolving choice between the quality
of our environment and the quantity of our material posses-
sions. People who support limits to growth see the choice
clearly enough given present levels of pollution. What
they fear is that tlie longer we postpone the decision to
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lx.it growth an. the longer „e choo.e to pollute, the
-re aa„a,e will
.e acne to the earth, s oarry.ng capacU.
an. the steeper will ,e the price we .ust pay to avo.a an
ecological catastrophe and to reconstruct the ecological
balance
.
The Counteraranmpn^
Economists, as we
.ight expect, deny the connectxon
between growth and pollution Rathoruxu . K e , they view pollution
as an inevitable consequence of an imperfection in the
price system which allows an individual or company to treat
the environment as a free good or service, passing the
real cost of environmental deterioration onto the rest of
society
:
There are not enough clearly definedproperty rights in the environment
•
• . ;
[people] cannot easily extract
a payment from anybody who wants to
use [an environmental resource] up bypolluting it. Hence the costs of pol-lution are not usually borne by thosethat are responsible for the pollution
and are borne, instead, by the victims.
The marl^et mechanism has not been adjusted to charge for
the loss of air and water quality. In the past, because
these resources were renewable and man's influence on the
available supply was infinitesimal, we could treat them as
virtually unlimited. However, current users of water
(e.g., industrial polluters) severely restrict the ability
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Of others to use it acco.din, to their own needs <swi™-
.n.ng downstream of the factory,. while still renewable
xt is now limited xn any one place at any one point .n
time
.
The solution is simple: place a price on the
resource by taxinq pollnt- inn ^5 ^, ,ly POi.iut. o . This approach or others
like it would help lower effluents in two ways. First,
this tax will encourage the development and application
of pollution-reducing productive processes. Technology,
spurred on by economic incentive, would be put to work
finding ways of reducing contaminants in order to reduce
the tax costs. Second, in the event that technological
innovations were not forthcoming or proved to be too costly,
the pollution tax would be paid and passed on to the con-
sumer via higher prices. Thus, effluents ^uld decrease as a
result of lessened consumer demand:
The consequences would be that the
price of their [the polluters'] prod-
ucts v/ould have to be increased, less
of them would be consumed at thosehigh prices, and the aggregate extent
of operation of these industries wouldbe contracted, leading to some diminu-
tion of pollution by that route. 26
An added consequence is that charging for the use of an
environmental resource highlights the inevitable trade-off
that occurs between growth and pollution. It is probably
true that in every industrialized society some price (in
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te™s Of environmental damage,
,„.3t bo pa., to „a.ntain
^
.iven stne o. U.e.
..,e„ise, to purchase a h.gher
level of air ,.alrty entails sacrifices elsewhere. Put
this liyht. the extreme demands oE some ecologists
would necessitate a degree of sacrifice which many of us
are presently not wilUng to undergo, "our objective is
not pure air or water but rather some optx^al state of
pollution
.
. .
that will yield the maximum possible
amount of human satisfaction.""
„e cannot ignore the
notion Of marginal utility however much we desire a totally
clean environment. It would be foolish to treat auto
emissions so that they are purer than the atmosphere they
'
enter. But „h:, le the case for optimal pollution levels
is indisputable on its face, it ignores the basic ques-
tion: What costs and risks are we presently incurring
(or can anticipate in the future given current trends) as
a result of effluents in our air, water and food? without
evidence on this score we can hardly be expected to take
collective positions regarding adequate levels of pollu-
tion and tolerable reductions in growth rates.
If the issue is making a clear choice as to growth
vs. pollution trade-offs, the nature of the problem
becomes evaluating the pollution threat. This is diffi-
cult to do because of the complexities associated with
monitoring the effects of contaminants. The search for
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appropriate standards is perhaps U,e „,ajor initial tas.
for technology in the pollution tield.
..^he proble,,. in
d-Xing With suspected or real poison rs to frnd a reaUs-
t.c
.no effect, level below whrch nothing happens, and a
frank effect, level above which poisoning takes place "^^
Between is the range of insidious da.age, the long-tern,
harm resulting fro„, chronic but low exposure. Much of
the argument and confusion surrounding the pollution issue
centers on delineating and examining this intermediary
range. As we might expect, disagreement abounds as to
the environment-health relationship. ^9 This being the
case, the risks of further pollution remain unclear,
consequently, decisions about the growth-pollution trade-
off will follow historic inclinations and power pressures
rather than vague and disputed evidence. Our tendency
here, as with resources, is to emphasize present consump-
tion while minimizing future dangers. We have become
tolerant of pollution, unmindful of its hidden costs. But
just because our consciousness has become desensitized
to the dangerous effluents around us, it does not mean
that our bodies have also become desensitized.
.'The wide-
spread belief that we canadai>t or g^t used to anything
constitutes one of the main difficulties in evaluating the
impact of pollution
. . . and in studying the mechanisms
of its effects."'" By systematically downplaying the
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costs Of pouution,
,y favor.n, the growth side of the
trade-off.
„e a.e paving the way for a .ore drastic
reversal of economic growth rates once the actual nature
of the ecological problem becomes known.
Yet, in many areas we have overestimated the
dangers posed by pollutiony . Too much stock has been
Placed in the extreme charges of some environmentalists,
and this has prevented an adequate assessment of the
costs of pollution. Many scientists back up the
economists, notion of optimal pollution levels by noting
that not every human intrusion onto natural processes
is somehow harmful to the system, dangerous to our health,
and destined to get worse. In analyzing the strength of
the case, we must attempt to sift out those problems which
are so gradual in developing and/or so easy to reverse
that they primarily serve to underscore the seriousness
of more basic environmental threats.
I have mentioned the issue of waste disposal
previously, citing it as a potential resource which, with
proper economic incentives, would become an asset rather
than a hazardous liability. Thermal pollution can be
viewed similarly. Shellfish production has increased in
estuaries warmed by industrial waste water (sanitized so
as not to include chemical, metallic or radioactive
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nd
substances,. TMs is not to sa, u.t such uses
inevitable ,or all places a„U un.er ai: conditions, or
that these poilutnnts will not- r^-.u«o ,t cause
.localized daniaqe i.f
no controls are imposed; however U- .
,
n v;ev , it seems probabJ e that
the normal operation o, the economic systc, win o„c„„r„
the uti.T..atio„ of «o,„e wastes. This is the io.ic behi
recycling. We would bo confronted with a „,uch larger
garbage disposal proble,™ i£ economic, did not dictate
that some by-product,s (woodchips fro„, lu.ber mills, and
son,e discarded materials (the lead in car batteries,
should be viewed as resources rather than wastes.
Other assumed dangers can be discounted even more
certainly, at least for now. Take Ihe relationship be-
tween worldwide economic activity, especially the burn,n,
of fossil fuels, and temperature changes. First, the
evidence is mixed, with some scientists predicting warm-
ing trends, others anticipating cooling effects. Second,
unlike the life-threatening dangers of chemical poisoning,
the temperature changes (and their consequent impact on
the human environment) will be gradual, easy to monitor,
and in the realm of a growing inconvenience."''^ Indeed,
given the normal cyclical temperature patterns that have
existed for thousands of years, man's impact will remain
small and perhaps even beneficial. Whatever the actual
situation may be, a deep concern with tliis "problem" is a
case of misspent energy.
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A.-ther area of overconcern
.s wUh such headline
catching topics as eutrophicat.on of water, oil spiUs
and traditional for„,s of urban air pollution. it is
true that local situations
,„ay require extreme poUcies
preventing damage to fresh water supplies. But it
is equally true that we have often overreacted. Phosphate
detergents have absolutely no impact on the oxygen
deficiency of salt water, nitrogen levels being the con-
trolling factor. opposition to the principle of ocean
dumping of
.sanitr.ed municipal wastes is also based on
ignorance of some environmental facts of life. "Properly
used, the ocean offers man a practically unlimited
resource for waste assimilation at a reasonable cost.
Even more to the point is the response we have to oil
spills, leaks, etc. Our interest i„ preserving fish,
birds, plants and coastal beauty is perfectly justified,
but we should not inflate the actual impact of accidents
like the Torrey Canyon oil tanker breaking up off England
in 1967. Four years later no trace (visual or environ-
mental) of the accident could be discovered. Indeed,
bacteria help decompose most typos of oil into plant
nutrients. Easily pursued remedies (off-shore pumping
stations) not only minimize the threat to the coastal
ecosystem posed by oil spills; they can also be a positive
benefit to the economy (utilizing larger and more cost-
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efficient tankers, reducina
. .g the need for elaborate dock
facilities, etc. )
.
What has been \ar^n^'r^A uignored by environmental extremists
IS the regenerative capacity of the environment. Its
ability to recycle renewable resources, to break down
some pollutants into harmless substances and to disperse
others to harmless concentration levels.
.o doubt this
capacity can be overstated. m the past, high concentra-
tions of certain pollutants (carbon monoxide, sulphur
dioxide, particulants.and some air-borne metals such as
lead) alone, with climatic conditions which worsened the
situation by prolonging these high concentrations (e.g.,
temperature inversion) were more than the self-purging
mechanisms of the atmosphere could handle. However,
reversing this trend has not been difficult, let alone
traumatic. Air quality in most American cities has
noticeably improved with respect to combustion-related
pollutants, probably because of the use of low polluting
fuels and the addition of antipollution devices. other
improvements can be obtained by situating polluting indus-
tries in comparatively clean locations, thereby allowing
the national cleansing power of the ecosystem to have
maximum effect. All in all, puj.lic policies encouraging
anti-pollution technology, pursued through profit-seeking
n,ar)cet activity and ul ijizing the regenerative capacity
Of the environment promise to achieve levels of optimal
pollution for many effluents.
„„„ever. the real menace
to our health an. to eoonomie c.rowth is more insidious
than the above examples, as the following section demon-
strates
.
Three Cases
I have chosen to discuss three distinct pollution
problems, not because they constitute the only real threats
to our health and well-beiny, but because they are the
.-St illustrative of the nature of environmental deteriora-
tion and the forces that prevent easy reversibility. The
first is the environmental damage stemming from agricul-
tural activity. The recent improvements in agricul tural
yields and especially the envious productivity of the
American farm are the result of a basically free market
system (agribusiness notwithstandin q ) and modern agricul-
tural technology. The intensive and extensive use of
irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and single-
crop farming (for cost-efficient, capital-intensive
mechanization) has contributed to the productive success
of the industry. Yet, given the competitive nature of
the business, farmers must accept as much of the new
technology as they can afford. The technological-economic
imperative is that the immediate benefits of the new
.nnovations or a.ricuUu.e ou...,h any ,on,-te.„,
..3.3
and dangers.
...„-,e crcu^stances that
.o3t fa.„,3rs fi„a
the.3ezves in aUow the. XUtle e.oico a3 to whether
they „iu use the latest teeh„o.o,y that is „aae avaUahle
They stm operate in their own
.est, short-ter. inter-
ests." The economic situation insures that the future
w.n be sacrificed for the present. The fear of financial
insolvency is sufficient to prevent individual farmers
fro. weighing the individual benefits of technoloay
against the potential environmental rishs. Personal
survival is paramount. within thrs context of structural
incentives and restraints we can begin to appreciate the
pollution problen, which modern agriculture presents.
What are the potential environmental risks which
niodern agriculture is forced to incur., one has to do
with the use of chemical fertilizer. it is undoubtedly
the best short-term investment a farmer can make. Lvon
with high applications and rising fertilizer prices, the
marginal increase in yields covers private costs. But
there are public costs to consider too, costs which are
both increased and hidden by the in^i^vate productivity
of synthetic fertilizer. On this score two facts stand
out. First, the higher the application of cheap nitrogen-
based fertilizer the more, proportionally, that cannot
be absorbed by the plants. Run-off from rains pours
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nxtrites into streams, reservoirs and ground
.ater
reserves, raising this pollutant to dangerous levels i„
so.e cases. Second, nitrogen iertUi.er obstructs and
reduces the natural fertilitv of ,l i y t the soil (by destroying
the soil's nitrogen-fixing bacteria,, thus requiring
ever
.ore reliance on che.ical fertiUzers and therefore
strll
.ore run-off. Significantly, the use of pesticides
tells a Similar story. ddt is an effective. eco„o„,ical
and comparatively safe means of ridding farms of destruc-
tive insects. Its responsibility for increasing yields
(and, in some third world countries, of dramatically
reducing the incidence of insect-borne diseases) is
unchallenged. But, as environmentalists have repeatedly
demonstrated, the pests build up a resistance to the pre-
vious dosage-more accurately, resistant strains of the
insect multiply and domunate the colony-and the biologi-
cal predators which helped to control the pests' nun±,ers
are killed off. Thus, to achieve similar results, ever
higher applications or more poisonous variants of the
pesticide must be used. The polluting effects of chemi-
cals such as DDT must be viewed in light of their ability
to change the environment and thereby to encourage
further pollution in the future.
This is the meaning of the concept "technological
fix." "Like an addictive drug, fertilizer nitrogen and
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synthetic pesticides litomiiw . •oo i eraily create increased demand
-
they are used; t:he buyer becomes hooked. "^^ Techno-
logical developments, once accepted, cannot be reversed
"cold turkey" without nearly proh.bltrve political
consequences and/or economic costs (recapitalization
costs). We thus require further techno 1 o.ica 1. fixes
merely to maintain our economic
"hJcjU." This ironic
cycle-the dancers ot technology leadrn, to an increased
dependence on technology to have it save us from the
dangers it has created-is what makes this type of
pollution process so threatening.
In a sense, other aspects of agricultural pollu-
tion are related examples of this same point. One crop
farming, overcropping, and other aspects of poor husbandry
have depleted the soil of many vital nutrients, reguxr-
ing chemical fertilizer to compensate. They also simplify
the environmental system of the Farm, preventing natural
balances from holding down insects and weeds. This
prompts the use ol pesticides and herbicides, again in
increasing amounts. Finally they lead to the erosion
of the topsoil, while technology tries to compensate
through the application of still more chemicals. As to
the claim that the current envi roniDontal impacts of
agricultural practices are not great, we ought Lo focus
on the process of worsening environmental damaqe, not
209
forces bohi.K, U,e ,rob,.,„
,„^,,„ ^^^^
pollution so niynificant.
Farmers,
„.u„ U,o,„ society in „encrn,. ar.
WUI lower yieWs, prevent the
.o.st co.t-eiacient u.e
Of fa™
,„achino,.y. and probably n.sult in the financial
ruin of many. (a fnrfhor- ...y lA Ui thor conscHiuonco would bo the inLor-
national furor fhat would bo raised by overpopula tod
and underfod Third World nations.) Tho fact is that wo
operate our farms as if thoy wore a short-terrn resource-
extraction invosfmont because we allow our fanners no
other viable alternative. The various kinds of pollu-
tion that results from such an orientation inCerforo in
very basic ways with the natural regenerative, cybernetic
capacity of the ecosystem. when we decide to halt the
pollution progression and to resurrect some of the
ecological baJances we had previously been so effective
in destroying, the cost may be high. We have an environ-
mental debt to repay. ,7ust as fhe addict must go through
a painful period of withdrawal belore he can rebuild his
life, we may have to face reduced agricultural productiv-
ity in order to avoid further dependence upon the
technological fix.
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-•^e threat. a„a so.e places the reality of water
pollution
, fresh water scarcity, is . second r.portant
and illustrative e.a.ple of environmental deterioration
More than any other factor, the avrlaMlity of water
aeter.rnes the ultimate population capacity of a
.eo.raphr-
cal province...
^ The need for water for industrra,,
agricultural, recreational and residential purposes has
grown greatly rn some areas of the country, outpacing
the ability of the enviornment to replenish this renewable
resource. m addition to overuse per se, there are three
related pollutron problems which reveal the centrality
Of this concern. One has to do with the i„,pact of varr-
ous types of run-off practices which increase the saline
content of fresh water sources. This is a notably diffi-
cult situation to monitor as to individual responsibility,
and, therefore, it is especially difficult to control
via traditional economic incentives. The immensity of
this problem is demonstrated best by recent trends: "As a
result of man.s activities, since 1914 the total salt
content of the Ohio River has increased by about 50 per-
cent and that of the Colorado by nearly 100 percent..'^^
By the year 2000, current projections indicate that salt
concentrations would approach the upper limits recommended
for human consumption.
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A second way i„
..^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
conta™.nated ste.s fro„, excessive pu„pin,
.round
water.
.he fixture o. salt water „it„
.resh in under-
.rouna roc.
.or.at.ons results
.ro.„ t.e lessened pressure
Of the latter upon the for.er after pu.pin,.
.iso be-
cause of excessive pu.ping, we have been forced to go
lower and lower in our effort^, ;rrorts to increase supply; in
effect, we „ine for water as if it were a nonrenewable
mineral deposit, and extract a poorer ,uaUty resource
besides.
..„e have, by our heavy withdrawal of ground-
water, contributed to
.
. . the lowering of water tables,
salt water intrusion into fresh groundwater, and deple-
tion of groundwater at rates faster than it can be
naturally replenished."" Thus, we are involved in parts
of the country (e.g.. West and Southwest) with an abso-
lute limit to growth; we are approaching it rapidly,
the possibility of substitutions or new sources is slight,
and the build-up of another environmental debt (replen-
ishing an intolerably low water table) is a very real
prospect. The dynamic forces maintaining this process
are in large part those associated with raodern agricul-
tural procedures (and the economic incentives which
rationalize these procedures).
Finally, as discussed in the previous section,
demands for more resources and increased reliance on
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domestic sources will require the use (pollution, of
more fresh water. within the context of the growth
ethic we will have little choice but to pay for these
resources with socrety's consu.ptron of poorer quality
and/or higher priced water. There are also the political
imperatives for growth which encourage residential and
industrial expansion before adequate public support
facilities (e.g., water sources, sewerage treatment
capacity) are provided. Given the acceptance of the
'
growth ethic, there will be bitter resistance to water
utilization policies which threaten future economic
expansion. And yet we must expect a radical breaK with
past attitudes and behavior if we are to solve this
pollution problem:
This country has reached a point in itshistory when water will have to be con-
served and managed like other economicgoods. Large inve.stments will be re-quired if mounting demands are to be
met, and much more systematic schemes
of management for whole river systems
will have to be devised and applied. 38
When we recognize that water resource management will
amount to controls on growth, we can appreciate the role
this pollution problem will play in the limits debate.
The final area of environmental deterioration I
will focus on concerns the group of modern pollutants
which cannot be broken down or transfoirmed by the self-
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Cleansing and sel f
-regula ting
.echanis.s of the ecosyste.
These nonbiodegradable chemicals are proliferating in
amount and variety-fro. the manufacture of plastics,
other synthetics, agricultural sprays, food additives,
etc., as by-products in the production of other goods or
in nuclear power generation. They pose an unknown cumu-
lative danger to the air, water, animals, plants, soil,
food, and eventually to our own health and well-bexng.
Modern contaminants make the task of determining the
costs of pollution all but impossible. For instance,
while low levels of a chemical may cause no ill effects
(short- or long-term), two chemicals at low levels may
reaction with each other in some way to magnify their
separate carcinogenic, mutagenic, pathogenic or teratogenic
properties. This process, known as synergism, is especial-
ly difficult to monitor when new variables (chemicals)
are continually entering the environmental equation.
Other aspects of chemical pollution are equally
serious and equally fraught with measuring problems.
Chemicals and many types of metal pollutants interact not
only with each other but also with the environment. They
are combined, concentrated and/or changed in largely
unknown ways. This creates a built-in time lag between
a given quantity of effluent and a related ievel of health
danger. Because of the ongoing nature of these environmental
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processes conta.xnant levels of certain che.xcals (e.g.,
DDT) will rise naturally in sprte of actions to reduce
the original source. By the ti.e public policy responds
to the health danger, a charn of environmental events
will have been set xn motion which would inevitably
worsen the situation. Such time delays tend to be little
understood, and thus our present perceptions of pollu-
tion's risks are similarly uncertain. Time delays, some-
times of as much as 30 years, also occur between exposure
to a pollutant (asbestos fibers) and the observation of
adverse reactions (asbestos-related diseases)
. Compound-
ing this measuring problem is the fact that chemical
pollutants often increase one's susceptibility to common
illnesses rather than cause their own clear and pollution-
specific maladies. AH this is by way of indicating the
obstacles to an adequate assessment of the aggregate
health hazards of our chemical society. Our ignorance
then becomes the greatest danger of all: "when we add
misunderstood chemicals to our ambiance, we put ourselves
in the position of not knowing what symptoms to expect,
in addition to the usual problems of cause and cure."^^
The inform.ation on pollutants is confusing and
contradictory (often depending upon who is funding the
research)
.
However, our ignorance of this matter has
not evoked a caution commensurate with the risks involved.
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For the
.est p..t the onus of p.ool
.e.ains on the public
to demonstrate danyer, not with the company to prove
safety. ^s to technological assessment and environmental
impact analysis-a critxcal evaluation of the impact of
technological innovations before they are operational-
ized-we have achieved some success on thrs score, notice-
ably in the SST controversy.
„„„ever, the testing of
every new chemical for complete safety before it is
marketed or discharged as waste is extremely costly;
.t
entails investment in testing, increases time delays and
tends to discourage chemical technology. This would
have an immediate impact on profit and growth rates and
would be strongly opposed. We can realistically expect
that the nature of this problem will worsen for some
time to come, resulting in very conscious increases in
health-related aspects of quality of life.
This final point on the worsening nature of the
pollution problem bears repeating. To ignore the hazards
of pollution in order to maximize short-run material
wealth is not to ignore the standard-of-living conse-
quences of elevated pollution levels. We will pay in
quality what we gain in quantity. Eventually, the price
will be so great that major sacrifices will be required
to reconstruct a balance betvreen our environment and
our style of life.
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?J}e_Polj^tic^^
An analysis of the p.obable response of our society
to environmental deterion i- i r^.. , uut.x xora t on must inr-iur^n -.^^-'oi, a-ticxuae an awareness
Of the pouucs or poucy
.ak.nc,.
,3 inseparable
element of the pollution prognosis. The decision of
Choosing between preserving environmental quality and
promoting economic growth is obviously and unavoidably
political. That is, factors of power and self-interest
will enter into the process, competing with (and perhaps
dominating, impartial analysis, the weight of scientific
evidence and the public interest. „y strong suspicion is
that, given the current milieu regardin<, growth and the
context within which such decisions are made, there will
be a gap between what economists say could be d_one and
what in fact V/ill hn rlnno rnu-;^
ri^J_:t. HPJl?.' This IS tlie crux of i; . j.
Mishan's observation:
In debating the foreseeable future,
It IS not the potential ideal that
economists believe they could realize,
not the brave words of government
officials or corporate executives,
that are agenda, but the political
likelihood of significant reductionsbeing made over the jicxt two decadesm each of the familiar forms of pol-
lution.'^^
Our politically determined policy response will also re-
flect developments in other areas. In a continuing energy
emergency, for exam.ple, we may be forced to return to the
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-re economical and available suppUes of fuel ,h.gh-
sulphur oil, coal, „it. negative impacts on a.r ,naUty
The argument that „e must give up an increment of environ-
-nt amen.ty in orUer to atta.n a „.,„er liv.n. stan.ar.
(the trade-off between pollution and growth, „rU rema.n
persuasive within a supportive political context and a
pro-growth atmosphere. m short, our optimise should be
tempered. What can realrstically be expected fro„, efforts
to control pollution?
Barry Commoner has argued that there is a strong
connection between the profitability of an industry and
the application of a mode of technology whxch uses up
environmental resources:
"a high rate of profit is asso-
ciated with practices that are particularly stressful
toward the environment and that when these practices are
restricted, profits decline. Technology has been
directed towards increasing this process because, from an
economic standpoint, any substitution of a free for a
costly good will be a savings. Conm.oner estimates that
since 1946 the technological factor-that is, the incre-
ment of added pollution per unit produced due to new produc-
tive processes—accounts for up to 95 per cent of the
aggregate output of contaminants in some Indus tries . ^
^
We have been producing basic necessities at comparable per
capita rates but with a more wasteful and hazardous
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technology (e.,., synthetics vs.
.ool and cotton, deter-
ment vs. soap, fertiliser vs.
.ore land-ha.ves ted acreage
has decreased-synthetic herbicides and pesticides vs
n.ore natural biological
.ethods, trucKs vs. rail haulage).
The profitability of this new technology (aided
in large part by its ability to pass on productxon costs to
society in the for. of pollution) and the political
.uscle
of the interests that benefit prevent the government from
imposing the economists' social costs approach. its
political difficulty was revealed recently when auto
manufacturers sa.d they would be unable to reduce emission
standards for 1978 engines as required by law. Given
the clout of the industry, standards have been lifted.
Local efforts to i mpose anti-pol lution regulations often
fare just as poorly. Marginal factories which threaten
to close down because of the costs of the stricter stan-
dards are allowed to maintain operation while the local
residents pick up the tab in the form of water or air
impurity, hazardous work environment, noise pollution, etc.
The recent organization of an environmental move-
ment has prompted the passage of mucli legislation despite
the reduced-growth costs of anti -pol 1 ution policies. Yet,
the degree of progress is very uneven, as we might expect.
Eliminating pollution is relatively easy for those indus-
tries in wliich the faulted technology is peripheral to
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the society.
s economic structure (determents,. However
for so.e of this nation's
.ajor xndustries the issue is
one of survival (chemical, agricultural and auto indus-
tries,. The likelihood and effectiveness of legislative
action thus hinge on the relative political power of the
combatants. Unwelco„,od environmental trends may insure
that this balance will change. We can assume that the
environmentalists will greatly strengthen their political
position, and that the government, spurred by a quickly
worsening pollution crisis, will succeed in initialing a
policy response dealing with environmental deterioration.
In such a case a new question may be asked: wto will pay
the bill? Even on this point politics, pollution and growth
interact.
What is often ignored by people seeking a politi-
cal solution to the problem is that a clean environment,
like many other socially valued objectives, is distributed
unequally according to the political power and social
position of various interests. Though pollution is viewed
as a socia l cost, it tends to be selectively concentrated
and localized. We perceive the problem in its particular-
ized and isolated senses. Water scarcity is not a para-
mount concern to New Englanders, nor are auto emissions
a threat to rural America. The health hazards experienced
by farm workers (picking in recently sprayed fields) or
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Miners (suffering fro.
.-..ac. Xung" disease) allow us all
the luxury of lower food and fuel prices. Cerald Oarvey
notes that this situation is not coincidental.
of^Sr^'°n^ "^^^^^t allocationgoods" and "bads." often exter-
coi^r /r^'^^^^^^^^^^y transfersts and benefits from one specialpublic to another, or from societyat large to specific privileged orvictimized groups. Thus spill-overcosts frequently fall not on those
responsible-these often being the
abfe to'^f °" wealthy, Ind bestl o defend themsel ves--but on
burdL!!?"' '° °^ the
It is clearly possible to submerge the fundamental nature
of the pollution problem by shifting social costs from a
more powerful group (region, industry, occupation) to a
less powerful one. Such political resolutions leave the
target group qualitatively worse off while the rest of
society benefits through increased growth rates or
reduced environmental costs.
The conclusion to be reached is a rather discour-
aging one for growth's advocates. We are even less in-
clined to face up to growth's limits stemming from environ-
mental decay than we are prepared to deal with the issue
of resource scarcity. The elitist strain in the environ-
mental movement will serve to deflect political energies
away from the more serious sources of ecological breakdown.
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ou. eon..ontaUon
„UH
.Hose
problem. Which are structured rnto our economic syste.
Thrs delay rn our policy response will the
anti-growth impacts of governmental actron since envrron-
-ntal reclamation has proven to be rncreasingly e.pensrve
the more the situation is allowed to worsen. The political
variable, that is. the role of differential power, „iu
likely r_educe th_e eHectiveness of efforts to shift the
social costs of pollution onto industry. Finally, we can
expect that the taxpayer and consumer will be forced to
pay excessively for any increment of clean air and water
that is achieved, thus placing a ma^or drag on the growth
of real income.
It is not that economdc and technological responses
cannot cope with the dual limxts of resource scarcity and
environmental decay. But coping with these situations
is not the same as handling them in stride. The "solu-
tions" the nation finally select will demand a price in
terms of our standard of living and future economic growth.
This, however, is not the only set of problems that bolster
the limits-to-growth position. Trends in our physical
environment parallel trends in the human environment. The
next chapter will focus on addition support for the argu-
ment that economic growth will be greatly reduced in the
America of the future.
CHAPTER V
THE LIMITS TO GROWTH DEBATE:
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
Ijltroduc bion
Most Of the evidence marshalled thus far in support
of the forecast of li^.ts to growth has stressed develop-
ments in the relationship between the physical environment
and our economy. These developments, so it has been
argued in Chapter IV, would inhibit growth by increasing
the cost of feeding our economic engine-higher prices of
raw materials brought on by real or induced scarcity-and
by increasing the cost of alleviating society of the
physical disamenities of economic activity-the rising
price of pollution control and abatement (or of ignoring
the problem of environmental deterioration)
. it is easy
to see how such physical factors may restrain growth
rates. What has been insufficiently analyzed and therefore
inadequately understood is the effect of human (non-
physical) factors on our ability to sustain economic
growth. Specifically, domestic and international economic
developments apart from those already mentioned call into
question our expectation of future economic expansion.
Likewise, worsening social and psychological stress
potentially could weaken our collective capacity to
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maintain growth, even given favor-,hio .y r rable outcomes regarding
resources and pollutionP . linally, we cannot dismiss the
crises confronting our oolitiral c:...,.juxicical system and wliat this
portends for economic growth Thi. .J u cn. ifa chapter explores these
three dimensions of the human environment and their
contribution to the arnT.T4-H 4-growth controversy. it then summar-
izes the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of
Chapters IV and V.
Economic Developments
This section examines some evolving economic con-
tradictions which have direct bearing on the contention
that the united States will face a no-growth or slow-growth
future. The first trend concerns the increased vulner-
ability of the economic system to a ,ua ]or business downturn
as a result of the mechanisms being used to maintain
present growth rates. The argument can be made that
capitalism generally and our own growth-oriented version
of capitalism in particular is fraught with operational
inconsistencies, conflicting tendencies and inherent
inefficiencies—contradictions in the jargon of Marxist
analysis.
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?esu?.r °' capitalism
stmilLn" producesi ultaneously the conditions
LTw' it fu^damen-
ofc^^it^f ^^^^"^ t^^^ successest apitalist development createsituations which are fundamental-
ilsliTT^^ to capitalism
Two contradictions are esoeciTiix. -; n •p cially illuminating in reveal-
ing the basic weaknesses of our form nf .u l o economic develop-
ment.
The fi.st concerns the claim that, even within advanced
corporate capitalism, competitive forces in the economy
compel the system to extend rts productive capacity.
As capitalist development continues, as companies grow •
and industries multiply.
There is an ever
-expanding volume
of profits seeking opi^ortuniti esfor reinvestment. Every time
profits are created, they must be
reinvested. And reinvestment
means precisely creating more out-
put, reducing costs (thus freeing
resources for employment elsewhere),
and expanding profits. Then the
cycle is repeated. This expand-
ing volume of profits therefore
impels the firm to look for new
markets, search for new products
to be produced, and create more
output to sell.
2
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Ma.ntainin, the pront.bility o. investments
.s usu-
ally no cause for ala..
.m a grow.,., econo.ny. However
recent efforts to handle the e_sca^,ting expansionary
thrust of capitalist productron have not and cannot depend
totally upon the guarantees whrch growth normally provides
What is Significant is that current policies designed to
bolster profit rates for investment capital offer short-
run success but inspire long-range problems. Two types
of policy responses win suffice to clarify this important
point,
The economic need to continue current rates of
growth and to avoid stagnation and regression forces
.ore
and more costs and functions upon the government.
The state underwrites business losses
sustained during economic crisis
Direct lending, indirect lending via'intermediaries, and loan insurance andguarantees socialize business risk and
create huge government liabilities that
can be guaranteed only by further pri-
vate capital accumulation and growth-
-
and hence more loans, subsidies and
guarantees.-^
In effect, the state has become the insurer of growth.
To the extent that the government is forced to make up
the difference between naturally engendered growth (i.e.,
productivity) and the growth rate required to maintain
investment and profit levels, the economy is involved in
a contradiction. If that gap is small, no major danger
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-
on the horizon. However,
^^^^^^^^^
woula necessarUy involve
.nfi.t.on.., aefi.U spendin,.
w.th excellent prospects that „el f„e state pro.ra.s
would be cut bac. The deep and visible
.overn.ent
involvement in the economy would weaken the legiti.acv
Of the state's role as a neutral arbiter or partner and
-y lead to the politrcization of the economy (and perhaps
Of the issue of relative shares,
. Investment and profit
levels which are artifically inflated through
.ajor
political intervention and stimulation are srgns of inher-
ent danger in the economy. Real economic growth had
enabled the system to avoid confronting this contradic-
tion. But it is symptomatic of a weakened economic
position that government intervention has increased enor-
n.ously. The temporary remedy of Keynesian deficit spend-
ing has become a small part of the permanent repertoire
of policy supports shoring up our lagging growth rates.
Another means by which capitalism stimulates growth
concerns the important question ot consumer demand.
Improvements in our living standards are not merely
consequence s of our economic system. The demand for a
better material existence and the economic wherewithall
with which to back up that demand are vital parts of its
successful functioning:
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A continuing general imoroveMcnt of
is clependent'opon'risiacj
'/evoi: T""'mass consumption which increasinglytransform the so-miir^.i ^ -^^^y-^ycaiiGd luxury qoodq
:;o"a°tro:r P-''"-f,/i;^,consu.„cd;co'™!
-s. be 3teadiiy'^l^?anI'co:^;;L™nS^:
mass market, through advertising
buy^ncj'o^a'^
broadening o£ insSi^ent-ymg plans and personal consumption . 4
Advertising is a necessary institution in an economy of
threatened overproduction; it is part of the material
ideology which helps foster consumer demand. t„ jou„
Kenneth Galbraith words, "Production only fills a void
that it has itself created." ^
Credit buying is an outgrowth of the intense con-
sumer desires promoted by advertising, but the expansion
of credit spending is a dangerous trend. The need to
encourage maximum levels of consumer spending in order
to maintain returns on investment capital has led to a
mortgaging of the future. Personal consumption debt has
been increasing faster than after-tax income-with no
sign of a slowdown. This stimulation of the economy,
made necessary because the grov.th rate does not by itself
sustain adequate consumer purchasing power, buys prosper-
ity as a speculator buys stocks on a margin. Consumer
debt makes prosperity tenuous since any sign of regression
threatens to have a snowballing effect. Our personal
consumption styles can be "devalued" by credit card
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companies
.e.an.Ung that a
.e>,.o. pa, on the ,ri..,,.,,
3ust as a bank n,ay force the liquidation of stocks
bought on the ™ar,in-both done in o.der to protect the
^
creditors, funds. Slight fluctuations rn growth rates
can thus have marked repercussions on „ass buying power;
the massive extension of the credit
.arket allows us Uttle
cushion to fall back upon, few options except for .ore
borrowing for those who are already overextended.
An economy that is touted to require only fine
tuning is at the same time more vulnerable to imperfections
in the tuning mechanism. To the extent that productivitv-
based growth rates are being heightened by a plethora of
governmental supports in order to absorb rnvestment capi-
tal, to the extent that the level of consumer demand is
being artificially stimulated by easy credit policies in
order to absorb surplus productive capacity, the economy
reflects "softness" and vulnerability.
A second contradiction flows from the above analy-
sis but views the same general problem from a totally
reversed perspective. Instead of focusing on the ability
of the economy to find a market for its goods and ser-
vices, it questions the capacity of the economy to meet
the ever increasing economic demands of the consumer. The
effort to promote these demands through advertising, media
images of the ideal American family, etc. runs the risk
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Of heightening frustrations anC resentment, especraUy
so given the related Ukelrhood of de.and-pnsh innat.on
"or.in, to diminish real wages. m pro.rsing afn.ence
and opportunity, our system "is con-i-^^ni-T1 L.t,iu 1^ nsta tly arousing
expectations v;hich it- i nr-Vc 4-iii n I lacks the current means to fulfill
and is betting on its abrlity to procure the necessary
means by the very act of stimulating people to demand
them and go after them. "
^
The issue goes even deeper than this. Our percep-
tions of the system's (and our own personal) success
center upon the degree and form of economic growth we
have experience in the past. A new set of perceptions
with new criteria of success and failure cannot be easily
substituted for our present values and biases. The impact
of growth reaches far beyond the hardware of goods,
services and GNP to encompass a way of thinking about
living, about each-other and about ourselves-a state of
being and becoming. As a result of past rates of economic
growth, the mechanisms the system utilizes to foster con-
tinued development, and our psychological commitment to
a growth ethos, we have burned the bridges behind us.
Changes in growth rates will become more glaring, more
difficult to understand and assimilate, more traumatic,
more threatening to status quo politics. In short, we
are more susceptible to the domino-like collapse which
limits to growth might entail.
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-i!2E£°!!!S_of_Econora^^
we are currently in an oconcuc decline relative
to other developed nations. Various economies are superior
to ours in measures of industrial productivity.' Our
competitive edge, based on a prodigrous lead in techno-
logical development, has dissipated in a number of areas
as America's technical advances have been copied, improved
and applied by our rrvals. Our share of the world market
for basic Items (e.g., steel, has declined. Add to this
the investment-attracting advantages of lower labor costs
found in most other developed and developing nations.
For these and related reasons America's economy has been
growing at a slower rate than most of the industrialized
world although its enormous economic base and therefore
greater absolute growth mask this unpleasant reality.
The balance of trade deficits we have been experiencing
and the concomitant devaluation of the dollar are two
visible and shocking indications of our weakened interna-
tional position.'' We can anticipate that as more nations
overtake us in per capita GNP (some already have) a feel-
ing of economic stagnation will set in, simulating in
part the psychological effects of no-growth.
But such a simulated crisis tells only a small
part of the story. He need to look at various problems
associated with our current economic malaise and how tliey
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-y effect lon.-te„,
,ro„u. trends.
...^ p^tXe.s oe.up,
our attention
.u, this section. One ,„a,or 3i,n of economic
troubles^ahead is a noticeable decline in industrial
profits.
5
An important consequence of this development
concerns the connection between levels of pubUc spending
and the strength of the industrial sector. in son.o
states (e.g., New York, Massachusetts) an economic retrench-
ment threatens to induce severe cut-backs i„ a host of
programs (or higher taxes on already overtaxed citizens).
In an era in which demands upon the government have never
been greater, the prospect of reduced outputs is of ma:ior
political as well as economic significance.
The primary consequence of reduced domestic
industrial profits relates to the investment decisions
of American-based multinational corporations. The shift
of capital from the United States to foreign business
opportunities represents both a cau..e and a result of
domestic economic decline. This nation's largest companxes
can prosper independently of the economic fate of their
home base. This is easily demonstrated by the differen-
tial impact the oil crisis has on the United states
economy and on the profits of major oil producers. However,
obstacles arise in our efforts to shape these investment
policies to the needs of the national economy. Multina-
tionals are not effectively controlled by the political
3 2
^yste..
.ot on.y
.0 ,.ev exe.eise
..ordinate poUtieaX
power an. thus can o.s.ruct poUcies aesi,„ed to
.eseriet
their
.reeuo. o. ac U.on
.
^ u-ansnational
Character enable, the. to eva.e la.s hy which our econon,,
could reap so„,e spill-over beneUts £ro„, their corporate
success. As our laraest fi rn,.^^ y ms turn increasingly outward
in search of higher profits, the domestic economy, depen-
dent upon marginal investments by secondary companies,
will be drained of a part of its reproductive power.
A second symptom of economic decline, as well as
the best indication of the failure of economics and busi-
ness administration (the business technologies) to manage
the economy, is our permanent battle with inflation,
inflation is the hidden tax of our economy, reducing
our gains in real income (spending power) even as increases
in absolute dollars masquerade as prosperity. While we
have always had this condition, recently it has become
qualitatively worse. The fear is that unusually hiqh
price increases are now endemic to the system, the result
of forces that are not easily reversed.
There are different reasons given for the new
inflation, each one reflecting an ongoing trend that does
not bode well for our economic health. A partial explana-
tion addresses the changing structure of corporate
capitalism. Major segments of the economic system are
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now dominated by oligopoliqf
^
^
stic or monopolistic market
arrangements that immuni:.e certain ^ ,-G industries from thedestabilizing and defl^f-i^lat onary pressures of free market
competition. This condition exists winth respect to theP-e Of 3e.vic3S, the cost o.
,s.on,
..o„ ^no'^Ues
investment). Companies in these indn^.vLii e. ustries can avoid the
inducements and penalties; oflties fiscal and monetary policies
They are therefore free to charge higher prices and
thereby get a leg up on the inflation ladder.
.he redis-
tributive effects of this form of market power should
be Obvious. inflation has been bearable, probably even
beneficial for some, as income and wealth have shiftcd-
from occupations, industries and situations m the sphere
of competitive capitalism which are more vulnerable to
inflation's negative impacts to those individuals who
can protect their investments and insure themselves a
better market position. Consequently, inflation has
created certain vested interests who realize that demands
for a curb on inflationary policies can be financially
threatening. '^
In this context it is important to note that an
inflationary mentality makes it politically difficult
to curb further increases. An HlM^AjL^^tory spiral is in
force; each industry or occupation seeks a hedge against
234
expected future inflation by de.and.n, future prices and
wages now.
^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Object to not bern, in on the last round of rncreases.
Short Of wage and prrce controls (which have their own set
Of technical problems), the standard approaches to reduc-
ing inflation cannot and have not halted the spiral.
There is the strong possibilrty that inflation
"is rooted in the rapid rise in demand for goods and ser-
vices in all advanced industrialized nations and m the
new demand from nonindustrial
, supplier natrons that
their raw materials return to them a bigger prece of the
economic action. Increases in demand come not only
from the developed West (including Japan) catching up to
our materialistic attainments, but also from a new (15-20
years) group of middle-class nations flexing their con-
sumerist muscles: Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan,
Nigeria, Venezuela, Poland, East Germany and the oil-rich
Middle East countries. Increased demand is especially
apparent regarding one very precious resource— food
.
Population growth, changing diet patterns, U.S. financed
purchases of farm products by Third World countries, and
the limits of the Green revolution will combine to apply
permanent pressure on our grain supplies, with a result-
ing steady rise in prices. Similarly, as more nations
have industrialized and can afford to utilize the raw
235
-terlals of a growing economy, and as previously
developed countries beco.e even
.ore productive and
wealthy, competition and therefore prices for the limited
supplies Of critical resources will increase. The issue
here is not whether there will be enough food or raw
'
materials. Rather, it is whether these items will occup.-
an enlarging part of the famiiys and the economy's bud-
gets, thereby reducing other ourrh^c^oc i- •^ Lu p c ases, living standards,
and productivity.
If we just focus on this conn-hr.-L.Li±i, unt y, we realize that
a demand-push inflation is the re-nlt- r.f ^cu ouit of too successfully
selling the American Dream. 17p are will innvvu iL. W ing, even eager,
to spend our way into debt in order to purchase the
affluence which supposedly we can already afford. indeed,
inflation feeds on itself, discouraging thriftiness,
economizing debt and thereby promoting more demand.
Furthermore, for a large portion of our population the
nature of our economic wants have changed in ways that
prevent easy adjustments in supply. m the past, hopes
for a car, a color television set, or a dinette set could
be fulfilled for most Americans. However, recent demands
are more positional, requiring not merely absolute but
relative increases in one's standard of living. But
we cannot all have the finest education or medical
services, eat at the best restaurants, and keep a live-in
2 36
-id. The
.esu.U is t..t pr.c.s for services have
'
.enerauy scare, as people are ,.ess wUtin,- ,o ta.e on
certain service positions. The a.enUies of middle
Of subservience. Inflation is a si,„ that the difference
.n attitudes between low and middle is not what it once
was
.
Another future cause of inflation, and one that
has ramifications far beyond t,>e price index, is the
increasing control of mineral reserve markets by cartels
(perhaps aided and abetted by multinational corpora trons)
.
O.P.E.C. is undoubtedly the „,ost prominent example. Thrs
n.ay pressage the growth of other resource-based economic
alliances attempting to set and maintain higher prices
for their raw materials. Third World governments, pres-
sured by or actually controlled by an ti
-American leftist
elements, desiring to get out of debt to the industrial-
ized West, and resenting the neocolonial exploitation
of their land and people, will view massive price increases
as an excellent vehicle for both profit and revenge. The
competition for raw materials has never been more intense.
"The shift from traditional buyers' market to global
sellers' market for a lengthening list of commodities
lespecially raw materials] is bringing a host of far-
reaching changes, many of which are still only remotely
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-sea...
--^s ts not
.o sa,
i-vitaMe o., issues o.
.,ove.e.U,„.„
ana a.vorc,ont econonac neeas, u,a. ^3 even „.ain-
ta.nabZe.
^t ,e.y least, H„„ever, we shoulC
,.pe.t
-dividual governments to
.a,ce effective use of t.eir
new-founa
.ar,alnl„, leverage, wit. a consequent ne.attve
inpact fo. us on p.ioo sta.lllt,, real Incon.e, stanaa.,
Of living, and economic growth.
This poinl: needs more elaboration because it
encompasses the major interna ti nn-. iJ -LHcorna o a
1. component oT the
limits-to-growth position. The claim 1,-1. k ,C has been advanced
that the United States econnmv h-.^ut.o o y has prospered at the ex-
penso of otl.er nations. Willingly or unwittinyly, they
have become adjuncts to our own econon.y via their subser-
vience to the objectives of foreign Investors. The
response usually yiven, that exports and in.ports are
relatively Insi ynif lean t in comparison with our domestic
economy, has been challengea by Richard J. Barnet and
Ronald MiiUer. Looking past aggregate aata to rndicators
previously ignore, the authors point out that our depen-
aence on foreign transactions is much greater than is
generally recognised.
..jf all these factors are considered,
some thirty per cent of total United States corporate
profits can be directly or indirectly attributed to over-
s operations...'" Thus, there is some well-placed
sea
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concern as to whether international developments will
restrict our lucrative activities overseas. ^s
.entionea
above, having lost the lead in productivity to other
industrialized nations, we arc less li.ely to achieve the
types of co.petitrve advantages we obtained rn our hovday
European countries have sufficient investment resources
to maintain (regain, control over their economies. Also
it would be foolish to believe that the underdeveloped
nations will ever revert to the more pliable, client-
state relationships that typified an earlier era. Their
demands and expectations have taken a quantum leap, as
the following observation from Business J^eek reaffirms.
"What the Third World is really af teTITT^idespread
redistribution of xncome among nations: taking wealth
from the rich industrialized countries and giving it to
the poor underdeveloped countries."" if, as some contend,
our affluence has been built in part upon neoimperialist
exploitation of the rest of the world, then this rise in
national and economic assertiveness
— the end of imperial-
ism—is another cause of nation economic decline, another
trend supporting the limits-to-growth hypothesis . ^'^
Conclusions
Taken in total, the ability of economic loaders
to prolong the growth of the business sector is certainly
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economic condition which continues to ,aeae analysts
forecasts o.
.„tu.-e upturns cons.stenti, prove ,rouna-
of the experts. Perhaps our con.piex and interdependent
economy is i„ a transition perrod, developing the concep-
tual and managerial tools to n.eet co.in,, threats to
growth (resource scarcity, pollution, energy crisis).
But we also can anticipate that the level of demands and
pressures placed upon the economic systen, wrll increase
and intensify, creating the insecurity of a permanent
transition period. The decline of certain social bases
of support-subjective resources such as belief in the
work ethic or trust in corporate activity
-cannot help
but exacerbate the conditions obstructing recovery and
renewed grov/Lh.
In assessing whether we can manage our economy
and defuse the problems mentioned above, we must take
into account the question of time. Specifically, will
all of these crises converge with disastrous suddenness,
or, the alternate scenario, will issues develop selective-
ly and gradually, to be handled incrementally, within
the confines of present economic arrangements? Our tech-
nical skills in business management and macroeconomics
are best nurtured in an atmosphere free of panic decision
making. Unfortunately, the former outcome seems more
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probable. The policies
.entionec, i„ u>e beginn.n, of
th.s section are intended to counteract the dangers of
excess investment cap.tai and excess productive capacity
AS a by-product they have increased the interdependence
of an already hxghly complex political-economy. This
in turn has maximized the likelihood of a simultaneous
domino-like collapse of various economic subsystems.
The political variable in this analysis lends fur-
ther support to the overall thesis. m previous sections
I have argued that we should not so readily expect public
policy to remedy the shortcomings of other social sub-
systems. It is my conviction that the governmental
response will worsen the economic situation. Inflationary
trends have been given enormous impetus by deficit spend-
ing, a condition that promises to continue at elevated
levels for the foreseeable future. The political dynamics
of the budgetary process prevent any other outcome. Demands
for services and for expenditures to relieve unemployment
are coupled with a rebellion against more taxes; the
recent referendum in California cutting the property
tax testifies to this last point. In addition, the imme-
diate political gains to be achieved by well-timed tax
reductions or by expansions in tlie money supply--to
coincide with election-year politics— is an admission
that political action is based on short-run interests.
:4I
Recovery cannot occur i> f^^^..uu It lits and st^^rt-^. 4-uthe insecurity
which instalDility enaenrlor-c •y genders is not conducive to invest-
ment and growth.
Microecononiic recover,, i^'^covery and growth policies- that
tho.e polices u.t ope„.e th,:ou,U speci... p.o,„,„3
rather than through
decision.-.
i
reveal the Cistortin, inauences oC the poiiUcaX sy.te,,,
.he trickle-do„n approach stUl proc.o.inate. as the .eans
Of raisin, growth rates.
.his is to he expected; public
policy reflects (responds to, poUticai power, and there-
fore those groups ,„ost influential are able to channel
policy outputs toward their benefit. Yet, the validity
Of this method is increasingly open to questron. especially
9xven the rise oC multinationals. The amount that in
fact trickles down to our economy is declining as other
(foreign) opportunities avail themselves. To the extent
that there is a distinction between the welfare of the
top business elite and the welfare of the people as a
whole, a large amount of economic-turned-political power
will be marshalled to further the interests of the former
at the expense of the latter.
Long-range prospects are of course difficult to
determine. The confluence of trends presented in Chapters
IV and V my or nu,y not lead business leaders to initiate conpensating
adjustments after the individual problems have been
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ions
revealed. Yet nni-Lt-L, ot ail segments nf -i-h^J i_ oi the economy are equally
adept at making adjustments, or enu-illv .> q al y m control of
their economic destinv "^k^my, the new-found affluence of the
working classes is very vulnernhio .-^.y able to economic dislocat
(as is the welfare state^cat, Itself) m the twin forms of
inflation and unemployment ^
^ Other groups may he simi-
larly vulnerable. Thus, even for those who doubt the
livelihood Of a general economic collapse, there should
be recognition of the probability that certain areas of
the economy will face serious hardship. Limits to growth,
even selectively experienced n^,. iy cx , can a] so have major implica-
tions for the future of consensus politics.
g££i^l__and_Psychologica l Stress
Sources ofacial Distress
The current debate transcends the simple issue of
the possibility of
.further economic growth. It is equally
relevant to examine the social-psychological costs that
are associated with a growth society. These qualitative
disamenities (or socio-psychological pathologies) are •
consequences of the operation of American society as it
seeks and achieves material progress. These costs, too,
should be placed on the balance against which we evaluate
the desirability of growth. To the extent that social
and personal distress-and trends portend their worsening
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"
into question the continuing benefits
Of current econo„,.c ,oai«. t.Us factor has a „a,or con-
trrbution to .ake in the ongoing growth controversy.
The socio-psychologioal dimension is crucial as
-11 due to its connection to other factors in the total
Picture. The social manifestations of growth s costs are
reflected in a number of ways: the decUne of the worR
ethic, the weakening of social cohesion, limited social
adjustment to change-to name three examples. These
signs have quite obvious negative consciences on tl>e
ability of national institutions to meet the physical
challenges to growth. Societal developments set the
context for attempts to fashion a policy response to
pollution or resource scarcity. The diminishing of our
social-psychological resources, of the vital social supports
for collective action, complicates political computations,
reduces the effectiveness of our decision-making procedures,
results in the failure of proposals and policies, further
deteriorates political and economic systems, and continues
the weakening of the public's faith in the nation's
institutions.
The social-psychological concerns presented in
this section are more than mere compiicators of the policy-
making dilemma. Implicit in these concerns are a host of
problems that rer|uire separate political (and financial)
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attention. Thus, the social
.nd psychological costs of
growth not only set the stage but p.ov.de a portion of
the Plot for the economic and political dramas enfolding
today. „e ™st address ourselves to these costs as
surely as we
.ast face the energy crisis because each
'
threatens to underline our con.it.ent to economic growth.
£Htur^o_ck by Mvin Toffler represents perhaps
the ™ost widely cited atte.pt to illuminate the signs and
causes of socially induced psychological stress. toffler
described many aspects of current society (or trends
that could be expected to predominate in the future) which
have placed inordinate strain upon the emotional resources
of the average citizen. Prin,ary among the sources of
stress is the quickening pace of change in a person's
social and personal world. Imagine our being placed,
permanently and irreversibly, into an environment sharply
different from our own. The attitudes, values and behav-
ioral cues that made sense of the previous culture would
be irrelevant in this setting; indeed, the surroundings
themselves are in a constant state of change, thus prevent-
ing us from taking security in a new set of values, new
cues, new definitions of rationality.
The transience in our lives is compounded by the
diversity of choices we confront and the plethora of
information available upon which we can base a decision.
24:
-t, the „.Uitu.e o. pe.3o„aX opUo..
.oes
.ot represent
-creasea
..eeao,,,.
.o. our a^ass.n, o.
.acts a r.n.o-t-n Of increased knowledge. Information overload, as
Br.no Bettel.oi. i„,pi.es, leaves us no
.etter off regard-
ing how „e Should proceed:
..[it, rs not a question of
the amount of information
.ut whether it can be used con-
structively. Whether it is understandable as a whole.
.
.
We must fight against the delusion th-,t H,utjiusx a the more informa-
tion „e have, the better we are..."
.,ow, then, to explain
feelings of ignorance in the face of the knowledge explo-
sion. I believe
.t is a matter of ideological incongruity.
The information does not fit neatly into the conceptual
categories of the past: the facts do not conform. The
search for a more rational explanatory framework for the
problems of the modern age is triggered by the realization
that anomalies make past frameworks unacceptable. The
sense of information overload is the sense that our world
view is getting more inconsistent with each new increment
of facts.
This bombardment of information is part of a general
overstimulation of our senses (the impact of media images,
the pace of social change, the transience and novelty of
our environment) which has given rise to definite psychoso-
matic, psychological and psychosocial pathologies. are paying
a steep price for our way of life. These are the symptoms
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of extreme wartime terminn • ^ns o , society-wide battle fatigue-
or future shock.
The problem is one of human adaptation. As Tofflor
Phrases it, unless man cuickly learns to control the
rate of chanye in his personal affairs as well as in so-
ciety at larcje, we are doomed to a massive adaptational
brea,cdown..^20 p^.,^ themselves on their ability
to adjust pragmatically to new problems and circumstances.
This boast may not apply to the condition of our psychic
state. The observation of Rene Dubos ds directed toward
this point: The limits that must be imposed on social
and technoloyical innovations are determined not by scien-
tific knowledge or practical know-how, but by the biologi-
cal and mental nature of man which is essentially unchange-
able. It is undoubtedly true that we can survive as
a species within a wide range of situations and under
severe pressures. However, our modes of living and think-
ing are not subject to infinite variety or permanent
instability. The maladaptive responses of our body and
mind indicate that we cope with the social and psychologi-
cal hazards of our society only at a cost to our potential
development as human beings.
While it is true that on one level--material/physi-
cal—the society has been productive and fulfilling of
our desires, development as human beings requires that
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other, higher needs be met T'h^ n. . u. he most basic emotional
requirement (beyond physical saf^t.. ^L Y^ i ety and survival) is that
Of love and affixation. This is a vital support for
psychic strength, especially in t.mes of stress. Soc.al
belonging and affection are getting more difficult to
achieve, despite the opportunities of a pluralist society.
The following observation attests to this fact.
In the rush to industrialize we breakup communities [physically, culturallyand spiritually]
, so that the controlsformerly regulating behavior aredestroyed before alternatives can beprovided. urban drift is one resultOf this process, with a consequent risem antisocial practices, crime, deU^quency,_and so on, which are so costly
orw:ri-beLg?2i^^^^ --^.-^
The weakening of personal and geographic ties has also
been brought on by the quickening pace of change. Our
style of life telescopes relationships with people and
places, impeding the formation of bonds of trust and
community. For many, the feeling of belongingness is
both artificial and superficial given the transitory
nature of our contacts with others.
More abstract needs remain similarly unsatisfied.
People desire some measure of prestige and social esteem;
ego satisfaction is a necessary prerequisite for a healthy
self-image. Also important is the belief in one's
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efficacy—control over one ' c; ^.w^ i-^s own life and therefore some
power over the actions of others with respect to oneself
Likewise, a hi,h value is place, on the needs for creatlv-
ity and achievement ^nr- -i => i ^. Social and occupational mobility is
the standard tactir for-c r those who want prestigeous, power-
ful and/or creative positions. However, all societies
have provided some opportunities for need-gratification
for most of its members. There is some evidence, though,
to suggest that industrial socities generally and the
united States in particular are noticeably limited in
the degree to which these higher needs can be met.
Examining the satisfactions of worklife situations
demonstrates this point (although other topics would suf-
fice equally well). Despite the claims of business
leaders that technology and automation have eliminated the
most routine and mechanical jobs on the assembly line,
the factory work environment remains debilitating and
dehumanizing. it might be becoming more so; even so-called
creative positions are increasingly defined as adjuncts
to the machine or "specialties" within a "subfield" of a
"discipline." Organizations have grown too large and too
complex; workers at all but the top levels are alienated
by distant authority operating through depersonalized
24hierarchies. Industrial psychology has established that
a work environment which ignores the nonmaterial needs of
249
the employees risks the loss r.f
,
.
" productivity and profits
-
si,nifiea„t. therefore, to note the
.a,or decline
^
-
the
.otivatu, power of the work ethic, revealin,
^tself in hi,h absenteeism and turnover rates, careless-
ness (or perhaps conscious sabotage,, anda.eneral
resistance to on-the-job authoritv
-rv.J ^ ciutno y. The normative mech-
anisms of industrial cohesion and coordination are hreakrn,
down. other means of insuring joh performance and task
integration (e.g.,
remuneration, strict oversight
coupled with threats of dismissal, require more material
resources, are less effective than hoped for. and thus
tend to reduce productivity still further. m many
respects the working conditions of Americans remain behind
those of their European counterparts, and this has had an
impact on comparative economic growth.
When this analysis is applied to society at large,
the connection between "style of life" and "quality of
life" becomes apparent. The limits of our adaptability
to future Shock and the inability of institutions to satisfy
higher level human needs combine to bring about a host
of psychologically-related social diseases. Increases in
crime and violence, alcoholism and drug addiction, broken
marriages, child abuse, etc., are as much social costs of
'
our form of industrialization as is polluted air and
water. We face a diminishing of social cohesion, especially
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o.. „..n areas, ana
.He
.reation o. a cU^ato of
^ea. ana
.Us..ust-a
,a„,3on
„.en.a., U,. Conse.uenU,.
society
.3 .o..ea .o reso.t to ealcu.aUve ana/or coe.cive
-aes Of integration
.eca.se the „,o.:ai restraints on ant.-
social behavior are aeclining.^S
TO other victims of growth, the loss of social
cohesion reveals itself in a nonviolent for.-increasing
socxal insensitivity brought about by a turning inward
away fro„ the larger group ana the larger group's prob-
lems. California, in .any ways a sociological laboratory
of POSt-industrialis., is an excellent example of the
modes Of thought and action encouraged by the psychologi-
cal pressures of change, insecurity and lost identification
With the wider communitY
:
Personal alienation and malaise havealso increased among many sectors ofCalifornia's society. ... in bothNorthern and Southern California, the
encounter-group mystique, the druq
culture, and other loosely organized
manifestations of the search for alter-
native life styles have been sufficient-ly m evidence to promote a rash ofpopular commentary.
... [in addition,]the doctrines of neofundamental ist and
mystical religious movements have in-
creased their drawing power. 2 6
The growing concern with personal self-awareness (or per-
sonal salvation) is in essence a conscious withdrawal from
the structural problems of our day. The long-run political
implications of this development have been excellently
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outlined
,a„in Schur in rj,ej,,,^^^^^^^^^2,
extent that pa.t o. the pu.iic
..^or.ed in sei.-neeCs
the.e wUi
.e weakened pressures tor soerai ana economic'
Change.
.hese sy.pto„s of social disintegration are the
other Side oi the coin to the violent hehavior described
above. It is safe to say that both industrial and politi-
cal cohesion are bein, threatened by creeping paralyses
Of noncooperation, as expressed in various types of
escapis. on the part, not only of the oppressed and ex-
ploited, but even of highly privileged groups. "28
Social Breakdmvn_andjjjiij^s_t^^
Both Of these behavioral responses to psychological
stress (and the feelings of alienation, frustration and
insecurity which lie behind them) will inevitably have
a negative impact on growth rates: first, by diverting
scarce resources, not the least of which is political
attention, from other pressing issues to the social prob-
lems caused by future shock and need deprivation; second,
by creating an atmosphere of justified noninvolvement,
making effective unified action against environmental
and economic crises all the more difficult; and third,
by directly causing a decrease in worker morale, in iden-
tification with corporate goals, and in traditional
aspects of economic development. On this last point we
note that, along with the decline in the work ethic, we
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eonce„3 ana a
.es.re
.o. e.,..en..aX
„eani., <™.„..tary simplicity) have replaced i-h. vt^pxac the keepmg-up-wi th-the-
Joneses syna.o.e fo. so^e, with i™po.,.„,
.onse.uen.es on
consumer
.uyin, pattern.. Xn addition, faith in the
outputs Of the private
.ar.et syste. has waned. Pro™
personnel practices (affirmative action, to investment
policies (environmental impact statements, to product
quality (seat belts or fire-retardant children.s pa.amas,
,
more groups are relying on the government to correct the
perceived abuses of the nriw^4-«n p vate sector. Charles E.
Silberman has addressed himself to the economic import,
at this point still vague, inherent in the social and
psychological developments to which I have alluded:
Our uncertainties today begin withthe probability that Americans may be
tha^'^h""^ °' ""^""^ differentt they add up to a whole new outlookon life and work and society.
. Thenew values could profoundly alter Con-sumer demand, on the one hand, and thegrowth of productivity of the laborforce, hence of the economy's capacityto produce, on the other. 29
Thus, we can anticipate some drag on our GNP, or on the
quality of our lives, from the psychological costs of
social change and economic growth.
are in a period o, transition, „f continual transi-
tion according to Toffio,- il ler, leading to the seeming uncon-
trouableness ol social change. We can therefore
order to find the hu„,an resources which will promote
personal and social adaptation to the enfolding events
Of the future. However, our society
.ay be unable or
unwilling to reverse the aforementioned trends toward
social decay and psychological anguish. I„ our commit-
ment to consumerism, individualism and the "now" mental-
ity, we may have lost that sense of national purpose,
conviction, hope and cohesion which is societys most
important resource. Social breakdown is a real threat,
especially in light of the increased pressures and sacri-
fices the future will demand of us. How we define our
collective destiny, whether we can emotionally identify
with the lives of generations yet to be, will dictate the
success we have in responding to our long-range economic
and environmental ills. In the words of Kenneth Bouldiny,
"there is a great deal of historical evidence to suggest
that a society which loses its identil.y with posterity
and which loses its positive image of the future loses
also its capacity to deal with present problems, and soon
falls apart tk^ • , .
°^ this statement forU^ts
.o growth cont.ove.sy
.3 seXf-eviaent
.
E°yuy£al_J^imits
Li™its to growth advocates often ignore the politi-
cal aspects Of the environmental ana economic reality.
They slide over the i no.r^ 4- uninevitable conflicts of interest
among social groups that will mark th.e way towards reduced
economic expansion. Their hope is th.f <=uu at some moralistic
consensus will arise out of the shock of h.
•
uiie i^aocK O being on the
brink of ecological disaster (in effect fh.vx ir , t e creation of
a permanent „ar-li.e united front,. B.ually confident
about the political variable are those who re:ect the
limits argument. Proponents of growth see our physical,
social ana economic problems as amenable to careful
political control and resolution. The ability of public
policy to rectify the environmental wrongs and manage
our society, with a minimum of delay, conflict, error or
cost to our economic growth rate, is never doubted. Both
of these positions, in spite of some allusions to politics,
basically contain no realistic appraisal of the political
prospects of certain changes. By ignoring conflict and
uncertainty they have tried to depoliticize these issues.
As Heilbroner has noted, this
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omission Of a political dimension is
compieh^nsion^of T^, ^
For the exerrl^f I''' Prospoot.
lies squa^"5 fn ti
P°l'ti<^'-'1 P°wer
deter„,inaUon o? th^t"'"''''
°'
^^^^^^^^^^ ^l'^'^
we have touoheC on the political variable in previous
sections, bot we now examine it directly in order to answer
a basic question: can political decision-.aUn, be relied
upon to overcome, with reasonable efficiency, the various
Obstacles to continued economic growth, or will it, too,
suffer from the rriQoc r^i^ 4-1-nc c ses of the age and thus help to cause,
not cure, our future economic ills?
What we are confronting here is the possibility of
political limits to growth.
[Political limits are] set by the al-
ready overstrained capacity of humanbeings to conceive, design, manage,
support, and adapt to extremely com-plex systems of human interdependence.
In short. It is the political limitsthat are likely to constrain the con-tinuity of physical growth well ahead
of all other factors. The United States
and other members of the world communUy
are now pressing against their politi-
cal limits and will find it increasinglydifficult to take actions that wouldbe required to assure continuing growth.
This notion of political limits will be tested under fire
as our institutions and processes are asked to deal with
the problems of resource scarcity, pollution, the loss of
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the decision-.,-..in,
.apacUy of u.e poXU.ea: syste.
-a that these sho.tco.in,.. at the very Xeast, van
ser.ously diminish the effectiveness of pu.fie poUc.es
designed to prolong growth Th» r-j . e remainder of the section
examines this hypothesis.
The major source of stress for the political
system is the ever increasing and varied demands thrust
upon government by an ever increasing variety of groups
Since the New Deal, almost all areas of social life have
required ,or appear to require) governmental action. The
degree and nature of public sector involvement now being
called for is a far cry from the public-private distinc-
tion premised by Lockean liberalism (and still touted in
current political rhetoric). a negative "invisible hand,"
operating on a number of present crises, requires an
enormous increase in collective control of the previously
self-regulated private sector and, with more difficulty,
the acceptance of a radically new perspective regarding
the amount of governmental intervention we must tolerate.
Failure in other subsystems (e.g., environment, urban
society, international economics) prompts and justifies
our turning to politics.
^et, not Of the de,„anas overloading the sys-te. can
.e attribute, to this so^.oe.
.or „an.
.roups
the poiitioal syste. has
.eco.e the new
..co..ons...
..^ry
"terest see.s a greater share of poi.tical lar.ess-
tarrff considerations, subsidy programs, tax benefits-
mindful that the burdens of such interest-specif io Xegis-
Xatron will be spread throughout society via higher
prices, higher taxes or hiaher ^g inflation rates stemming
from deficit spending, etc. The forces promoting a
tragedy of the political commons are formidable." Com-
pounding this new pressure on the political process is
government's continued concern with unresolved policy
areas; incremental ism does not solve problems so much
as defers them. Finally, additional time and energy must
now be devoted to the issues posed by the limits crises.
Thus, the demands placed upon the system have escalated
to threatening levels.
Parallel developments have been taking place with
respect to the qualitative nature of these demands.
Policy issues have become more complex and interrelated,
the variables that need to be considered are more numer-
ous, and the costs associated with delay or error are
much greater. Given these difficulties it is no wonder
that the impact of governmental action is often opposite
from expectations; r^licies operate counter intuitively . '
we stxU Know surp.isin.Xy lUtle a.o.t the into.connec-
txons t.„u,h „.xch poucy outp.„s (auU.o.ita.ive govern-
mental decisions, are trans.or.ea into policy impacts
(soc.al consequences,. This ignorance is heightened
"hen „e focus on issue-areas, such as the environment,
about Whose internal Cyna.ics even less is
.no„n
. Policy
overload is also related to the gravity of the problems
that ask for attentinn Tr,o . m an era of back-up systems
and low-level technology, the consequences of policy
mistakes were never irreversible or cataclysmic. Now,
however, errors in policy judgment can have severe reper-
cussions upon many other social, economic and ecological
events. As mentioned above, complex interrelated systems
and subsystems are more vulnerable. Thus, governmental
decisions are filled with immense risk, thereby placing
the political system under immense stress.
Add to these factors the role of time. If we ponder
over the problems associated with limits too long, if
we do not quickly appreciate the severity of the situation,
if our policies are piecemeal and ineffective, matters
can only worsen. The imiTiediacy of these crises clashes
with a political system prone to delay, obstruction and non-
decision-making. It is difficult for us to realize the
time pressures we are under. Geometric growth of our
energy needs, for instance, means that solutions posited
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on past re,u„e„,ents
^^^^
^^^^
—
..3 pace Of can,,
.eaves Utt.e
.00.
^or reflection a„a consultation
. In the present context
Of r.sk and uncertainty, it is no wonder that policy-
making is more stressful.
unfortunately, the political syste. has not adapted
to the new de.and structure of our stressful era The
to handle certain types of problems while ignoring or
anguishrng over others. Thus, the polrcy-.a..ng process,
by xts very nature, distorts our perception of a given
issue and prevents rational approaches toward its resolu-
tion. According to Karl W. Deutsch, the procedural and
conceptual biases of politics emphasize
ol^^fr fc.miliarver the new, the past over the presentthe present over the future. They in-volve overestimation or overvaluation
ot the organization compared to the en-
mth^rr^' °^ P^^t methods and com-ibments over new ones, and of its
current will and inner structure over
all possibilities of fundamental change.
The press of elections and the "now" mentality of the
electorate discourage long-range time perspectives,
especially those which attempt to justify present sacri-
fices. Simultaneously, fragmentation in the policy-forma-
tion process (pluralism and interest group participation,
checks and balances, veto groups, incrementalism,
.le,islative-co™,ittee-a,ency
aUiances, se.iousl, .
are supported in terms nf m • •O their immediate and personal
Pol.trcal benefits; thus, there is the tendency toward
syn^oUo acts whioh achieve temporary
.reathin. ti.e „Uh-
oot anta,on..in, the powerful interests which would feei
assured by pseudo-policies whiVhP c , like nondecisions gener-
ally, give time the opportunitv t-^y to aggrevate our condition
Without substantive leaislat^nr, rJ g iation, further deterioration of
our Physical and human environments is inevitable.
Realise, too, that past affluence (and the illu-
sions Of affluence, allowed us the lu.ury of irrationality
and waste. We never had to maximize the utility of every
dollar spent. The decision costs of increased policy
efficiency outweighed the benefits gained by attention to
marginal policy productivity. But in an age of scarcity,
economy is a necessarily important aspect of a program's
overall objective. Yet, such a concern represents a
basic conceptual shift for the public and for policy-
makers alike. The requirement for optimality increases
the decision costs (and thereby decreases the capacities)
of the system generally. v,e can expect political resis-
tance to efficiency reforms from groups that benefit from
patterns of waste and ineffectiveness. We cannot ignore
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the fact that „e have reached the present i^asse
-an part Because of the ahsence of past poUtrcal
prudence and rationality.
The procedures and instxtutrons of our political
syste. further complicate the tas. of fash.onin, an
effective response to the limit-cn its ciises. is our system
an appropriate vehicle for dealing with these new issues^
in an interesting article entitled
..clean Rhetoric, D.rty
water,..
„y,iek Pree.an in and Robert „. Have^an
. summarize the strnnt-nr-=in iuctural, systemic reasons why current
approaches to water pollution abatement (and environmen-
tal damage generally) are failing. The authors claim
that despite the legislation recently passed, the regula-
tory strategy being employed to limit pollution "pits
the power of public agencies against polluters in a con-
text in which the rules of the struggle and the information
available to each party are biased against the govern-
ment." 5 The economic inducements public policies offer
to companies result in sub-optimal measures being taken,
with financial benefit going to business but little gain
in water quality. Certain types of pollutants that are
less measurable or less visible are de-emphasized in
policy because political pressure stresses point source
pollution. Thus, feed-lot run-off, heavy metal pollution,
loss of soil fertility and nutrients, etc., are allowed to
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are not
continue. Federalism creates crn..cross-pressures which delay
onto anothe.. The lack of policy coo.aination and
Obstacles in the way of i„ple„,ent.ng legislation are
additional causes of failure. Here as elsewhere, the
PoUtical process distorts policy
.ntentrons. Solutrons
Which are technically and economically feasible
politically Viable. Antr-poUution policy has become
..other source of government funding, another chance to
distribute public largess towards oneself. Optimists who
.re counting on effective, efficient governmental action
Should consider the conclusion reached by Freeman and
Haveman:
"the continued spending of taxpayers' money to
clean up after polluters-along the lines of current
strategy-is going to be an enormously expensive and
relatively fruitless venture."^**
The idea of political limits is a credible addition
to the host of other challenges to growth. We may con-
clude that a syneryenic relationship is present. That
is, politics may magnify these challenges, distort rational
attempts to meet them, prolong costly and debilitating
trends and, in general, achieve minimum salutary effect
with maximum misallocation of resources and, therefore,
maximum negative impact on growth rates and standards of
living. It is also possible that the political system
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ove™He.„ea, u„..:e
.o cope „.u, poUc. ove.Xoaa
°^ co.frontin. Us own U„,ies, syste.
might collapse, a pathology best describe," c d as political
future shock.
SiS_J^5s__o£jLegitjjMio^
The nonphysical limits to growth discussed in
this Chapter are all indications of the failure of tech-
nique, the inability of various specralists to manage
the social system. The law of diminishing returns is in
effect on a societal scale.
The more complex the society, the
n^ore regulatory functions ar; requiredthe more lawyers are needed to argie
'
about inequities, the more administra-tive personnel are
.required to olan
supervise, and audit. Most of Itlsepeople are necessary to manage an ex-tremely complicated society, but theyinevitably drain away vast numbers oftax dollars and thus reduce the dis-posable income of the workers who areproducing the goods and rendering the
services for which people enjoy spend-ing their disposable incomes. 38
From a managerial perspective bigness, centralization,
intensive specialization and interdependence exact their
own cost in administrative inefficiency. in both the
public and the private sectors there are programs of
enormous waste, inconsistency and ineffectiveness. The
optimists' expectations of relatively painless managerial
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-aus ,or o.r ,™an and p.,3i.u p™We„,s a.e there-fore highly questionable.
Soch expectations provide the „,omentun, for an
accelerating cycle of Ce.and-failure-frustratron ,
heightened level of conflict co,„.rnes with an added sense
Of urgency on the part of combatants to improve or .a.n-
taxn their position through the conung economic crisis
However, in the absence of a spirit of course, trust
socral cohesion and patrence mutually satisfactory poli-
cies may not be found; the system fails toLc t live up to the
Cesires of concerned citizens. This further exacerbates
the Situation.
"The greater the failure of the State to
meet the demands made upon it the more the State is over-
loaded With fresh demands for it to rectify the shortcom-
ings of its performance. Frustration in some circles
™ay take the form of impulsive violence, disruptive
terrorism or well-directed social protest activity. The
failure of technique is transformed into a matter for '
politics: "Our traditional methods of election and manage-
ment no longer give administrators the skills and capacity
they need to handle their complex new burdens and deci-
sions. They become swollen, unresponsive-and repud iated . «
This grim prognosis strikes at the heart of our
political system. The era of the politicized society
foreshadows the end of consensus politics.
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ren5^?L"-*y.°f the system mav be
down. New forme, '"^^^^ ^-^^^ n ons is
^ ^ir^ii: -----
ries are revived, on new terms with
cr:aZe'L%"""^- Berr;r::,in.
cne desirable direction of change. 41
This serious observation is not necessari ly t ied to the
fate of any of the previous elements of the limits to
growth controversy. The squandering of the resource of
legitimacy is a separate guarantee that major social and
political changes are in the offing.
Conclusions
Chapters IV and V have examined the varied aspects
of the limits to growth controversy. The argument is
clearly not one-sided and will undoubtedly remain on the
social agenda until events decide the issue. However,
this is no reason to avoid taking a stand. Human choice
has a critical role to play: "probably the most important
factor in the complex equation of the country's future is
the way individuals will respond to crises ahead. "''^ So
we must choose between the combatants in this debate,
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snowing that a prudent weighing of th. av.ilahl •^ ^ ^ nc a b e evidence
IS always subject to reconsidor.MG sideidtion. My own analysis
leads me to nmnr-^h 4-u ,dccepL the limibs hypothetic, .''.yLJ"^nesis, not because the
expectations oi the p.o-,.o„th position are i^possi.ie
'
but because they are i.«probable.
At first yiance the issue seems to be one of bal-
'
-ce; a product or service econo.,,
,uaUtative vs. quan-
titative growth, a sociai- vs. private-benefit orientation,
cU.ecteC or uncontrolled development-these terms seem
to summarize the problems and choices confront.nc, th.s
nation. We need not limit growth, so the argument goes,
only re-emphasi.e certain of its components in order to
oonstruct a more appropriate and sustainable form of
economic growth. Growth advocates hope to avoid ma ior
structural change by successfully tinkering" „r th (and
within) the present system. The concept of technique is
at the heart of this position. The economist searches
for answers in the careful adjustment of free market
incentives. The scientist and engineer seek relief
through the application of their areas of specialized
knowledge. And the social scientist relies on the elli-
cient management of effective public policies. Technical
'solutions^' in this vein can overcome the obstncJes to
future prosperity without requiring basic and painful
alterations in our economic, social and political systems.
2G7
..nuG
Indeed, many conLcMid th^f- -iat the continuxny cjuest of the A,„eri.
r " - CO..,, .......
P™:ecti„,..„,,,.,,,„^,^,^^.^^,^,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
'^aveinaicat.a.at.h.utiono.oonn.ict.
Science an.
.oc,
nolcy have been the
.ene.o.ent forces that „iu conti
to reshape the physical environment in response to new
economic demands. "'^^
The curative power of tcchnolo.lcai tinkerinc, to
rectify the i.haiances of econon.ic ,rowth
.s, accor.in,
to the li„,its position, grossly inadequate to the type of
problems we now face. These superficial solutions yloss
over the touqh baf Llo^ -.nri m-,jn D L ics a d major consequonces which truly
effective policies would entail. More aud more observers
are impressed with the fundamental nature of the limits
crises. What of the claim that we need only adjust the
balance in our mode of development in order to success-
fully handle the disamenities of cjrowth? Tho " t inkeriny "
that would be required for this endeavor will necessitate
basic changes in our political economy. m effect, we
will have Uiereu^o) accepted a redefinition of growth, and
our acting on that new definition will be nothing short
of revolutionary. Tfius, while technology might ideally
alleviate a large part of the economic hardships and dislo-
cations we will experience, its effective use will have
major structuraJ. consequnnces
.
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^^ent to the public interest Tho h ^. e best outcome can hardlybe achieved when private interests fh. • •iiLcre , t e sacrifices of
which are a neri^c^o v,,cessary part of the total good, can preventthe passage of desired policv n •y. Conflict will cloud both
problems ana sol.Uons. in process,
.He ,ene„: lessen-
xn. Of our poutrcal capacities „U1 itself
.eco„e part
Of the overall crisis.
. reairstic appraisal woula con-
clude that faith in puhlic policies aesr.ned to maintain
growth levels is suspect. m an area so fraught with
-If-interest. socral importance and conflrctin, opinions,
PUbUc action will never be swift, clear, cost-effective
and decisive.
„e „iu probably continue past trends of
neglect, conflict, inconsistency and waste. The product
of our political labors „,ay bring relief, but it will be
transitory, costly and ultimately self-defeating.
The major consequence of the political factor will
be on the third variable--tim,^ if t„ .time. I technology attempts
to buy time for long-ranye solutions, it is equally
accurate to say that politics will often waste time. We
need to gradually adjust our structure to a new reality
and our minds to new attitudes. A conservationist mentality
does not develop overnight nor can it immediately motivate
actions and institutions. Yet, we have talked of crises.
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can
a term which assumes very ^iittle time for such social
and psychological shifts. Admittediv ^^iui ixttedly, time pressure
encourage the necessary impetus to decis.on-.a.ers, ,Z
-
does not create a cU.ate conducive to cal. deliberation
and rational proble.-solvin,
. This factor see.s to be the
-St crucial and most unknowable rn the controversy.
Reviewing the evidence, the „,ost prudent and plausi-
ble conclusion is that there wmrn ill be a long-term drag on
our economic growth. At best this will result in overall
stagnation with selective severe distress for „,any indus-
tries, regions and groups; at worst, economic downturn
will significantly lower the standard of living for n,ost
Americans.
Those who want to keep people a part of the history-
making process, who reject notions of historical impera-
tives or behavioral inevitability, ndght object to tl.e detenni^is.
implied in my analysis. I share with them the belief
that the future is always open to the handiwork of human-
kind. However, the various historical, ideological, physi-
cal and social forces discussed in Chapters IV and V
compose the context within which the subjective factors
of technology, politics and time interact. These struc-
tural givens may not determine the future but they do have
a future-shaping role to play. Problems in the physical
and human environment are imperatives in the sense that
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-ey are t.e
.,ena. our a.sc.ss.o,.
,,,,3
our energies.
^uch, they n.cess.rUy i.peae our
capacities, aivert our attenUon, aivi.e our collective
resources, re.uce our options an., uiti„,atei„ prevent an
accommodation between further ,ro„t„ and our values as a
people. The limits positron therefore encompasses
.ot,
Objective and subjective elements in reachrn, its conclu-
sxon. in the words of Kobert Ueilbroner,
..„hether ,^are
-"iHibl^^iL-2L^iii.ciro,^^
^^^^^
be no doubt that a radically different future beckons.""
Though events propel us toward limits, our polxti-
cal system hesitates, recoils and soe.cs expediency. It
is unprepared (or afraid) to accept the possibility of
limits, to conceptualize a no-growth society.
NO toerican politician has ever beenable to talk about [problems associ-
ated with a no-growth future]; indeed,there is no political language inflmerica-not yet—in which they can bediscussed, no language not founded onpremises of growth and expansion, andthe country desperately needs such alanguage
.
The demands of the transition period are enormous. Just
as growth helped mold our conception of ".hope," "success,"
and "the American way of life," so limits may be equally
demanding in reconstructing these images. However, if the
limits position is correct, we will, we must somehow have
to accept our new circumstances. Indeed, even though the
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political syste.
.ef.a.ns fro. conr.on.in, the issue
°^ no-g.o„th, „.ny people are slowly awaKenin, to the
prospects of lirnil-s r..^ i,i m L.. But how will society understand
and interpret the evolving political economy. The ne.t
Chapter examines the prospective Battle over this ,uestro„
its implications for the future of
..errcan politics.
CHAPTER VI
SPECULATIONS ON TIII^ FUTURE OF POLITICS
Introduction
This chapter speculates on the political questions
dominant in a no-growth or slow-growth future. Our
initial Objective, however, is to examine the process by
which society cones to recognize the new economic rea.Uty.
conflicts surrounding this process-fhe politics of aware-
ness-are the first shofs in the political battles to
come. Attention next turns to forecasting methodology.
Biases in current futures research are noted, and the
"scenarios" approach employed in this analysis is intro-
duced. Discussion then focuses on the various scenarios
competing for donu.nance in a future of limited growth.
Specifically we will study the conflicting interpretations
of limits vying for popular support, the strategic
appeals associated with those interpretations, and, fin-
ally, the factors determining the political success or
failure of the conflicting images of the future. The
chapter's conclusion probes the implications of "limits-
to-growth" for the future of democracy in America.
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Despite the evidence
.n f.vor of the li.Us-to-
Srowth posit.on
.ospite the headlines wh.ch
..pi..it-
o. Us vai.dity, the pressures fo. change have not
built sufficiently to force the creation of »t-i-cacio a new politi-
cal system premised on a new set of political issues
This ti.e la, is critical for the analysis which foUows
«e cannot usefully speculate on the dynamics of a future
political situation until we know how that situation
evolved. Eudolf Klein alludes to this preliminary concern
in posing the following question: "what are the social
and political processes which will produce a stable
society, as distinct from the social and political prob-
lems that may be created by the emergence of such a
societyr'l We need to examine the means by which the
limits-to-growth problems presented in Chapters IV and V
will lead to a general acceptance of economic limits.
The future is an outgrowth of the process of economic
decline as well as a product of a declined economy; put
another way, the politics of limited growth reflect the
politics of limiting growth.
Resistance to the Idea of Limit s
Creating a limits consciousness will not be easy,
so intense has been the support for the growth-as-is
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position. B. Bruco-Briggs (citing Hudson Institute
figures in an art.oXe representative of all professional
optimists, has proclaimed the present feasibility (read
desiraMUty, of a world of 15-.0 billion people consn,,,-
xng on average the products and services of a modern
American upper-.iddle-class fa„,ily-a 100 fold increase
in world productive capacity. ^ Additional examples of
optin,ism abound. Even the calendars seen, to inspire
confidence: "the cultural heritage of nullennialis.
leads to a widespread feeling of hope that rounding the
bend of this last thousand-year cycle will usher in a new
'
and better era for n,an."^ President Carter has discovered
that the energy crisis is not sufficiently war-like in
its magnitude, as of yet, to impress upon the public the
need for national unity above politics-as-usual. Indeed,
the mood of progress infests our attitudes almost in
'
spite of events around us. Individuals, divorcing their
own material fortunes from that of the society, expect
personal improvement even while acknowledging the troubles
of the present.''
The public's faith in future growth is further bouyed
by business interpretations of the limits debate. The ZEG
(Zero Economic Growtll) position, according to some
business analysts, is planting the seeds of' its own success.
Fruition depends not on actual environmental or sociopolitical
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i-uts create a climate of economic opinion
.es.stant
to growth. onrney Brec.enfeia
..ritin, in the Saturday
—
'
believes that current (and inture,
.iow^o:^^
--It tro™
..siness insecurity about the level of social
support for growth. Business leaders are hesitant about
making an investment in the futnrnunc r u e because of forces
which make their growth plans very risky (e acu i SK .g., consumer-
ism, environmentalism, labor demands, government inter-
ference, an anti-incentive tax structure). ^ Many of our
economic ills arc therefore "cured" with a healthy dose
of optimism. NO doubt there is some truth in this obser-
vation. A precipitous loss of public confidence would
very quickly incite a run-on-the-banks mentality and
result in a psychologically-induced economic collapse.
SO the maintenance of a positive economic posture, which
includes the belief that obstacles can be easily overcome
by technological advances or by minor adjustments, is an
important cause of business opposition to antigrowth
enthusiasts
.
International economic and political factors can
encourage a "growth-at-any-price
" attitude. When future
economic expansion is tied to notions of national security,
society tends to tolerate the domestic costs of growth.
David Amidon states this point clearly:
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There will continue to be virtu.
n
irresistible worlrl wnVi V ally
to growth prec?sel7so^.r""''""^^
i ny,^r^r.A ^^^^-^^^-^Y SO loncj as there
conflict iT.T^'''^ international
Policip=, t„ ^ anti-growth,
spates is the ate^v'
'^"^'^"^^^^ nation-
blocs i-ofv tachment of rival
ness Of ec^°"°' ^^'^ related-onomics and power and pres-
selms to "afford a
°PP°''t™ity which
power i°
chance to increase
«het^ej-r:!;cSnt[ro^cr;L\-fnrjr'^:"-
3^^= f--^- that a^ythinq'thafi?,^ht
canno? H '^"'^"^'^ its poJert be neglected as a possible aH
Growth"" col.?rictwth of course, is generally sup-
.
posed to contribute fairly directiyto increased national power. 6 ^
Resistance to growth-reducing policies takes on the aura
of patriotism. This, however, will not still the debate.
Programs will be proposed which, for instance, impose
strict regulatory standards on the discharge of industrial
wastes. If foreign "enterprises were not subject to
similar stringent supervision, they would enjoy relative
price advantages in international trading."' This would
adversely effect our balance of payments, spur the export
of investment capital, magnify the economic impact of
antipollution policy, and thereby intensify resistance to
a limits-to-grovrtli awareness.
A great deal of the popular opposition to the limits
position can be attributed to the structural biases in
how we perceive indicators of the costs of growth. The
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as „a.u„i.
.0 accept pre..,,,
natural problems as the 7oro .zei base acjainst which to con.parefuture disamenities. Our past .v,experience with limited
con.u.os up :U. u.e „.,.,3 of
.„,„,,,„3
periodic recession, an. depressions
.Ha. have increase,
unemployment, decease. Uvin, stan.anKs, an.
.eon the
source Of so „,uch
.tsen-. The equations have been hurnec,
" the public's consciousness:
.„.-owth = affluence.
l-i".its
= deprivation. Perceptual bias is also a factor
in the weicht „e yxve to economic measures of well-bein,,
AS a result, people are inclined to overlook any evidence
that economic activity may be reducing their standard of
living. communities defend industrial plants that pollute
the air and water because of the alleged primacy of mone-
tary considerations, other examples indicating a similar
distortion of values can be found.
Perceptual bias also refers to the way in uhich
signals of decay are conceptually isolated from their
economic and political roots.' The health hazards imposed
by certain types of pollutants are difficult to monitor.
Built-in time lags, interactions wi i h environmental pro-
cesses and synergistic relationships with other pollutants
(as explained in Chapter IV) complicate the task of tracing
responsibility for the specific danger to a specific
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e
be
co^eroiax ac..v.U.. Kn-,
. o™,ental Capers „Me.
,„.,,,es.the^selves
....eas.n, a,,.e,ate v„,„era.nu. a..„easin,
the likelihood that ha™ «iu occr thah ah-,"
'
'-•lat higher percentag
°^ the population win ,e aiiected, that the severity „U1
proportionate!, greater, perpetrate the raea that ^rvid.alfate and chance, not political and economic structure,rTI7
behind the pollution pro.le.. continuing along this sa,„e
vein, many dramatic q-innQ o-f ^signs environmental decay are perceived
to arise from diverse and seemingly unrelated sources. As
a result, broad demands for basic relor,,, get transformed ,nto
weak piecemeal and issue-specific proposals; examples include
an air inversion in Los Angeles, unreclaimed strip-minod land
rn Ohio, soil erosion in Kansas, cancer deaths and birth de-
fects near nuclear power facilities, massive oil spills off
the Texas coast, or a worsening water table in Florida, viewed
as isolated cases, these events could be minimized as the
•price Of progress" or the "plight of industrial man." A
similar form of perceptual evasion occurs regarding the popu-
lar understandinc, of social problems. The tendency here is
to place the blame for crime, delinquency, declining social
cohesion, etc., on the superstructure (e.g., permissive values)
rather than on the substructure (inequality). It is obvious
that overcoming these biases and building an awareness of
the true import of the growth crisis will be painful and
therefore resisted by many.
This resistance is not confined to any one ideological
position. Opposition to limits spans the political spectrum.
Advertisements by companies favorinq growth skirt
the fundamental nature of the limits debate. A public
2 79
--ice
.essa.e p.o.oted
,.,e
.VK.ert...n, Council of
A.eri.a
...s.ness a.na.n„ as.s „Uat one person can .o
to so.ve t.e polXut.on c..sis. rn.
...esUons Uste.
<-9., Cleaning spark pl.,s to cjet better ,as „ulea,e,
putting Utter in a Utter basket, are olterec, as v.tal
steps towar. an eC.ective solution to envrron.ental decay
The prece concludes with a reveaUng plea: "Above aU
let's stop shitt.ng the bla.e. People start pollution.
People can stop it. When enough A.,erieans realise this
we'll have a fighting chance in the war agarnst pollu-
tion." This approach not only diverts responsibrlity;
it also sets out a hopeful and basically painless
.cans
of avoiding the basic growth-environment choice.
Leftists also attempt to deny the li„,its argument.
Claiming that scarcity has been contrived in order to
increase corporate prices and profits, Stanley Aronowitz
is very „uch a part of the progrowth perspective. "I
believe that the chance of stemming xnflation depends
entirely on finding ways to expand production of real
goods. "9 Gus Tyler reinforces the same theme." His
support for left-liberalism is based upon the expectation
that, once in power, its representatives can remove many
of the contradictions of capitalism which inhibit the
economy's future growth. Both authors contend that the
slow-growth position is elitist and inegalitarian. While
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there is much substance to thp,',- mhen charges that corporate
policies lie behind resour,-o =,ource bcarcity, other elements of
the limits argument are less clenn,-J-es arly a matter of conscious
manipulation. That is n,o „u-n a , the characterization of the no-
growth position as eUtist does not rin, true. m anv
case, the pro-growth stance taken by most companies and
leftists indicates the ideological breadth of the resis-
tance the limits position generates.
Final mention should be made of the "insider's"
assumption that the pollution issue will follow the usual
cycle Of public problems and eventually decline in popu-
lar attention. This is a common pattern, according to
Anthony Downs, but one that is unlikely to occur for
this policy area." The author cites a number of reasons
why he expects that ecological matters will remain in
(perhaps even dominate) the public spotlight, reasons
which can also apply to other problem areas we have
examined.
This, then, is the dilemma of transition
— the
confrontation between a set of events and concerns which
will demand increased attention and massive resistance
to the economic implications of these events. How will
this resistance be overcome? The following section
discusses the various ways in which the public will accept
the validity of limits to growth. This is the politics of
awareness
.
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Those „Uo already have
.ee„ convertea,
„Ho welcome
°^ have .e.U,nec,
,he„selves to the i.penain, aecX.ne
.rowth rates, ao not reaaUy a.ree a„,o„,st themselves on
ow the p^hUe.s
..a„a.en.n,.. ta.e place. Some o..erversbel.eve that society „Ul vol.ntarUy accept the ethics
no-,ro„th. reduce personal and social aspirations anddevelop into a ior. of steady state.
.he toUowrn, com-
-nt by Erich
.antsch is indicative of this line of
thinking
:
T'\IT'T"'''' ' ''''''' ^-^"^i 1 think it
iL, possible conclusion, isthat we shall have to net the W^sJerncountries not only to prevent their
We:t"TJlJ h^ that'^he
dard of ; • ^^""""^ ^'^^ rnaterial stLn-
cu??.- I
°^ ^^^^ population,
a sh^ro ^
consumption and taking
tion o? ^ ^
"'"^"^ equitable distribu-f the world's resources. ThisIS going to be hard on the Westerngovernments and even harder on thepeople. -LS
such a view depolitici.es the process of linuts "conscious-
ness raising" and consequently is able to gloss over the
conflicts that such a transformation would entail. A
variant explanation of the vol unta ri ..t ic transition is
offered by Walter A. Weisskopf
. According to Weisskopf,
everyone in society is experiencing a profound loss in
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non™ate..a.
..,..3
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
the steady state is desirable existential
,
„
ly even thouah
It IS not yet a physical necessitv t 1^ y. I do not doubt thetruth of this conclusion hu^ ^ •, b t It IS quite another
.natter
to assume that our exi sto„n , ,ential loss applies to all and
xs seen with similar clarity by everyone.
The Obstacles to voluntaristio transition scenarios
are both political and conceptual. First, while the
sta.es people have in maintaining present arrangements
are real, the future remains vague; interests have not
yet concretised. One's losses from change are often
Obvious but the future's constituency cannot speak with
as firm a voice. Admittedly, some people can identify
their interests in a no-growth future and voluntarily
accept its con.straints. For most others, however, living
in a culture that is bent toward the "here and now," a more
compelling reason to forego growth will have to be found.
Second, the shift to a mentality of economic limits is not
something that can be imagined or Intel lectualized easily.
Awareness can come best only with hard experience (al-
though how "hard" that experience will have to be is open
to debate). An interesting demonstration of this point
is found in a story told by Jerry Mandel on understanding
the idea of finiteness.
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I have some friends who about threeyears ago moved to Hawaii after living mc3st of thpir- i -; , Lc i -
land, and who ^econtlv"they are si,Ff=;; « ^ wiote me that
ness
(^''^^"^f'^ring from island sick-
TALiUTrTT" tIT°"''- f- -^l-triatodriving aro:^d'?,™^rj:„^™^^
lt.Tnt,t'2 ^^^"^in^ tha't
appe"ar?'^L^°rnr.:r^^^:^-^-" "^--^^
thi.s'p?oBfii^ °^ Hawaii don't have
sUt"d"'^?"'^-^^^'~
?rlLa'°d:f4^'^->^ about gettrng Off
"
The limits perspective cannot be internalized
,y any volun-
tary effort of will To ^r.m^. l some extent we have to live it,
experience it, in n-rr^c^y
.
o der to appreciate the change it demands
in our outlook and conduct.
A quasi-voluntaristio vision sees the coming
decline as a result of the reevaluation of public marginal
utilities and a subsequent steady adjustment to a less
expansive and more ecologically livable society. The
gradual transfer of funds from private material to public
or nonmaterial sources of satisfaction is, in fact, what
is presently occurring under the notion of personal and
social trade-offs:
"as environmental quality deteriorates,
people will, through voluntary controls and the political
process, divert resources from material goods to environ-
mental types of material well-being."" Technology helps
buy time to avert the most serious effects of this exchange,
to allow for its psychological acceptance, and to insure
284
that the economy and the socip;^„ ,> iety can adapt gradually
The growth mentality (and n,„ ^therefore the political influ-
ence Of growth.s advocate., slowly loses rts pulUng
power as the high costs and deep contradictions of further
.rowth
.eoome self-evident.
...s last point has heen
aptly Phrased
.y .y,,,.^
conventional
economic assumptions prove inconsistent with emerging
ecological realities,
• economistic UUnking loses
credibility..."
,,,3 gradualist version of limits-aware-
ness Places us in the middle or turning point of a classic
S-shaped growth curve. As we approach the
..ceiling condi-
tions', imposed by a closed ecological system, the slope
JHlturally levels of f
. The question of how to reduce
growth is irrelevant. We would not voluntary choose a
steady-growth policy and repudiate growth; instead, we
face the prospect of slowed growth (with some regret, I
suspect) as a consequence of policies dealing with other
problems that have risen in priority to the
..crisis.,
stage—social breakdown, water pollution, etc.
This vision does have a political element. The
incremental antigrowth impacts of numerous, separately
contended policies, rather than the conscious mass accep-
tance of the steady state, more realistically portrays
sociopolitical processes. In addition, it does not fall
victim to the failing found in much of the ZEG literature.
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The social values we have lost-i st-coimnunity,
unalienatinq
work life, authentic personal relationshio.-i-t,xdi.ionsnips
— cannot be
Of our econcv, not Us continue, y.owt..
... the root
cause Of gro„t„-.inaucea pro.le.s,
.na, as ,.as
.een often
scenario assumes that the crd c.^^ „^x-n ises we will confront can
be overcome through piecemeal pro.ra.s, that our structural
dependence on growth can be withdrawn in stages. Thxs rs
-
n,y opinion, not lively. E. P. Schumacher parnts a
-re accurate picture of the difficulty involved:
..the
present consumer society is liko . ,-LCL e a drug addict who, no
matter how miserable he mav fp^^i -f^ iy teel, finds it extremely diffi-
cult to get off the honk "^^ an n o . Any time gained by techno-
logical advances is, like an addict's "one last fix," a
reason to believe that limits can be permanently avoided,
and therefore a chance to postpone the processes of reform.
Gradually "tapering off is conceivable but not probable.
An effective way of encouraging a limits-awareness
is by indicating the consequences of ignoring its inevi-
tability. AS Frederick Ferr6 poses the dilemma,
Either the ending will be involun-
tary and tragic, through the dooms
of starvation and disease, or through
widespread pollution catastrophe, orthrough economic collapse due to ex-haustion of nonrenewable resources-
or the ending will be voluntary [gradu-
?"^19 • * "^^^sly horrondously dif-
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The potential of disaster i« ,s a popular theme. This quote
-
.ndrcative of the general Moo„.saa,.. approach to no-
™. .erre offers socret. no choice re.ardin, ii„,U3
but a very important choicp whhiC e ith respect to when the pub-lic recognizes the necessi tv of .loceosi y reducing growth. Delay
brxngs on disaster. x„ reality, though, the doo.sday
'
^^terature is a..ed not at prediction but at dra.a.
.
believable simulation of a major social or environmental
crisis may be sufficient inducement for readjustment in
.rowth policy.
,.,y own Reeling is that such simulations
wxll have negligible effect on long-term trends given the
strong resistance to the limits position.
A more realistic and less r^r^mn^ ^cinu dra atic version of the
disaster thesis ought to be examined. Perhaps our economy,
structured for growth rather than for stability, will
periodically overshoot its natural limits (whatever they
may be at any given time) and then abruptly tall back
down to a lower level of economic activity and personal
(dis)comfort. Robert Heilbroner posits this bleak sequence
Of events in his analysis of our awakening to the new
order.
There seems no hope for rapid changesin the human character traits that
would have to be modified to bring about
a peaceful, organized reorientation oflife styles.
. . . The myoj^ia that con-tines the present vision of men to the
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TOre diffi°uir"^9''^' rendering stiu
retrench,;;:nt'an; r^edi^f u^n'r'^f'^
foreJ urS;"L^--;:„-'---;--n,e
"thei than by conscious rhoico hv
^xcixiy viable social system. 20
Spas^otio growth thrusts, followed hy periods of retrench-
-nt, depression, and severe hardship, win by
.agrees
^Iter oor psychological and structural inclination toward
""bounded, undirected ^ater.al growth.
.
..storm oi cr.sis
problems" will urnvir^c ^ •p ovide a sufrrcrent enough demonstration
of the inevitability of limits ^^y i to iorce some reevaluation
of personal and social goals.
This examination of the possible transitions to a
limits awareness addresses a number of the concerns
raised in this chapter. First, the level of conflict
engendered in coming to grips with our economic fate will
carry over into the future. Intense animosities will
hinder consensual no-growth strategies whereas a spirit
Of common sacrifice will be to their benefit. Second, the
manner of our confronting limits will go far to determine
the actual level of sustainable growth we will have
achieved, an issue of immense and obvious importance.
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Third, the debate over Limits wiJ I .x ll continue even afterthe structure ha. adapted. rxu.n^^. . •L pa sionist interests want-ing once more to i 004- 4-vU.st the waters oi: growth will face
countergroups seeking qualitifiv. •J at e improvements from further
Fu^tures_Je£ecu^
The e.e.,ence of a
-rutures.. industry has
.pawnee,
the kind Of adherence to do^.a prevalent rn other
.ore
established disciplines.
"Professronal predrctions'' eo„,e
fro. acadenucs „„a research rnst.tutes which contemplate
the future fron, the vantage point of economic and techno-
logxcal imperatives. Decision-making (and therefore
future-creating, in the post-industrial society will be
marked, according to thrs school of thought, by reliance
on specialized knowledge rn all spheres of policy-making.
Ideological (value, considerations give way to questions
Of technique. Increasingly, the rationality of means and
ends loses its political element and takes on a determin-
istic meaning. Although paying lip-service to the idea
of value choices and public input, many futurists support
a set of assumptions and criteria which effectively pre-
determine or at least strongly bias the eventual policy
selection.
289
Samuel P.
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
comments on it in the following:
social and 1^ f ^ ''^ ^'^^ economic,
teristic:
''T^ey'do .Ur''""-'
role to the natL T ^""^ ^ central
institutions? po iticai'^ro'"'^'^^^^
political rulers o^ noi^f '^f^"'^'Tn a „„ i i , r political valueso a considerable degree inf^,^t tt'
Tl]r^J^^r^^ cincept^-i^n-^
This omission is somewhat understandable. Like experts
'
in other fields, futures
..experts" tend to interpret
political input as interference. An acknowledgement of
public Choice adds a major element of ambiguity to predic-
tions. Therefore, the hope as well as the expectation
is that this factor not enter their equations.
However, the conclusion that politics is absent
is not entirely accurate. The establishment approach to
future forecasting is as political and strategic as was
the ..end of ideology', position voiced a generation ago.
Perhaps the most lucid statement of this criticism is
made by Jan Miles in The^overty of Prediction
. On the
implications of technical methodology upon futures
research generally:
It is probable that quantitative social
science is largely reinforcing rather
than challenging an image of a future
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tion and statistical ^?^h "^^"''^^^-^i"i-
priesthood, can coL. v ?^ •-science
that onlv fho the impression
t?ons Sf^ecLicar'""""""'^^' prescrip-
validityjr ^^^^1 experts have any
Deference to expert
-i^f^ -i o ^-Kise is the encouraged norm. Not only
the public and its representatives but a] so .h.DUX, l t e researchers
themselves may become
"mystified" with the supposed cer-
tainty Of the quantified conclusions. But what are the
actual political biases of this antinniit-^ ^Luro ipolitical approach?
Miles continues:
Thus a great deal of current researchconsists Of treating trends as univer-
^o '.Iv ' ?
^''''^^^ Predictionso lely contingent upon technological
and economic forecasting, of technolocri-cal fixing- and technological planning,of prescriptions of piecemeal reform to
'
ensure the adaptability of the status
auo, and of pouring scorn upon ^"tiH"a-tive conceptions of the future. 2 3
The dominant futures research paradigm utilizes a methodol-
ogy which gives the appearance of objectivity but is
in fact biased, reaching conclusions which give the
appearance of inevitability but are in fact open to
political choice.
Additional bias stems from the irrelevancy of much
of the forecasts coming out of the establishment perspective.
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Their proiectics tena to ove„„.phasi.e changes thefor.s Of society. Por example, alterations in the
context
„ith.n wh.ch traditional social forces operate
(e..., P-3iaentraX-Con,ressionaX
relations, feaeralis,,,,
the future of our cities) m;,v ic ay leave untouched the most
important substantive issue<.ues (e.g., degree of control
individuals exercise over 1 i f o ulife-shapmg decisions, changes
-
the allocation of valued material and nonmaterial
-sources).
.He fre,uentl. idealised
.mage of a consnm-
errst future ignores the more basxc question: WUl the
new gadgets and services of tomorrow improve our lives
or divert our attention or be a cause for further enw,
conflict and insecur.tyP P.ture modes of social organx-
zation-the formal element-may not address our deeper
need for more rewarding social re la t ionshxps
, an increased
potential of self-actuali.ing lifestyles, or more secure
and satisfying self-images. The politics of the future,
if it is to have meaning as a distinct change from the
present, must involve some impact on these most basic
of issues. Trends and alternatives must have a connection
with the substance and not just the forms of the future.
Given the heavy influence of the technofutur ist
perspective, it becomes critical to reemphasize the role
of people above imperatives. Dennis Gabox states the case
we 1 1
:
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The future will be mad. lo^. bv uhn^ •objectively
I rno" ik-. , ^ '^'^'hat is
take to bo t rue hr. :r ^"^ ''^'''^ P^°Ple
to their qon r , 7 ^''^'y '''^''^'^ that
about it,^what'they^^::^^Hr;^^^/^°
^ and what di r flLnco
'imake tor the tin, 5 ^'^'"'''^ efforts
will thus crea;ef24' "^^"'""^^^ '^'^^ they
-
this regard, the often-abused word
..crisis., is useful
-
discussin, stressful social sUuations because it is
not deterministic but nn 4kjjLii., o the con f- 1 ittary, leaves room f-or--
indeed, probably necessifates-.political " activity.
An attention to crisis brinqs us tofocus on the particular iss. is of pub-
po?n?s"irtim'' particulari ts m ti e, on the policy optionsthat were considered and chosen b^governing and influential el tes andon the way in which the cri t cal re-
:ff:ct:d?25^°--^^^^ actors- w;L^^
The future is open-despite the probable constraints of
economic limits-and many alternatives exists from which,
presumably, the people will select. How we view the
possibilities, potentials and implications of these options
(in fact, whether we contemplate them at all) will deter-
mine the shape of our future.
The thought that the public will somehow collective-
ly select one or another alternative future seems the
height of political innocence. Yet, in a very real sense
this will inevitably occur. Specific issues will of course
be handled by those few in positions to make decisions.
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The ™..s.oIe Win,, to p.ov..,e a context wUhin
"hich policies are chosen, an.
.u, ,:Hat sense it wUi
help predetermine the oFficim „ , .lf,c. al evaluation of the potential
alternatives. Wendell Bell and aa„,es A. „au present a
™odel of social change which incorporates the pubUc
Choice perspective.^^ it is sche.aticaUy represented
Figure 1. According to Bell and Hau, the decisions
that help Shape the future evolve out of an accepted
i.nage of the future. This i.age is formed ,a„d continu-
ally reformed) from the interact-inn ofx coract o our perceptions
Of reality and our personal and social values. it, in
turn, operates w.i thin the decision-making process to set
in motion the ludxvidual and collective actions that will
construct a new reality. To be sure, an image is not
self-fulfilling. It might be unrealistic and therefore
beyond the system's capacity, or ,: may be short-sighted
and contain the seeds of its own destruction, or it may be
thwarted by outside factors which society can neither
anticipate nor control. Generally speaking, however, an
appropriate, popular and dynamic image of the future
shapes behavior, attitudes and institutions and thereby
summons forth its own realization.
The greatest obstacle to image-actualization is
the inevitable conflict that will occur among divergent
images of the futu.re. The technocratic model discussed
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Source: Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, "Imaqes of the
, Theory and Research Strategies," Pelland Man (eds.), The Sociologv of the Future(New York: Russm-Taye-T6unaa4i§§^4w p
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ives and
above is composed
„.,„e.ous
.r.n.U alternat
Choices but it
.as.caUy conforms to Tho.as Ku.n
.
--iptiono. a dominant paraai,.." T.e e„o.t o. so,„e
^nte.ests i„ soc.et. to propagate t.Us
.„a,e to the e^cXu-
-on of alternative scenarios ina.cates the political as
wen as inteiiectuai nature o. paraai,. contircts. Co.ni-
zant Of this fact and critioxzrn, the narrow perspectives
Of technocratic planners,
.rthur I. Waskow wants to
encoorage a
..politics of r.a.ininc,. in order to create
and publicize a variety of approaches to the future. 2«
But, as John McHale states surh h^, ^^^ , c a development is already
taking place due to the tenor of i-ho +-
•
Lc t the times m which we
live.
There are multiple future posslbili-
chnnni"
Present replete with rapida ye, uncertainty and trubulence
dvnan??
seemingly oppos;dy amic forces or trends. Divergenttheories of the future simply reflectthis situation of flux and indetermin-acy indeed they are part of that com-petitive process of imposing meaning
upon human events in a "situation in
which no plausible theory has emerged. "^^
The future is fluid and "up for grabs" until such time as
a picture of the issues central ho Limits to growth poli-
tics captures the continued attention and firm support
of the public (or of that segment of the public interested
in and capable of having an impact on decision-making).
What then is the future of politics? It cannot be a
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static vision; rather, politics vin , .ur e vrll be dynamic, reflect-
^n, a Ion,-ter.„ competition between
.roups ana iaeolo.ies
that are attempting, through the promotion of a speoific
-age, to set the
.Mased, groundruies tor the ne.t halt
century of our history. m short, society will „e
.uided not
.y a ooilective rmage of the future but by
the balance of poirtrcal power among contrasting and com-
peting images.
Delineating these specific alternative images is
the most futile of undertakings. People's expectations
and desires will change as circumstances change. Also,
in a real sense we each have our own individual dreams
(and fears) for A„,erica. Finally, many of the better
publicized images are form variations on a sxngle sub-
stantive theme. The full scope of possible futures cannot
be encompassed within one paradigm. I have chosen to
sketch out four alternative images or scenarios, not be-
cause they represent all currently viable options for
policy-making and future-creating, but because they are
sufficiently diverse to include the major perspectives
of social theory. These scenarios will be offered as ideal
types, indicative of four distinct forms of political/
electoral/psychological appeals. The neo-liberal or plur-
alist scenario' represents, in essence, a continuation of
present political, social, and ideological arrangements.
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niodified somewhat to adaot tn ^^ rp o the fact of economic limits.
The radical or neo-M^rvio^arxist paradicjm views limits as an
opportunity to create ^ iof4-a left-oriented mass constituency
de.andin.
.asic change in the stratification system.
.he
corporate-conservative or neo-fascist model is primarily
a counter image, designed to thwart leftist influence
While continuing to centralize political, economic and
social power in the hands of an elite. The traditional-
authoritarian or middle-Class conservative position seeKs
to accept limits by reverting to a more static social
system and more controlled forms of economic activity.
Within each image a great deal of disagreement can be
found, but it is the differences among these scenarios,
not within them, that constitute the broadest- that is,
the least self-limiting-conception of future politics.
The strategies associated with each image of the
future are also ideal types, to be strategically discarded,
readjusted or combined as social, economic, and political
conditions warrant. The success of a strategy will depend
upon its ability to convince the public that its expecta-
tions, its scenario of future events, aid its explanation
of the present, more realistically and beneficially deal
with the new economic situation. If a given image is to
garner support, it must respond to a number of pivotal
questions. Who is to blame for economic hardship
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(rainorities, foreign powers cioih.i' .tix , apLLalisLs, etc.)? By
what measure are we to doF-ir.^ef ne our interests (as a nation,
a class, a group)? Whaf
-i f •t, If anyllnng, can be done (reform,
revolution, resignation, etc ) tm^ .)? The response to these
questions will form the crux of any strategy.
The political interaction between the competing
scenarios gives the publrc the opportunity to assess the
appropriateness an. desirability of each. But this evalu-
ation is not done m isolation. The context determines
the relevancy and relative strengths of the various
'
i-ges. certain variables are vitally important in aid-
ing or hindering a strategy's quest for popular support,
by their ability to affect the public's prior perceptions
of the situation. This is the core feature of a futurology
that has not become depoliticized
, in which interacting
strategies and socioeconomic developments will combine
to shape a new set of normative predispositions and,
with them, a new political system.
This is politics in its most dramatic form, a
critical battle not over a specific issue but over which
of numerous perspectives will mobilize the political
loyalties of the nation for the next 50 years. To impose
one's perspective upon the political system has enormous
consequences on the kinds of conflicts generated, the
kinds of policies passed and the winners and losers in the
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political wars. it is ^-Ls small woru oj Utti-t.nat interpretations
°^ the present an. i„,a,es of the auure are hotly con-
gested,
sohattsohneiaer
.escri.es what is at
Stake
:
The_definition of t-hn i i-
.
I I.e. the dominant preipe"^ tTv-iT-T^suprc^e_^^
J>f power- ^he
?he'?ss;:s\!S^'it, issue are because power i qvolvedin the definition? He whodetermines what DolifnV.J •
the country/ because iho Vr"^"^^'
of thf- ^n-i^ t e definition
confVT.^ ""I^'"'^^ the choice of
a??n ? ' of conflictsllocates power. ^1 ^^uxxx l
The following four scenarios-the s trateai ^-v .i-iit, bc gies that promote
them, the values that are imDljrih in •p ic t m them, the interests
that are favored or disadvantaged by them-all are
potentially part of the politics of the future.
Liberalism
^2l£_Case__for Ideological ContinujJ-v
The neo-liberal (or liberal capitalist) perspective
is a valid point of departure since, despite numerous
claims of its imminent demise, liberalism remains the
dominant paradigm of our culture. As the historic concep-
tual context of our political system, it defines, at least
initially, both the major policy issues and the terms of
debate. The liberal scenario of the future depends for
3 00
1 ve
pres-
^ts attractiveness on the a.Uity to pa.-, alternat
-ages While cjraauail, aUaptin, and evolving to the
-.es o. eoono„.o i...ts.
.o the extent that the
w^Xl be an incremental out,„„th of present trends, a
modified form of lihr.,-^!Ixberal-capxtalrsn. stands a faxr chance
of maintaining its dominance.
Charles W. Anderson defends ^hou r t e pursuit of ideo-
logical continuity.
lulion b wh "k' ' *° line, of evo-t ich we might contrive
.ore desirable £uture\itna'"tior ou ofthe materials at hand.
. . i „onld
t'"':^'
'° possibilities con-ained rn the going concern than to
mode?f ' scenarios of the fu ure or
TltlL'i "iticism ,„ defininga ernatives for public choice.32
This is faith in liberal millenniaUsm, m the expectation
that bold, rational policies, prompted by a spirit of
sacrifice and cooperation for the public good, will solve
our new problems in the new age. Obviously, liberalism
is under attack; the language of personal and group asser-
tion-"nonnegotiable demands," "total] y unacceptable
proposals"-may very well result in nonUberal policies of
coercion, a form of institutional counter-assertion. But
there is also the possibility that the urgency of the
crisis will sufficiently modify consensus politics to
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and to adequately Un the public
' s eyes) respond to
emerging social pressures. Aided hvby the expertise and
technology of the social natnr.il i, u al and applied sciences,
lauded equally by corporate leader. .nH •P c s a d union spokesmen,
Republicans and Democrats, this scenario envisions that
we Will aeal with econc.c limits within the parameters
Of our current political structure. This optimistic
Claim shouM not be aismissed lightly. Because Uheralis™
w^ll most probably continue to control the policy-.a.rng
apparatus and dominate the political spotlight for the
immediate future it faii^. I falls upon other perspectives to
mount a serious and successful challenge. If the liberal
response to limits proves viable, its electoral strategy
effective and its image of the future popular, then most
of tomorrow's politics has already been written.
Themes and Policies
A number of themes will most probably be included
in this paradigm's appeal for support. Not wishing to deny
completely the possibility of future growth-that is, still
relying on this m.eans of moderating social conflict-the
liberal strategy would claim that economic progress remains
a realizable goal. Though reduced, regulated, and perhaps
redefined, economic expansion could continue and thereby
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conunue its consensual innuence; the shadow o. growth
wouM serve U,c sa„e function as ,.»tH hac, served pre-
v-usi,.
....e is ai„a,s the possiMi.t, overe.tencUn.
ourselves. The rrs.s of „,a,or reversals
,in social,
"
ecological an. economic ter„s, „oui. force the
.over cnt
"
-
—
^
-.at encourage aan.erous
unsustainable levels of growth. A,,randi.in, impulses
Of corporations
„,ay have to be reduced, likewise, the
destabilising i„,pact of consumer demands will
.erhaps
decline. But on the whole the values of competitive
striving, consumer orientations and material progress
so central to the liberal-capitalist ethos wxll not be
eliminated, only tempered.
Growth wil.l still be a prime objective of public
policy, but the actual nature of growth may be redefined
to avoid the envxronmental pitfalls of industrial expan-
sion. Spending on social services-public investment-
would not directly confront the environmental factors
limiting industrial growth and additionally would perhaps
impact positively on the symptomn and causes of social
decline, easing pressures from that quarter. Mass trans-
portation is the most obvious example of this shift, but
other forms of collectivist
, coopera t i vist ownership and/or
usage is just as indicative (time-sharing arrangements for
clothes washers and dryers or vacation homes, multifamily
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dwellings/ comnmnity based Pnfo.n •Y D enteitamment centers such
as museums ana p„..,
. <anticxpated, continued
transition to a service economy, whether publicly or
privately funded, will further- ,il ther those dimensions of growth
least threatened by environmental repercussions
.
The fly in the ointment is the lack of economic
Wherewithal brought on by limits. with industrial profits
declining and inflationary pressures making budget defi-
cits even less desirable, the money for the above policy
agenda is not easily found. The general belt-tightenmg
will effect government spending levels, perhaps leading
to politically explosive cutbacks. Whatever the rationale
in terms of growth and efficiency, the familiar pattern
of policy retrenchment in times of economic retrenchment
will probably recur.
It might be more realistic to expect, at least
initially, a change not in definitions of growth but in
the means by which growth can be encouraged. Through a '
deeper understanding of the problems we face and of the
most modern techniques of political economy, the govern-
ment (and by this is meant primarily the federal govern-
ment) can enable the economy to drastically reduce
inefficiencies and contradictions. Public aid to and
administration of the private sector, so the argument
goes, will be the difference between a spirit of hope or
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one of despair. Cont-nl r.^Lra planning a„d control can lessen
the doplicat.on rn.erent in competitive capital.s.; it
can direct production towards ecolo.,ically sound goods
-d services (thus reducrng the possrbiLrty of adverse
impacts on our ccoJoci vW ^ 4-e l jy), It can coordinate our resources
on the national level to strengthen our econo.xc pos.-
tion vis-a-vxs toreicn trade rivals; rt can further
cooperation between possibly antagonistic elements of
the economy; it can promote research and development
efforts. In short, planning and control wxU maxindze
Whatever growth potential is still available to us. Only
by this further merging of the economic and the political
systems can we apply the tools for sound econo.xc recovery
More trust and confidence will be tendered to the politi-
cal system in order for it to carry out these functions.
But this does not reflect- a departure from the liberal-
capitalist paradigm. The growth in formal governmental
power will not be a threat to private business interests
since the thrust of policy will take the form of incen-
tives for growth and profits (through use of various
subsidies, market control arrangements, and mechanisms
for shoring up consumer demand). The expansion of public
responsibility for growth rates represents an adjustment
of a second-order value (limited governm.ent) in order to
protect the viability of a more critica] and central value
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.lor-
(-SS acuiescence to unequal wealth due to the a.el
at.n, effects of economic
,.owth)
. The fus.n, of social
and scient.fic technolo,, creates an
..press.ve potential
to deal with the problems of limits The-Lx j.i:s. iiie scenario antici-
pates that liberalism will reas-um no • •soure us spiritually as it
attempts to revive us economically.
We need to note that this scenario requires even
-re economic concentration than presently exists. Accord-
ing to Anderson, central planning as a "technique only
worked satisfactorily when 80 percent of the production
was concentrated in 20 percent of the firms. "^^
addition, success often required the support of trade
unions. This points up another vital element in maintain-
ing the dominance of the liberal paradigm. The effective-
ness of this level of centralized bureaucratic control is
dependent upon great amounts of group compliance. Liberal-
ism obtains compliance through cooptation, not coercion.
For example, some leaders in Germany attribute that
nation's peaceful labor situation to the principle of
co-determination whereby the worker is made partially
responsible for the success of the industry. Along a
similar vein, reformist representation in the decision-
making process (e.g., consumerist, environmentalist and
minority spokesmen on corporate boards) institutionalizes
conflict and creates a collective stake in the system's
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maintenance. Pet-^r nr,i.^i.Drucker's observation about union
-"-on pxans in
^.U^^J,,,,^ ^^^.^^
^^^^
thewor.er.srutu.-e has been tied to the strength o£
corporate America ^'^ w^a. Widespread participation (or pseudo-
Partroipation, has the added advantage of drspersino
responsibility for policy, always useful if one wants
to deflect pointed critrcrs™ and demands for structural
change. The public, kept out of ^v,
.
K the processes of economic
policy-making, might very well turn on leadership elements
threatening corporate wealth and power. Cooptation (par-
ticipation) may seem to be a DalnfnKi^u p atable approach to prevent-
ing this polarization.
Traditional divisions withrn the liberal perspective
will continue. Left-liberals (reformers) will dispute
right-liberals (the "Establishment") over the efficacy of
different techniques for handling potential social unrest.
Progressive groups would push for broader participation
and selective appeasement, noting the recent success in
isolating and defusing student/radical activists (primar-
ily by responding to noneconomic issues-drug use liberali-
zation, loosening of sexual standards, abolition of the
draft, nationalizing the eighteen-year-old vote, reducing
art and media censorship)
. Student involvement in college
and university governance provides an outlet for demands
while reducing the economic and political implications of
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student f.ustrat.o„.
actual
.„pa.t o. ,o™aX partici-
pation mechanises on questions of power and policy
.s
open to debate, but on the probie. of eonUict
„,ana,e.ent
the consequences are clp>ar- n i •e . Broad involvement can qive
the appearance of unity, create consensus- inducing depen-
ciency, and cloud issues of accoun tability-very useful
strategems for perpetuating control.
One important theme of liberal politics is the
issue Of economic mobility. Undoubtedly, opportunities
for advancement in the public and private sectors will
diminish as economic stagnation sets m . Class lines will
harden and the upper classes will become n.ore concerned
about passing their advantages on to their children.
This is as critical an occurrence as is the existence of
limits itself. Economic opportunity and expectations of
individual advancement are deeply ingrained in the American
mythology. These hopes will not fade away quietly. in-
stead, what once was a safety valve for lower class striv-
ings may become a time bomb of frustration, resentment
and political unrest. For this reason liberalism must
continue to press for policies to encourage mobility and
maintain opportunity. Education had been the traditional
means of promoting an open class system, but other mechan-
isms and outlets are being tried, with mixed results.
An additional reason for keeping the goal of opportunity
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as a real o.,ec..ve
.elates to the U.eral desire to
opti„a.e
,„„tK levels, an a.™ Ul-se.ve. a rl,la
class structure: "fho r^vt e pressures to use human talent
efficiently, by rewarding
„,erit, are coantered by pres-
sures
.a.ln, for sooial continuity in the class positron
Of fathers and sons...39
^^^^ ^^^^^^
drrection win engender enormous opposUion and inspire
intense debate. Support for this positron (and other
reformist and adaptive programs) might entail a mild
brand of class consciousness to overcome the formidable
power of economic privilege.
of Liberalism
Liberalism faces obstacles to continued ideological
preeminence. Some of these obstacles arxse out of the
propensities and biases dominant in the scenario itself.
Others stem from the uncertain influence of variable factors
which may lessen the appeal of the liberal image. The
principal bias is one that we have already discussed. De-
signed to respond to concentrations of power, liberalism,
in either its Republican or Democratic variant, will dis-
tribute uneq_uall>; the burdens of economic decline. In so
doing, it will incite rather than mute social conflict.
For instance, the thrust of regulatory policy allegedly is
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to controX p.i.ate powe.
.o. the pu.Uc
,00.,
actual impact ,„ay ,e quite another
„,atter. The old
laissez-faire views of economic freedon, and property
r.*ts have been greatly modified
,y events and policies
since the Depression. A redefin i h- „tion of property rights
(e.g.. pollution regulation, has already taken place, as
noted by Daniel Bell:
..property today consists not only
Of Visible things riands, possessions, titles, but also
Of Claims, grants and contracts. The property relation-
ship is not only between persons but between the individual
and the govern.nent
.
" But this is not so much the
socialization of private property which conservative
ideologues warn us about; rather, it represents the pri-
vatization of social policy, the extension of private
property rights onto selected areas of the public sphere.
Private interests use public power for private gain (via
grants, subsidies, market guarantees and other special-
interest programs,. Politicians defend this policy
approach-Interest-Group Liberalisra-as democratic, a form
of government regulation in pursuit of tlie public interest
(e.g., economic growth, industrial stability, . ^ ^ However,
political '.control" of business may lead, through incre-
mental steps, to a major redistribution of wealth from
poor and middle to the corporate class. Luther p. Gerlach
and Virginia H. nines back up this analysis: '.Critics
310
-
'o-^n.'
.o.e an.
.„o.. o.
.He „e.ns o. pro-duction but without commensurate contrn, o1-JT.e iol over operation
°^ Partic.patrou u, tinancial rewards..
.he econonue
syste. ,arns further legitimacy
.hUe the political sys-
tern has to bear th iL xs additronal burden on its own freedom
Of action and on rts level of public support.
The emphasis on long-range planning and
' expert. se
and the diminution of polrtical standards of rationality
..ight lead liberalism to adopt a very strong elitist
position. The Umrting of public rnput by intellectual
intimidation and/or manipulation leaves the expert deci-
sion-maker free to construct and pursue "optimal" polrcy.
Paul Ehrlxch and Dennrs Pirages attempt to justify th^s
bias of liberalism.
Lonq-range planninq in a very complexsociety will require a much higher levelof competence in politics. Governing
must be transformed into a profession
that .IS reserved for wise and dedicatedindividuals.
... In the short run,the critical problem to be faced intransforming politics might very well beto defend existing political institutions
against a populist onslaught .
3
This attitude will strengthen the hand of status quo inter-
ests, further inega 1 itarian policies, and all the time
give the appearance of rationality, objectivity, and neces-
sity.
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io
The fouow.n,
,uote fro. Busi^^e^
— --="o„3 .hie. res...
.ro™
. sce.arbiased toward business interests.
It is inevitable that tlio n <;
.>y --.U grow „ore slowXy tha„"it h.^f"""
do-wlthTsr°o'r\Tfi' to
the economy as a whoL'"'''"'°^' ^hat
^ilea.e ou^ of ;\:itib,.ro,.H^Ttar^
a'r:;,r^e1'^L:i"l'r'^^^=''^'^^'--"--t-
sumer, will all n^^ \ ' ^ '''^^ ^^n-
and the biggest lenders/^!"''
^^t'u'
to wn?io ''m Americanss allow-the idea of doing with less sothat big business can have more. 44
The article's line of thinking conforms well with the
dominant ideology. Even more important, this may be the
only policy direction feasible (passable) within the
capitalist, inegalitarian structure of liberal consensus
politics. Efforts to induce economic recovery will be
justified by updated versions of the "trickle down-
theory. Attempts to reduce feelings of hardship and rela-
tive deprivation will be symbolic (psychic reassurance)
and status oriented, letting material distributions follow
past patterns. in short, many of the claims of privilege,
backed up by the power mustered by the privileged, will
find a receptive audience in the future liberal perspec-
tive. Economic hardship, even more than presently, may
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not a
.a.io„.x ca.a„,u,
,
^^^^^^^^^^^
-.uax.,
^^^^^^^^^
The biased poUcy-co,„plex envisioned for post-
liberalise
„iii ,i„,,,
^ ^^^^^^^^ ^
distributive arrangements, but only m,,,,,
Clearly reoo,ni.es the interests, rnstrtutions, processes
and attitudes responsible for poUcy-ea.in,.
.He success
Of liberal strategy is therefore tied to tactics of
deflecting bla.e. m a syste. of control based primarily
on the market, the allocation of benefits and burdens rs
not perceived to be in the hands of an identifiable social
group. Because the market mecha.usm is so highly imper-
sonal, the power to alter this distributron appears diffused
inequality seems to evolve out of abstract, quasi-sanctified
forces or by purposeless chance. Because responsibility
is so hard to pin down, acceptance tends to be the norm.
There are reasons to believe that this reaction
will be less pronounced in the future politics of limits.
First, the policy load on government will increase in
amount and intensity. The po] iticiza tion of more issues
inevitably will lead to more overt conflict between compet-
ing interests over vital policy matters. Daniel Bell
discusses this point:
The more planning there is in a soci-
ety, the more there arc open group
conflicts. Planning sets up a specific
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v?siblfno^''i''°"' "'^i'^'^ becomes ^
al prefer-^
value conflicts. 45 ^ ^hs^rpsns
second, as government becomes further involved in the
economy, it becomes the le.itrmate target for economic
9rxevances. The ongoing breakdown of the public-private
drchotomy serves to remove a form of conceptual insula-
tion protectrng the politrcal process from the distrrbu-
trve ramifications of economic arrangements. Third and
most important, the coming economic decline and its
impact on political and social structure will have an
illuminating effect on public perceptions.
"rerhaps the
only benefit of a crisis is that the institutions become
transparent, that their structure and power relations
are visible to the naked eye . "« if the reward system
now appears as the consequence of the purposeful activity
of those groups benefiting from public policy the most,
its accountability-and the potential for consciously
changing the system towards one's own ends-is clearly
revealed. Increased economic concentration and government
regulation tend to shift blame from iimnutable market
forces to obvious and controllable rules, institutions and
individuals.
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:ore or
Many factors intervene wh.eh either undersce
conceai
,and de.iect, t.e responsr.i ii ty of the systeV
-i-r, „ay
.e the or.anizationai e«ectrvene..s of eo„,pet-
-9 scenar.os. Zn the absence of reco.nizea ie,it.„,ate
alternatives to the dormant paradr,., any faii.re can
be interpreted as unavoidable and outside of the syste„,.s
control, excusable because the objective srtuat.on required
certain outcomes, unintended in spite of great precautrons,
etc. However, the probability is that lef t-liberalis.
will offer a continual (though not structural, critique
of the reigning capitalist ideology. The e..istence and
validity Of this reforndst alternative is vital, for it
offers legitimacy to other for„,s of leftist criticism
and thereby ,„ay move the entire tenor of political debate
in that direction.
The role of the media is also critical. In an
atmosphere of natioml crisis, the media may help lower
expectations and counsel patience, excuse the failings of
government and encourage an apolitical fatalism, caricature
extremist positions and dramatize their potential for
violence, fragment issues and publicize personal aspects
of the problem (scapegoats and success stories), and, in
general, may rally around the 1 ibora 1
-capi tal i st flag.
However, in a climate open to some criticism, the coverage
might emphasize the structural connections between disparate
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headlines, hx.hl.,,, corruption and the unevenness of
economic sacrrtrces, rllu.inate the substance ot radical
-terpretatrons of events and the alternate pol.cres that
follow, and, in general, help wean the publxc away f.o.
a blind acceptance of liberal politics. Notrng the
trends of the last decade and the nature of the
.ed.a's
wor., sa.uel P. Huntrngton envisions the latter outcome
as likely. His co™.ent, directed toward political conflict
within the executive branch, applies with even more
appropriateness towards politics generally.
The national nedia
. .
. increasingly
came to conceive of themselves in anadversary role vis-a-vis the executivegovernment. At stake were not merely
conflicting personalities and differ-ing political viewpoints, but alsofairly fundamental institutional in-terests. The media have an interestm exposure, criticism, hiqhlighting
and encouraging disagreement and dis-
affection within the executive branchThe loaders of the executive branchhave an interest in secrecy, hierarchy,
discipline, and the suppression of
criticism. The function of the press
IS to expand political debate and in-
volvement; the natural instinct of
the bureaucracy is to limit it."^"^
The press can reveal or conceal the failings and biases
to which the liberal scenario is prone.
Events in the international arena can also improve
or hinder the appeal of the liberal scenario in various
v^/ays. Generally speaking, "war and the consequent
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prominence of fo.ei.n poUcy concorns do in fact worX
toward a reduction of Polarisation, " especially that
resulting fro. class distinctions/^ This diversion of
popular attention and the national unity brought about
by the presence of a common enemy rs clearly beneficial
to liberal strategies. But rntense international divisions
put additional policy loads upon liberal governments,
diverting resources from economic recovery and threaten-
ing the level of individual freedom t)>at is the hallmark
of liberal philosophy. Such tensions may be inevitable
once the true dimensions of the limits crisis are known.
For example, a prolonged world-wide economic slump "could
force individual nations to pursue their separate inter-
ests and breed an international political disaster as
4 9well." Foreign and domestic spheres interact in a
mutually detrimental relationship. We also cannot overlook
the possibility of raw materials cartels forming in the
underdeveloped world (parallel to OPEC) which would be in a
position to demand a higher price through control of the
resource supplies. Third World governments may national-
ize Western industries, initiate acts of terrorism and
sabotage (even nuclear blackmail) against Americans, or
in other ways threaten our physical and economic security.
While the negative impact of these hypothetical developments
may be substantial, their political consequences might
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cer-
actually be syste„,-supportive, directinu at.' ^-LJ^'-C'ting tention and
"
- unaccountable
.orel.n
^P'-re. . p,,.,,, „„,^^,^
„,^_^^^^^^^„
^^^^
^^^^^^
to pass policies demanding mass sacrifices.
Even on this score, the interpretation of events
-
not Obvious, and
.Herefore there wrll probably be some
a.sacreement over the replications of rn terna t iona 1 prob-
lems. Mthough direct military threats win ,i„cst
tarnly unify the natron, other typo. of rnternationa
1
tension will prod our patriotism much less. Foreign
nationalization of American investments overseas may
.ppear to be a justified reaction to exploitation, or a
useful end to a corporation's e.xporting capital and ,obs
outside Of the Unrted States. foreign nations experienc-
ing Similar economic pressures might approach them in a
way not in keeping with our liberal framework. The.
success of these approaches would put into doubt the
correctness of our own techniques; their failure would
reinforce faith in our system and buttress the belief that
nothing more can be done to better our situation. It is
therefore uncertain how events overseas will effect the
viability of liberal strategies.
Conclusions
The diversionary potential of any variable is
critical in estimating the staying power of liberali sm.
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insti-
ls 111
"—^ability can be deflectoU. i, efforts to
tute left-UberaX re.or.s confront not clear opposition
but the structural
,uic,sanC of consensus politics, and
the severity of the crisis does not give credence to
.deologrcal crxticis... the probabU.ty is that Uberal
wrll hold as an image of the future.
But there are too
.any tensions wrthrn the paradign,
The dominance of rrght-liberal forces
.ay lead reformists
to embrace the ideology (and the class-oriented strategies
of leftism in order to further the ideals of liberalism,
on the other hand, the institutrons
, procedures and power
relations of capitalist democracy tend to block reformrst
goals and to fulfill conservative objectives. Can liber-
alism contain those forces which are polarizing the
society? The pressures of limits to growth may make
leftist images and neo-fascist counterstrategies more
effective at mobilizing support. Incapacity on the part
of the dominant paradigm clearly represents increased
options and political resources for those interests and
ideologies intent on competing with and supplanting
liberalism. Half-hearted policies will not remedy the
imbalances and strains of the economic crisis; rather, it
is reasonable to expect that they will intensity botli the
problems and the public's frustration with governmental
failure. How liberalism weakens, in which direction it
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leans, „U1 determine the altern.Uve images that v.e
^or center stage and „iu also shape the battle for pre-
eminence between liberalisn, and rts challengers. Even
failure liberalise sets the agenda for politics, the
context of the debate. If the power structure prevents
reformist policies, structural crrticisn fro. the 3eft is
-re appealing. if le Et-liberalis. appears to be gaining
influence and surn(=>r^c =. -.^a ccess, a corporate-conservative counter-
Image will „,ore lively arise. A polarization of some
sort is probable, either by the growth of a set of forces
opposed to the liberal ,„iddle, or by the fading of liber-
alism and the increasing confrontation between policy
extremes. The most effective strategy will be the one
most favored by events and the one most able to mobilize
the public to appreciate its image of the political future
Neo-Marxism
Positive andJJega_bive Dimensions o f RaOA^al_j^^
The drawing power of leftist or neo-Marxist images
of the future have been successfully dampened under con-
sensus politics. Admittedly, egalitarian values have
had some influence, and class consciousness has not always
been submerged as a political force. Still, as a thorough-
going critique of and major alternative to the liberal-
capitalist paradigm, it has been quite ineffective within
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the poUtic.l arena. The awarenos., and i,„„act of
economic can potcntiaXl, enhance U,o
.nteX.ecU.al
^^PPo.l Of leru.t po,.c.e. an. cr.a.e ,He o.oUonal cli.a.e
wxthin Which leftist stratocjie. wiJi Uour^.n.
As noted in the previous section,
,„uch depends
upon the fate of the liberal response to li„,its. The
dominance of Republican. Establishment or probusiness
forces pursuing their objectives with narrow sel f-servi n.,
policies may leave lp.ff-i-iK, .t-y >.cavc .ictt-liberalisni witli no reformist
and consensual opti.ons. There is l.ttle reason to believe
that the hardship i.n.posed by limits is a burden that
powerless and powerful will equally share. Indeed, logic
(and past practi.ce) compel us to accept a different con-
clusion: The costs associated with economic Umils, and
with attempts to overcome those limiLs through public
policy, will be as unequally distributed as have been the
benefits of growth. Obvious economic injustice will make
it more difficult for liberalism to maintain the legitimacy
and social cohesion necessary for its survival.
Additional drains on these vital resources can
be expected from the increasing inc^pl ness of public: policy.
The political system, even with a surfeit of information
and broad administrative control, is unable to hancllo the
problems which threaten growth rates. The issues have
become too complex and interrelated to be dealt with
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through incremental and plural icf-a list processes; the liberal-
capitalist paradigm may no lnno«>- ko ger be appropriate to the
tasks of environmental protection • i •t de , social integration,
political staMUty, etc. PoXUical
.aUure a„a f..t.er
deterioration
„iii cre...ii.ty to the ar,™,ent that
Patchwor. repairs cannot
.end this
.ost recent and ser.ou=
damage to the social and economic
.abrrc.
.adicaX change
is required.
Finally, liberalism itself tends to give sanction
to leftist critiques of the system, a fact noted by
Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Iiriggs
.
tho^i't^if
1-^etween revolutionaries ande status quo v.'iU be promoted ifthere IS a continued tendency toward
I'.tVhi^li
^^^"^"^"^e the part of theestablished forces in dealing withprogressive" and/or humanistic revo-lutions, agitation, and criticisms ofthe existing system. The principal
cause of this factor is that the West-ern "Establishment" is to a ]arge ex-tent motivated by the same values ex-pressed by its critics. Since theWestern leadership itself believes inpeace, justice, freedom, etc., it is
vulnerable to claims that these idealshave not been achieved. -'0
We might have some reservations regarding the system's
real commitment to these ideals. However, the rhetoric
of liberalism helps instill in the public the values which
form the basis of the neo-Marxist image of the future.
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This alternative to the lih<-r.i^ i loe al perspective
--c.es o.t a ,u,.,,
^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
Picture o.
..e
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
publicized i™.,e „ou:a
.e p.o.is.ons
.or a .ore e^aUtar--
an straM.rcaMon s.ste., a „ore ae,„ocra.ic socret., a.K,
more humanistic SQrl^^ v^i j-
•
social relationships (all hallmarks of
radicalism's idealistic appeal) nnt .^i i;. Bu along with this
positive alternative attracting support there is a ne,a-
t.ve component critiquing present arrangements. This is
a matter of tactical necessrty. as navia C. Schwartz
indicates.
It is often easier to attract supportbeing against something rather ?hanfor somethina C4 "^n rn
is aa.in^? r ' ' ^^tressmg what one
Jen? 1 coalition po-t tial, Thus, very disparate groupscan converge on the one agreed on pointoverthrow of the hated regime.Sl ^ ''''
'
The class bias of governmental policy, increased and
visible economic inequality, exploitation anxieties (job
security, occupational safety), etc., are sufficiently
onerous prospects to spur pressures for radical change.
These negative expectations, and the positive image of
the future provided by the neo-Marxist alternative, high-
light the crux of the radical strategy.
This strategy receives encouragement from the
social tensions produced by limits to growth. Economic
'^-t.ess opens up eno^ous oppo..un.i Ues ,or polari.i„,
-ciet, axon,
.i,,.
^^^.^^^^^^^
the left. The i^ediacy of the economic crisis also
eliminates the ,„a,or tactic „Mch had previously been
the route to raaicali.e the wor.in, class-.raauaUs.,
education, single issues-the
..politics of the Ion,
haul...- The dominant „ood of cynicism, powerlessness
loss of trust and faith in institutions, leads to a
marked receptivUy to new outlooks and a notable expec-
tation of radical change. The left cannot ignore this
opportunity without foreclosing on its future potential '
for power: A turning point, by defrnitxon, cannot be
returned to.
Leftist
-interpretations will also benefit from a
Changed attitude toward the system in general and toward
the business elite in Dartirnl-ir- rn.p ticular. j.he generation whose
political socialization encompassed the years 1960-1974
have been exposed to and therefore are cognizant of an
undercurrent of structural criticism unlike most previous
generations. The idea that something is basically wrong
and in need of change will not be too unique or difficult
to accept. Then, too, there is a growing realization
that our corporate economy is not all-beneficent. This
recognition weakens the defense of the economic status quo
based on the positive outcomes of the system. David Bell
refers to this trend.
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A rcoliny has bocjun lo spro id in +-h
nas made the society uylier, dirtier
^It slZo or?/°i'"*=^' "-iod-ine ense Identity between the
the ^""^ =°^P°ration andpublic interest has been replacedby a sense of incongruence. 53 '
The loss Of corporate stature cannot help but ,ive aid
and comfort to political strategies designed to reduce
corporate pov/er.
An additional possible advantage to the noo-Marxxst
cause hinges on the nature of the ocono.n.c decline we w.ll
experience. if it appears that the hardships of limits
are not equally felt among all social groups, that the
wealthy have been able to protect their resources and
even take advantage of the situation, rosontment and
pressures for redistributi ve policies will build. Pub-
licizing both the affluence of the economic elite and
the deterioration of the living standards for most other
Americans will make stratification more visible and
irritating. This is especially true if the classlessness
myths discussed in Chapter III remain a formidable element
of liberal ideology and popu.lar culture. David Potter's
examination of the dysfunctions oi these equality myths
is doubly relevajit in an era of econoiii.ic limits:
When Living in a, society thai |pi-eac,^hos
andl practices outward uniformity, [an
individual]
. . . finds himself the ob iect
of class discT- iminations i mf)osed at close
quarters and based upon marcjinal,
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tenuous criteripi
no longer iTel^l r'""'
unjust and Suf ' ^^^^^'^^ . ^^^m
disp^iitiorn ^'^^ real 'economic
ha^ m^d^ ^ ^""^^ separated classes,
class^tr^li?''^ ? distinction or
^^'^''''^'-^i^^tion seem doubly unfair
Ing cirs^T""''"^ • . by elLinf?-'
in f u '-'''''"^^^y Without being able
morP
subjective differentials
d?f?pf i'^?' f"-^^ ^^"^^'i"^^ objectivei ferentials less evident. 55
There is a strong possibility that power relationships
between economic groupings will become as explicit and
repugnant as other class distinctions. As generalized job
anxieties increase, employers acquire extra bargaining
leverage in proposing work speed-ups, poorer working con-
ditions, the arbitrary removal of "trouble-makers,"
tigher work regulations, etc. The perception of class
differences is a critical precondition for a viable class-
oriented strategy. In the past the differences within
the broad middle class were seen as more important, but
such distinctions as blue or white collar, regionalism,
urban or suburban residency, even race and age, may not
be able to cloak the unity of class interests. And this
IS especially likely if economic limits make material
needs and distinctions more central and salient.
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Michael p. Lerner in "tk,. c ^- c r, ihe Future of the Two-Party
system in ,,„erica"
.ets out a scenario along leftist
lines. Lerner anticipates that rates of economic growth
w.U decrease drastically due to the inability of u S
monopoly capital to continue the exploitation of Th.rd
world nations or the domination of the rnternational
economic system (thc^ "^v^^he end of imperialism" argument). in
the past, a small part of the surplus skimn^ed off the
top by American corporations trickled down to the lower
classes, providing some benefits and an apparent coinci-
dence of interests. However,
In the period ahead, monopoly capital
will have less room to maiieuvr^M", andthis will progressively decrease its
ability to buy off American workersAs a result, there will be an increasem class consciousness, which wil] be
expressed first througli labor agita-
tion, second through existing party
mechanisms, and last through' the like-ly emererence of an explicitly socialist
party.
. .
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Lerner
-s assumption, not so unreasonable given the above-
mentioned biases of liberal politics, is that the powerful
will pass any hardships of limits onto weaker, poorer
groups. A divide-and-conquer strategy whereby ethnics
and poor/minority/inner city elements are played off
against each other is used to deflect attention away from
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structural criticism. However thi. c:^- .tive , s strategy cannot
succeed in weakening class unity since it ^^ I does not addresstho.a,o. issues Of
.He sand.e,ona.
..e author
aces not clai. t.at a socialist victor, is inevitaMe,
but, in keeping with a realistic vrsion of the future. He
does expect that the focus of poiit.cai debate rn thrs
country „rll shrft farther to the ieft. The issue of
inequality will fi^.^y
.e put on the political agenda.
Lerner's vision is perhaps that of a true believer
seeing possible converts wherever he looks. Yet, analyses
Of relative deprivation and revolution give a strong
measure of support to the neo-Marxist scenario. An exam-
ination of revolution is highly appropriate to this study.
It will underscore those two factors that heighten social
unrest and channel it towards politrcal action: A con-
ceptual rejection of existing reaUty and organized efforts
to bring to realization a different image of the future.
The work of James C. Davies is perhaps the most
cogent and relevant of any attmept to grasp the aspira-
tion-frustration-aggression relationship central to leftist
scenarios. The following summary quote of Davies' thesis
has been graphically represented in Figure 2.
Revolutions are most likely to occur
whon a prolonged period of objective
economic and social development is fol-
lowed by a short period of sharp reversal.
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"EKD SATISFACTION AND REVOLUTION
Figure 2
source: James C Dayies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution,"Davies (ed.), When Men Revolt and Why (New York
•
Free Press, 1971), prTJsT ~^
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and, during the latter ^'""".'?
of anxiety and frustr^M^ "'7''"^ '''^''"^'^
Pated realltyT" ^ ™" antici-
The J-shaped curve in econo.io capacities occurs over a
time span too short to aliow for adjustments in expecta-
tions. When
..people are
.ade aware of not having „hat
they have been brought to think it feasible or proper or
necessary that they should have/, tensions and the search
for bla.e results. ^8 „ government and other instrtutrons
(e.g., capitalism) can be blamed for this gap, desire for
a radical alternative builds.
An increase in relative deprivation (and the corol-
lary of perceptions of downward mobility) is the major
motivational impetus behind leftist appeals. As the gap
between needs and satisfactions widens, the feeling grows
that one is falling behind, losing ground. Relative to
one's expectations, deprivation seems to worsen, whatever
the real levels of need satisfaction. In addition, actual
(as opposed to felt) downward mobiliLy may be an unavoid-
able consequence of the economic dislocations brought on
by our approach to limits. What intensifies this problem
are the numbers experiencing such mobility and their
probable grouping among certain precarious sectors of the
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economy.
,,,3 sit.ation a
.e-ovaX.ation of
..e entire
--ax syste. „,ay ta.e plao3. structu.aX interpretations
Of one's predicament tend to predominate, as do coUec-
tive strategies for improving one's chances: "If an
entire stratum, craft, or profession is declining, there
is more chance of unity in misery and a coUectrve pro-
test
Vulnerable segments of the workxng class, middle
class aspxrants to professional and managerial positions,
rural and middle America generally, and elements of the
intelligentsia may seek redress of their condrtron through
revolutionary change. These groups will be hurt by the
economic and social transformations to come, and there-
fore they will probably provide support and leadership
resources for the leftist cause. And where the normal
channels for collective action are blocked, and the
policies offered to these groups do not seem to measure
up to their desires and to the vastness of the problems,
then protest will take a radical turn. The pivotal role
of liberal policies attempting to keep open the class
system is more clearly apparent. If these efforts are
not made or are thwarted after passage, the potentially
explosive situation of downward m.obility beckons.
The overarching educational strategy of the left
is to increase an awareness of class unity and the role
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Of economic position on one's U fe . Social prote.t
Which rests on occupational, cultural, phUosophical
regional, and racial bases can be used xnstru„,entaUy
to further leftist causes
, but their long-range useful-
ness is Slight because of the ultimately divisive class-
cutting nature of their outlook, Li„,.Us can allow people
to appreciate the srmilarities in therr economic condi-
tion and therefore to overcome the separations imposed
by alternate self-definitions of interest. The gap
between blue collar and rlf^r-ir^^ia c e cal oi service occupations
will be lessened, increasing perceptions of a common
working-class interp^^i- c-ir^;. ia J-nreiest. Similarly, other challenges to
the dominant culture ( neo-nostaly ia and primitivism,
back to nature, inner-awareness and personality develop-
ment, new family arrangements, antiscience and antitech-
nology, sensitivity) are individualistic and apolitical
in their long-range goals but contain the seeds of a
radical social critique with neo-Marxist dimensions. The
left anticipates a transformation of the ecology movement
toward less reformist aims, and this can be a catalyst
for an overlapping coalition of issue-based movements
connected by a class analysis of American politics.
Along these lines, Michael riann ' s study, "Tlie
Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," indicates that,
while the ideological principles of the establishment
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P.raai,„, a.e
^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^
Class ™o„„o..,
.e,..,,„,
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
policies ciass interests nre accu.aOoly oxpres....
Mann beueves a„u, SOC.U, sta.in i . resuUof
l^he social xj^ed inabi M tv of \-hn \,'^• y .t Llio Irmor classes to coiuk.cL
their awareness of tvT»-i-w,, iUL particular in Loir-'cM r. i_-Lij (...j csts vv' I Lh a broader
delegiti„,i.I,Kj i uto.pretntion ot
.ociety." „„m u„„.s
will notably raise the priority oE concrete issue co„-
llicts, perhap. to the po.,vt at whi.,.,, u.o dominant libera,
abstract beliels w.i U see. loss a„<, , e.s relevant. ,„
effect, economic l:i„,lts win „n.,c.n„i„e the cohesive ampact
of socialization and provide a conceptual bridye llntin.
particular class interests wi i h i i ,uut^xcoLo t a tJioi oucjJu/oinq class
critique
.
In a relal:od development we can anlicipate a rise
in the importance of ideology qoncraLly. People wH 1
be under immense pressure from a mn 1 I: :i faceted crisis in
coming decades. They will, need to assimilate and under-
stand the often inconsistent information and behavioral
signals that they receive. At the same time the dominant
explanatory framework may have been discredited aivl
rejected. Searchi n<i for an i nterpreta 1. i on of events ,u.d
acting within a poJ i ticized envjrcninu.nt (movements,
threats to one's interests, calls for pa r tic ipa f ion
,
high
emotions), peopJe may icmore fhe explanations of established
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-aae.s an. see. so.e secu...,
..^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
Ideological consbructs.
Short Of a „,ajor ideological co.™it„,3nt, a group-
orxented refo™ist posture (e.g., trade-union conscious-
ness,
.ay leave „o,„ tor strong pressure placed sporadical.
ly and for narrow ends. However it-c; .k't.u c , Its ability to inspire
generalized and intense dissent or f-n .b to ejicompass a broader
view of polrtxcs and society is severely restricted
Anthony Giddens has demonstrated that relative depriva-
tion and resentment, alienation and social disorganisa-
tion cannot in and of themselves brrng about a change rn
consciousness. There i c- m-.^r^v-in s a a or perceptual leap that
must be .ade. Revolutionary consciousness
"involves a
recognition of the possibility of an overall reor^._a:,
^i2ILJ:il_the^^
^-belieOh£t_^uc^^^
th£OU2l^clas^tJ^."^ Offering an alterna"I7^J7^^.
of social order and fostering the popular (political)
support in furtherance of that image are the necessary
tasks of a leftist political party. The existence of an
acknowledged organ of leftist aspirations is vital in the
politicization-polarization process. Among the functions
of the mass-based neo-Marxist party is providing political
cues for those who are sympathetic to a class analysis
but lack the ideological awareness to recognize their class
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A certain
interests on abstract or drstant issues '
threshold point is reached where the or.ani.atio.;'
ana strength enaMes rt to effectively address
PoUtrcal cues to a noticeably enlarged audience. The
-edibility Of rts anti-establish.„ent
„.essa,e is increased
a. well, allowing people to swij^ ideological aUeaiances
rather than ask the,,, to take the More difficult step of
rejecting the previous
.odel of politxcal rationality
Without having been offered a substitute. The
.ove.ent,
once legitimized by numbers and prominence, can prcnote
the very conditions most favorable to its Maintenance and
growth: sensitizing members to deprivation, increasing
social disorganization, inciting establishment repression.
The dynamics of ,„ove.„ents allows people to make the con-
ceptual leaps required for revolutionary change." The
gap between ideals and reality becomes the wedge with
which the left can encourage individuals to loosen and
eventually break their attachment to the current economic
system.
The existence of a viable anti-system movement
might also lead establishment forces to reactions which
would intensify the drift to social polarization. If
liberalism is itself pushed to the right in order to coun-
ter egalitarian strategies, reformists will find it
increasingly difficult to differentiate themselves from
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the more critical left t„ ,. In an effort to quell the „,ove-
-nt,
.issent is la.ele. disloyalty,
.Uh counterinturtive
results.
..Where the existing regin.e tends to force
(ascribe, a revolutionary or illegitr.nate status onto
a reformist group, the revolutionary fervor of the croup
may markedly increase..." Hadical action becomes the
only option as the society contrnues to polari.e. The
recruitment of reformrst groups and other disillusioned
and resentful members of the old order <e.g., elements
Of the national bourgeoisie embittered over the economic
and political power of multinational corporations) offers
a broader constituency for the left (but one that will
be a future source of tension as well)
. m sugary,
the strengthening of neo-Marxist forces and the reaU.a-
tion of the leftist scenario is possible on its own
(Davies), and downright plausible if certain actions are
taj.en by liberal forces and by radical organizations
Which would heighten class consciousness and mass receptiv-
ity to revolutionary change.
Defects in the JLHeftist Scenario
The weaknesses in this scenario, and therefore
the causes of its potential failure to dictate the iinaye
of the future, are many and varied. The first category
concerns contradictions within neo-Marxist ideology. The
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^trate,, o. u.e ,e.t is to incite
.esent.en. a,..,.,
"e,uaut..
.uis appeal rein.o.ces
„..,eria:i3.
ethxc o. U.e.a. capitalist an.
..viaes t.e p.Mie on t.e
^asis o.
..at etUic. Both of these ejects
.u„
.o.nte.
to the aavert.se.
.„a,e ot an e,aX.ta..an t.tu.e, a t.anscen-
<^ent social
.nit.
.e.on.
„ater.ai.st st..vin,3 an.
.eoio.s.es
The not.on that the anti-syste.
.ove.ent. once in powe.
can heip society
.eet the blocked material expectations
Of the
.ovetent's adherents conflicts with the ai™ of
creating a structure with non-bour.,eoise values and asprra-
txons. can a moral and compassionate society be achrcved
through a polrtics of conflict, envy, and probably so.e
violence? The authoritarianis,,, of the traditronal left
is juxtaposed to the imagery of the humanistic left; the
means to gain power conflict with the broad ends for which
that power is sought. Consumeristic envies provide a
power base but undercut long-range ideological goals.
The "solution" is not pleasant. Either the goal is pursued
authoritatively and the initial strategy rs merely manipu- '
lative (e.g., the Russian Revolution's slogan of land
followed by Stalin's collectivization campaign) or the
goal is abandoned as the left experiences derad ical i za tion
.
Deradicalization is probable if the scenario is
allowed to develop without coup or civil war. it can take
a number of forms. The distinction made above between
337
the fo™ vs. the substance of social change is appropri-
ately returned to here. The typical leftist policy Ma.
'
toward nationalisation of private property is an ineffec-
txve ™eans of chan,i„, the nature of eeononuc relationshrps
-
society. This constitutes part of a
...odified, inadc-
quate definition of tho r;,^-;^-,!1-ne radical perspective. As E. F.
Schumacher has noted, it is often the scale of ownership
that is .ost at fault. a .ore substantial (and .ore radi-
cal) approach is needed in fostering a humane relatxonship
between the worker, his work and his world.
Perhaps the major form deradica lizat ion takes is
in the switch in emphasis from economic equalization to
equal opportun.Lty and social welfare, primarily because
the latter two goals will travel on the path of least
political resistance, Frank Parkin discusses this tendency:
In so far as countries with a record
of socialist rule could be said todiffer from others in patterns of re-
wards, it is in the relative openness
of their class system. ... in other
words, Social Democrats appear to havebeen more able or willing to broaden
the social base of recruitment to
privileged positions than to equalize
rewards attached to different positions.^^
The role of political expediency is central. Parkin
continues:
Whether or not socialist api)roaches
to inec^iiality become politically accept-
able depends on whether or not they con-
fer advantages on the dominant class, or
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WelfaJo
-^niportant section of it.
carrv^
rnaritocratic reforms doCd ry such advantages.
. . Faalif^rSan refornns dosxynel.to chanqe ?he ru^c^of distribution and ownership do not.^f
is satis-
Doradicalization will occur if tho nuddlo class
fied with tho gams n.ade in oponxn, up the class systc
However, according to the neo-Marxrst scenario, such
groups will have been thoroughly in.acrsed in the leftist
image of the future, including the critical concept of
equality. This points up one of the most damaging weak-
nesses of the scenario. Many people will give support
to radical positions without ever accepting their ideo-
logical underpinnings. Still materialist and individuali
tic, their attraction to the left stems from narrow
self-interest, not a cooperati vist or socialist mentality
This somewhat cynical observation is well stated by
Lopreato and Hazelrigg, paraphrasing Pareto.
.
People
.
. .
do not engage in "class
behavior" for abstract reasons. Thev
do so because it is in their selfish^
interest. People do not v;i sh equality.
They are merely "bent on escaping cer-
tain inequalities not in i:heir favour,
and setting up new inequalities that
will be in their favour, this being
their chief concern." In the process,
they will support those parties that
oCfer the greatest promise, but will
offer whatever explanations are "fashion-
able" for their actions, f^^^
An instrumental commitment to noo-Marxism is almost a
guarantee of declining popular iniluenco with increased
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PoUoy success.
,s Uu.s
.ou.,rul
„...,er a aete^Une.
leftist coalition operating within the confines of plur-
alist electoral politics can hold together long enough
and fervently enough to truly revolutronize the stratifi-
cation system.
The assumption of policy success is itself one of
the weakest links in the leftist scenario. Many of the
administrative problems facing Irberal programs will also
diminish the effectiveness of radical efforts. Indeed,
overreliance on central planning-a hallmark of socralism
in power-may tend to strengthen trends towards political
instability and managerial incompetence discussed in the
previous chapter. Lest we think that a clear ideology
somehow allows us to apply simple solutions to complex
'
human problems, the plight of England (prior to the dis-
covery of oil m the North Sea) should demonstrate the
handicaps under which all systems must operate. A Labour
government, sympathetic to the material demands which its
strategy had helped to promote, had found it difficult to
institute effective action versus the limits crisis while
at the same time maintain both a semblance of national unity
and a spirit of egalitarian reform. Economic distress
and the confrontations spawned by leftist ideology encour-
age anger, resentment and even violence, diverting scarce
political resources towards conflict resolution and away
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economic recovery.
,,ere is rea.son to believe that
-
the context o. X..its to ,.o„tH, de^ocr.t.c neo-.ar.il.
-
not a Viable and stable approach. civen the potential
conflxcts o. a U.its society, 30,„e fo™ of authoritarian
control, £lthe>^b.,^y^i^^^^
embittered,
,„ay
be inevitable. class „ay indeed becon.e a central poUti-
c-al issue, as so^e contend, but the ability of leftist
parties to handle class f-nnfii„ki o co fl ct wrthrn nonauthoritarian
structures can sincerely be questioned.
The „,ajor obstacle to the success of this i^age is
not those inentioned above. Rather, like its liberal-
capitalist counterpart, radicalism must compete with
other images in a structural situation which is not favor-
ably disposed to its message. Our political culture
has socialized us to oppose radicalism instinctively, to
suspect its idealism and reject the substance of its
arguments. This cultural and ideological bias means that
a heavier burden of proof rests on the leftist position
than on other approaches to the limits crisis. While
conservative scenarios play on established patterns of
belief, radicalism requires mass acceptance of new ideas
and new modes of organization at variance with past
experience. The neo-Marxist imago also carries a heavier
burden of organization. Present forms and levels of public
participation help maintain present power relationships.
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The dominant cultural attitudes of deference,
resignation, parochialis,,,, and top-down co,,,„,un
, ca tion
conservative in their
.nCluence, can be overcome only
organized „ass involve„,ent in the political process,
such a co„„„it,„ent, dxfficult to achreve in any era, is
even ™ore difficult today. Walter Dean Burnha. has docu-
mented the trend toward voter disaggregation which is
reducing both voter participation and the ideological
potential inherent in electoral politics. The directed
passion, party loyalty, and total mobrlization underly-
ing the leftist scenario may be almost impossible to
nurture. Conversely, other strategies which demand less
of their adherents' time, attention, loyalty, etc., would
Stand a bette.r chance.
The blind optimism (road material determinism)
of the left as it contemplates economic decline ignores
the political conflicts to come. Hard times are not
necessarily or inevitably opportunities for the building
of an egalitarian constituency. Quite the contrary,
Times of depression are conservatiz-
mg. It is in the affluent periods wh.-n
people can afford to demonstrate and rebel
and worry about their identity crises.
In times like these, they become more
square, less interested in Consciousness
III, more worried about three meaJs a day,
more job-oriented and the hell with liber-
al arts./O
If economic and social collapse occurs, a survivalist
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on
sm
-^ehavior.
...e „.ost basic ne.C. o.a„„
attention,, the
.o.t narrow definitions of self-interest
have currency. We can be certain ^o that an attempt to stimu-
late these perceptions will be made by
.roups bent
undercutting leftist strategies. Corporate-conservat
i
represents the counterimage to neo-Marx.sm and U xs to
this scenario that I now turn.
Corporate Conservativism
The corporatist-conservative scenario reflects a
quaj^itative refinement of the strategies and policies
pursued by conservative business interests within the
liberal paradigm. More conscious of rts own interests, more
intent on long-range control, more subtle and effective
in its use of power, the business elites formulate a
Machiavellian strategy that is not accompanied by any
clearly positive image of the future. An outgrowth as well
as a challenge to the dominant liberal framework, this
scenario is a reaction to the potential inability of liber-
alism to ward off the threat from the political left. Fear-
ing the rise of class consciousness, class based resistance
to economic privilege, and a radical restructuring of the
stratification system, corporate conservatives devise a
counterstrategy. The personal frustrations of non-elites
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Who are painfully facing the new realxty of economic
1-its
.ight be deflected and/or redefined to actually
^t^^ili^ the system of control and even to further the
interests of the economic elite.
This strategy is obviously Hobbesian in its concep-
tion Of power, conflict, authority and human nature. A
centrally inspired and controlled "state of nature," a "war
of an against all" among j^on-elite force_s, allows for un-
challenged power by industrial, commercial and financial
elites. The past inappropriateness of the Hobbesian
vision in explaining American politics was due in large
part to the mitigating circumstances of economic growth
which cushioned the impact of self-interest and muted the
frustrations of subordination. Economic limits lend
relevance to the discarded vision. But the new Leviathan
will not necessarily suppress conflict; instead, it will
remove its system-destabilizing and egalitarian ramifica-
tions. Numerous social divisions, skillfully manipulated,
will displace class conflict and create an atmosphere of
structural insecurity. This is the perfect context for
corporate groups to achieve political hegemony and for the
wealthy to reap economic advantage. Kenneth E. Boulding
alludes to this scenario in a discussion of the steady-state
society.
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In the stationary state, there i=; noescape fro. the rigors of scarcity?
unfortunately tfis°inc^^Lsl °tT.: p^^^^^"offs for successful exploitat ion--ttat
£S™|rin--i--?ion-arpry-^-better than in procrresq Fi o \
growth]. Stati^nLTsL :;rti™ore'
^n'whrr'""^ mafia-type soclTtlll
'
instil n^^^^'f^'^^^' primarily an
iSward redistributing incometo ^the powerful and away from the
In its own way, corporate-conservativism would politicize
the distribution system as surely as neo-Marxism would,
but with totally different consequences.
Bertram Gross has laid out the extreme version of
this image of the future in an article entitled "Frxendly
Fascism: A Model for America. "^^ The author suggests
the growth of a fascist state is, plausible given certain
trends, unless the drift is recognized and consciously
thwarted. Under the guise of democratic and patriotic
slogans, the governing elite will defuse the forces of
social change and covertly direct social, economic and
political activity for its own benefit. Democratic symbols
and institutions will survive, but only in form. Substan-
tial (and pervasive) control, according to Gross, will
be concentrated in relatively few hands, immune from the
constraints of pluralist politics.
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A managed society rulpc. k^, r
police ^nre.^^l^^^^ons-
Attempts to
.nspire division, diversion and despair, and
to manipulate these attitudes tow;.rr^ .-LLuue wa d support of elite-
maintaining programs, underscore th^u e long-range implications
of corporate-conservative strategy.
complementing Gross's picture of "Friendly Fascxsm"
-
a scenario of the future that stresses rnternational
dynamics and variables. Nurtured perceptions of leftist
threats to national security, either from within or out-
side our borders, lead to demands for a build-up in our
external and internal military capabilities in order to
insure America's stability and survival. Real threats
(terrorism and sabotage, expropriation of overseas invest-
ments, resource embargoes), when combined with a well-
orchestrated series of implied dangers (economic breakdown,
fifth-column insurrections), will yield an agreed-upon
justification for increased surveillance, suppression,
ideological vigilance, a state of military preparedness
and perhaps the diversions of brush-fire wars. This image
of a garrison state, developed by Harold Lasswell,^^ is an
obvious corollary to other elements of corporate - conservatism.
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It is especially related to the desiro fn kLn a e to submerge class
as a political issue.
or en's'cutn'"'" °' ^'"^ ^^^^^
SGrvP^%o ^ ^''^^^'^^ ^1^^^^ lines
and inhibit c?f agreement
tion:Us^:\:i?-^:^--rw:rtl.e^^-
orm^^berr^/S??^-^ perceptions
enemy anrcoL^i^b^^ro/^oyaUr^
thereby blurring the percepU^n of'objective class differences or makingIt a fringe, subsidiary consideration . ^
^
Events in the international sphere can be expected to
influence greatly the application and effectiveness of
corporate-conservative strategies.
In terms of the domestic dynamics of this scenario
there are numerous cleavages along which the working
class, broadly defined, can be divided. To explore and
exploit the internal disunity among the left's potential
constituency is a central task of corporate-conservative
tactics. Racial and ethnic distinctions are traditional
points of weakness, perhaps made more vulnerable during
times of economic transition. m an article on verticle
mobility and bias, Joseph Greenbaum and Leonard I. Pearlin
conclude that mobility, up or down, tends to increase
prejudice towards Jews, Blacks, and, by inference, other
ethnics as well. Feelings of prestige insecurity, during
the process of downward mobility especially, encourage
the stereotyping reactions associated with prejudice.
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Inter-ethnic scapegoatxng assures an al.ost unbridgeable
gap between srmrlarly situated wor.rng-class groups
Regional differences provide additional sources of divi-
sion, as revealed in the continurng battles over energy
policy between orl-rich and oil-dependent states. Even
age differences can be exploited to advantage. For
instance, the student protest movement has been greatly
defused by ignoring its broad critical messages and
instead treating it as a generational and cultural con-
flict, isolated from potential allies, student radical-
ism could then be handled as simply another case of group
pressure within a pluralist system. a more telling
example can be found in Richard Nixon's 1968 and 1972
Presidential election campaigns. Playing on racial,
welfare and cultural images through such symbolically
loaded issues as crime, drugs, abortion, radicalism and
patriotism, Nixon combined corporate funding and a
Middle America constituency to fashion victory. Such an
approach, consciously pursued over a number of campaigns,
could optimally encourage members of the middle class
to view themselves in opposition to v/elfare poor, asser-
tive minorities, liberals, planners, humanists, and other
images of the left. Obviously, corporate-conservatives
must firmly direct this movement so that their own inter-
ests and maneuverability are not threatened by these newly
salient issues.
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The overarching econonuc ethos of this i„,age
<^-ides individuals
.na groups ana, in ,He process,
further diverts their attentions fro,„ the true causes oftheir condition. Materialise re.arns a dormant feature
Of social hehavior. i„.eed, as social organisation
degenerates, unfulfilled social and personal needs
increasingly heco.e a source of displaced consumer demand
-itai Et.ioni notes how far this process has already
progressed:
The American way of life may wellhave been founded on the notion that
"^"""S.P'^oducts is a main ?outeto obtaining greater affection (fromspouse and children)
, highe^ prestige
iv^n'T^f'"™ fellows), "^and"'^^
mind
^-^^tualization (in the com-
Limits to growth heightens consumerist desires and, with
them, competition between people for the fewer rewards.
The aggression arising from frustrated expectations is
turned against competitors or against oneself, not against
the system. The zero-sum game of limits, played for a
reduced slice of the pie, pits blacks against whites, sun-
belt vs. Northeast, suburbanites against city dwellers.
The business elite need not play for it has already taken
its share off the top. As long as the structure fosters
this game, as long as economic tensions produce a culture
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Of alienation rather than one of oo,™on perceptions and
P-Poses, the corporate-conservative strategy can en,o,
political success.
In this regard, the development of a two-tiered
economic syste. is especially conducxve to the sort of
social cleavages most supportive of coroorst^r-i u-i-ve UL p a e-conserva-
tism. Multinational giants lead a top sector of „a,or
companies whose successful operation is securely main-
tained through market control arrangements with would-be
"competitors." Small companies or companies in peripher-
al economic sectors are prone to the cyclical dislocations
of the economy and receive a reduced share of production.
Economic power maintains this division. In the labor
sphere, unions affiliated with dominant companies or
industries, and who recognize the facts of managerial
prerogatives, obtain a fair return for their labors.
Likewise, technological skills are rewarded whatever the
industry or company. On the lower rungs, the poor, the
unskilled, minorities, small businesses, subsistance
farmers, migrants, etc., form a permanent underclass
without opportunity or hope. The fear that this group,
who bear the brunt of the costs in the transition to a
limits economy, will challenge the relatively secure
position of the bulk of the working class guarantees the
support of the middle-class population for the system
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ana against e.alitarianis..
. Ur.e an. v.siMe under-
class also provides a reference cjroup with which those
workers
...aKin, if can favorably compare themselves
thus reducing feelings of relative deprivation. Pinally
the existence of this depressed group gives rise to a
survivalist mentality for others a few rungs up; the
fear of falling to such a state is impetus for directing
an attention and energies to individual needs, narrow
self-interest, and the pursuit of material security.
Policy in the corporate-conservative scenario
would follow one major pattern. Programs will be devised
Which, While purportedly responding to public demands,
serve as vehicles for the redistribution of funds toward
the wealthy and powerful. Antipollution efforts will
take the form of subsidies, tax credits and government
supports in an infinite variety, assuring us a dime's
worth of antipollution "bang" for every dollar of public
and consumer monies spent. Increases in spending for
social welfare, health care, housing needs, or manpower
development will help funnel money to representatives
of the corporate elite, leaving the social needs still
glaringly apparent. Part of the reason for the public's
tolerance of this charade is the intimidating weight of
technocratic expertise used to buttress policy choices.
The masses defer to the government's judgment, aware of
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probable policy failure but impressed by the rational-
xty behina the atte„,pts.^8
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
the in.iv.,ual and poUtical ratifications of this policy
pattern in his article on basic hu.an needs. Given a
Coverntental structure that is unresponsive to hu.an
needs, symbolic assurances of responsrveness will lead
a person to direct his aggression, not against a known
Obstacle ,i.e,, the
"Establishment",, but inward toward
himself. TO internalize frustration rs to depoliticize
^t and in the process to create a climate in which
rational analysis of one's situation cannot take place.
A3 Etzioni makes clear, this is not merely a hypotheti-
cal concern.
World War II
. . . ^.ay mark the ini-tiation of a new period, post-indus-trial or post-modern, in which inauth-
entic elements are arising.
. itIS a mark of the post-World-War-Il
industrialized societies that theydevote a major part of their endeavorsto "front" activities. 79
Inauthenticity is an aspect of politics generally, but
it is central to the corporate-conservative strategy.
Even decentralization, which has long been thought
of as a radical departure from current structural arrange-
ments, can be construed in ways that are perfectly
acceptable to this scenario. The sociopolitical implica-
tions of decentralization may be highly supportive of
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conservative interests. Decentralization is a
.eans of
(1) reducn, relative deprivation reducing contacts
across co™.unal-olass lines which would otherwise accen-
tuate Class distinctions;
,2) deflecting attention froo,
central structures and similarly disadvantaged people-
potential allies-While emphasizing local issues, local
distinctions, etc.;
,3) structurally (ideologically and
institutionally) inhibiting support for social policres
dealing with collectively-conceived of problems (e.g.,
stratification); (4) insulatrng and li,„itrng the xmpact
of local radical tendencies; (5) encouraging the acceptance
of locally-imposed social and political controls, ignoring
the structural roots underlying local conditions (e.g.,
high unemployment); (6) coopting local leaders by offering
them limited power and status in exchange for acquiescence
in the national status quo; and (7) promoting non-economrc
paths to individual satisfaction (e.g., local political
mobility)
,
thus undercutting the strategic use of envy,
deprivation a nd resentment in fomenting radical discontent.
Other policies can also be devised which, while radical
in form, are conservative in substance.
As to the problem of economic limits, the corporate-
conservative scenario, more so than the other alternatives,
IS likely to continue pro-growth policies while tolerating
the high environmental and social costs this development
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entails. A pro-growth and consu.erist ethic is facili-
tated by the organized ideological and institutronal
power of big business. Political efforts to restrict
either economic expansion or corporate prerogatives
bring on threats by co.panres to export their capital
investment to friendlier cities, counties, states, or
nations. This for. of blackmail is used on all govern-
ment levels to Obstruct any attempts to impose profit-
reducing controls on business operations. As to the
unwanted environmental side-effects of post-industrial
development, costs can be transferred from the public
at large to those segments of the public least able to
defend their interests. Unavoidable costs (higher
resource prices) can be handled through the price system,
thus becoming a regressive excise tax falling most heavily
on the poorest. Social stability can be imposed by
conditioning welfare benefits to "good behavior,"
increasing police power (wiretapping, stop-and-frisk
laws), maintaining control over the communications network,
and by the judicious use of selective coercion. Growth
will be sought to the limits allowed, but these limits
and the view of what costs are tolerable for the sake of
growth, are greatly extended under the corporate-
conservative scenario.
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This scenario m.cjlvt signal tho end of politics
or at least the end of representative government. Su«ly
that is the the.e behind Gross's
"Priendly Pascism"
crted above. Thrs the.e is echoed by Christopher Lasch,
"ho fears a nu.ber of politically restrictive post-
industrial trends.
The tendency of political grievancesto present themselves as personalgrievances, the tendency ?or repres-sive authority to assume the guiseof benevolence, the substitution ofpsychology for politics, and the per-
thonahrri°' n>anagerial mode ofought help prevent conflicts fromcoming to the surface and contributeto the illusion^that ideology has ex-hausted itself. 80
Both subtle and overt forms of authoritarianism
benefit from the developments which Lasch presents.
Without any ideological contrast model, this image will
have free reign to shape our political destiny according
to its own values and interests.
Corporate-conservativism, hov;ever, is not immune to
the numerous potential pitfalls and complications that
will obstruct any of the various images from gaining
absolute dominance. With reference to this scenario in
particular, the degree of policy comprehensiveness and
elite coordination is probably beyond the system's
capacity. Even with increased centralization it is
highly unlikely that any plan can be initiated without
the unintended consequences and e„ors of design that
weaken its ability to operate. There is also the need
to Simulate representativeness in order to ™axr„ize
voluntary compliance, rrnally, the problem of policy-
effectiveness is compounded for authoritarianism, as it
-
for liberals and radicals, by the complications of
economic limits and the pressurp-^ of „„i •iiibsures policy-overload.
Effectiveness aside, the corporate-conservative
strategy must make its appeals in competition wxth other
strategies, each relevant in its way to the reality of
limits. The politics of the future prohibits any easy
victory for neo-fascism. The efforts to submerge the
class issue and to cloak the injustice of widening inequal
ity must overcome the vocal opposition of left-liberalism
and radical elements. Previous discussions of these
two scenarios indicate the strong forces behind the
question of relative shares. This is an issue that will
not simply fade away. Thus, there definitely will be
contrast models challenging this image. They can be
concealed only by our relinquishing even the appearance
of an open society. Short of this outcome, we can expect
that the corporate-conservative strategy will have a role
to play in the politics of the future but one the impor-
tance of which will depend upon the interplay of events
and competing strategies.
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The final scenario, DurJ.hexmian xn its idealiza-
tion Of a static social order, harKens bac. to an age
Which growth and the narrow n.ater.al strivings that
accompany a growth ethrc were not the central dynamic
Of life. Traditional-conservativism, more reminiscent
Of feudalism than of post-rndustr ra lism, rs a plausible
-del Of the future because, despite the intrusions of
modern economies and social patterns, it has remained
an attractive way of life. A study of the impact of no-
growth on selected metropolitan areas reveals that there
are potentially very desirable consequences to be achieved
within a static setting.
The stability of the no-growth communi-ties seemed to have positive
. as-pects in some of the case study areas.Church, family, and ethnic ties were
strong. The incidence of stress diseases
was low. They were relatively safe from
crime.
. . .
The reluctance of so many
people to leave was not perhaps irra-
tional, but a reflection of a particular
set of values in which these qualities
outweighed the possible material gain
associated for some of them with moving
to a more prosperous area. 81
In our prospective no-growth situation the public's
decision would be not one of limiting personal mobility
(as in the above quote). Rather, it would be whether to
adopt public policies which emphasise nonmaterial values
within a less stressful social setting. According to
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thxs scenario,
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
=o™.unity,
.ather than the entities (race. eUss
culture,
„iXl tone
.own the level of intrasocial conflict
and provxde nonecononuc outlets which prove
.ore impor-
tant to an individual's self-i„,a,e than the satisfaction
of consumerist material desires.
Indeed, a major aspect of the traditional-conserva-
tive strategy is an attack on materialism and the social
deterioration brought on by modernity. Thus, limits to
growth policies would be more conscientiously promoted,
.
and they would be tied to a structural and ideological
reconditioning of man and society more in keeping with a
no-growth economy. The principal reconditioning goal
would be to lower expectations of material progress and
thereby to prevent the growth of class consciousness and
frustration-aggression tendencies. Morris Rosenberg
states this theme in the following quote.
He would expect class consciousness
to be least where the individual's past
and anticipated future position accords
with his present condition. This is
particularly likely to occur in a static
society, in which a view into the past
or future is not likely to produce per-
ceptual distortion of class position. ^2
Positions in such a system are allocated via a high ly
modified meritocracy, without the degree of divisive
competitiveness associated with the notion of equal
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opportunity.
.ow
.oMlity expectations
.ave other advan-
tages for society. They bring about lower levels of
insecurity and frustration (the psychic costs of competi-
tion and failure), reduced fragmentation of the social
order arrsing from mobility, and renewed interest in the
worth of the work one is presently doing.
The task of reducing expectations is also handled
by calls for the stoic acceptance of the end of growth.
The process of accepting limits will transform man's
acquisitive appetites and allow him to rediscover non-
consumerist life styles. Personal living habits will be
made less complex, more simplified, fulfilling basic
psychological needs but without many of the frills (goods
and services) which society has come to demand as neces-
sities. The belief is encouraged that these cutbacks
in one's standard of living are inevitable, ought not to
be resisted, but, on the contrary, ought to be the impetus
for the creation of a new social order.
Further lowering of aspirations can be anticipated
by readjustments in types of reference groups which
determine levels of relative deprivation. The ironic
truth is that "a decline in prosperity, if not too violent,
can restrict the sense of relative deprivation by inhibit-
ing comparisons with more fortunate groups. "^'^ Whereas
radicals attempt to revise our comparisons upward, thereby
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hoping to heighten feelings of resentment, conservatives
point to those below or those in other countries who are
worse Off, thus promoting feelings of satisfaction and
perhaps even gratitude. m this regard it is important
to note the role played by advertising in increasing
expectations and perpetuating relative deprivation. Ad-
vertising intensifies dissatisfaction and taps elements
of our personality (ambition, vanity, greed) not appropri-
ate to a limits economy or a nonmaterial perspective.
Presently the trend is for more "hard sell" (the role of
sexual images in product promotion, commercials directed
at children), and this will probably continue as the
economic situation worsens. It is obvious that this
scenario will involve controls on advertising (and other
reference-group-determining mechanisms) as part of a
general policy of reducing economic expectations.
The description of the social structure proposed
by traditional conservatives also serves to elicit acceptance
of the consequences of limits to growth. Society is
viewed as an organic whole composed of interrelated roles,
institutions and groups. By upgrading the status of
lower-class occupations and by highlighting the functional
and social importance of all positions, the interdepen-
dence of the various parts of the structure is demonstrated
and accentuated. A well-nurtured spirit of national unity
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and a transcendent taith in the whole syste. prevents
people fro. seeing their roles i.> i3olation or in purely
self-interested terms.
In this light inequality is justified and toler-
ated as part of the natural order of things. Hardship
'
and unequal opportunity go unresented. To the extent
that limits to growth are taken to be unavoidable, the
inequities of the sooial structure will acquire a simxlar
oast and a like.inded measure of resigned acceptance.
Efforts to question material stratification will be rnter-
preted as threats to the equilibrium of the system and
to the nonmaterial benefits the system provides.
The quest for stability is basic not only to this
image of social structure but also for the ascending
ecological perspective as well. The conservative implica-
tions of environmentalism dovetail nicely with the political
implications of the traditionalists' limits to growth
scenario:
Although [the ecological perspective]
has radical implications
— it forces us
to regard the structure of a system as
a whole—it is also quite conservative.
It suggests that changes should be made
with extreme care because even the most
well-meaning and constructive action
can have deadly consequences. To view
the environment as a system, then, im-
mediately imposes a certain constraint
on the outlook of economic and politi-
cal decision-makers . 85
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Traditional-conservativism
thn<; =us presupposes a philosophy
that limits the artlnncc io s of the power-holders along with
the hopes of the powerless.
An examination of the source of this scenario, its
social basis, and the circumstances required for its
-rength. win ,elp to differentiate it fro. the corporate-
conservative strategy mentioned previously. This brand
Of conservativism is a counter-strate.y, not to a resur-
gent leftism but to a degenerative liberalism. The
dominant liberal paradigm is unable to cope with the
demands and pressures of the limits crisis. its coalition-
al, nonauthoritarian procedural biases prevent effective
policies from being formulated or initiated. Liberalism
flounders but its failure is not a catalyst for leftist
mobilization or countermobilization by the corporate right.
Power is maintained by a top-bottom coalition of forces
which fails to represent the interests of the "great
middle. Middle populism organizes in response, gaining
conservative strains and allies along with some liberal-
reformist supporters. However, it remains basically
unsubverted by either side, being anti-big-business as
well as anti-liberal-leftism. Seen as a prime constituency
for numerous strategies, once organized on their own terms,
they are viewed suspiciously by both the corporate elite
and traditional radicals.
362
Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Br.g.s cite the possi-
bxlxty Of
"ideological renewal governments" dedicated
to preserving traditional values against intrusions by
left revolutionarres and the right business leadership ^7
Populist rn the sense of sincerely atte.ptrng to further
the interests of the con^on
.an, this alternative for.
Of authoritarianism has a rural and traditronalist base.
However, in this nation other elements of the population
-ay be drawn to traditronal-conservativism. its neo-
nostalgic, anti-growth, and anti-technology appeals have
a strong attraction for segments in the environmental
movement who see the problem of no-growth as that of
social integration rather than class conflict. Frustrated
by the petty debates of incremental politics, these sup-
porters seek to further policies for broad social and
ecological regeneration while paying a price in terms of
liberal (individualistic) freedom and democratic (pluralis
tic) procedures. Faced with social and environmental
Armaggedon, people may readily renounce voluntaristic
approaches and opt instead for authoritarianism. Robert
Heilbroner makes a strong argument along these lines:
The passage through the gantlet
ahead may be possible only under
governments capable of rallying
obedience far more effectively than
would be possible in a democratic
setting. If the issue for mankind
is survival, such governments may be
unavaoidable
, even necessary.
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The
.any p.oble.s constituting the li,„its crisis as well
as the problems associated with n.aintain.ng stability
a no-gro„th situation strengthen the belief that such
authoritarian structures will be not only condoned but
also welcomed.
In addition to an authorx tar.an bias, other elements
of this scenario make it similar in appeal to corporate
conservativism. The stress placed on unifying values,
including patriotxsm and nationalism, inclines this image
toward militarism and interventionism (although a reverse
reaction, a turning inward, cannot be dismissed). Atti-
tudes toward social dissent, social unrest, and many forms
of social deviance are comparable in the appeals of both
strategies. An emphasis on the traditional values of
the work ethic, frugality, etc., may result in a conserva-
tive backlash against welfare programs and an insensi-
tivity toward segments of the poor. Indeed, a major
strategic goal will be the repression of class conflict,
seen as the prime obstacle to group integration and social
cohesion. Members of the business community may there-
fore create tactical alliances with the leaders of this
scenario for the pursuit of common objectives. However,
despite this overlap caused by practical political con-
siderations, traditional conservatism represents a
distinct alternative image.
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This is quite evident when we examine other
trends wh.ch ,.ve this scenario t.es to ieft-X.heral and
-d.cal polit.cal forces. Polrt.cal controls on xnvest-
.
-nt decisions, advertising and other aspects of corporate
policy Will be necessary to
.nsure socral stability hut
will be detrimental to business profits. The dxscoura.e-
ment of consumerism, materialism and mobrlity-str.vin.s
and the emphasis placed on environmental and spiritual
regeneration and on non-economic outlets for self-definx-
tion are clearly not the goals of a corporate-dominated
ruling elite. m fact, they reflect part of the cultural
critique of advanced capitalism prevalent in New Left
writing (and largely absent from working-class radical
analysis). A strategy that has in view the lowering of
levels of class and group conflict will attempt to smooth
the roughest edges of the stratification system. Funds
may be directed toward labor-intensive industries and
projects to garner support from that sector for the
economic status quo. In short, depending on circumstances,
choices and threats, this scenario can align with or
offer the same appeals as any of the others, gaining tem-
porary tactical advantages in the process of furthering
long-range strategic objectives. If the leadership of
traditional conservativism can maintain its political
independence, this image stands a chance of gathering
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broad based support. We are witnessing the beginnings
Of thrs response in the initral attractiveness of California
governor Jerry Brown and President Jimmy Carter.
The critical phase in this scenario's prognosis
is the transition stage. Like liberalism, this brand
Of conservatism is built around consensual forms of politi-
cal interaction and gradualistic forms of social change.
But stability is a prized and perhaps rare commodity in
a market stocked with tension and strife. it can be
argued that, of the different images we have examined, the
attitudes and behavior patterns of traditional conserva-
tivism is best suited to a future no-growth society.
The dilemma lies in trying to habituate ourselves to
the self-constraints of limits to growth while enduring
the traumas of economic crises. The nonmaterial, conununal,
and spiritual values which this scenario hopes to protect
and promote may not survive the potentially explosive
pressures and conflicts ahead. it is possible that a
politics of drift and estrangement, coupled with the slow
decline of our economy toward a state of permanent
sluggishness, might ease the transition to traditional-
conservative ideological, political and social structures.
On the other hand, a precipitous drop in economic well-
being might give rise to a host of domestic and interna-
tional confrontations. In such a setting, this image of
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the future would find it difficult ta.in, hold in the
'
public's consciousness. it is therefore obvious that the
popular receptrvity of this scenario's appeal, the effec-
tiveness Of its strategy, is i„ large measure deter^rned
by the events of the moment.
Conclusions
One of the major themes running through this chapter
is that the future is open to choice. Most of the meaning
behind so-called technological, economic, or environmental
imperatives is as an attempt to Umit the perception of
possibilities. Such futurologrsts define as inevitable
what is in fact quite problematical in order to create a
general acceptance of their own opinion of events. But in
truth the reality of choice is not open to dispute; only
the number of people aware of and involved in the choosing
is what is at issue. This tactical ploy-the claims of
necessity-is part of the politics of the future, being
fought over now in the present. This irony is perfectly
understandable once we accept the fact that the future
is rarely a break with the past (except in severe cases of
catastrophe); rather, it is part of an evolutionary develop-
ment, only a portion of which is visible. Long-term changes
in attitudes and values often come about through a slow
process of predispositioninq
. Political appeals help
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create
-^e^u^,_^^_^^^^_^^
^^^^
surface when conE.onted with catalytic events ot circum-
stances. A crisis triggers these evolving political-
ideological propensitres
. What passes for a .ajor turn-
ing point in political and social history is thus the
result of groundwork, prepared years and decades previously.
In subtle and not-so-subtle ways our view of the future
is being predetem.ined
, much r-i^ n-,c:4- • ^ .
,
n as past socialization processes
correspond to our present attitudes and behavior.
This is not to say that our future freedom to
persuade or to bo persuaded by others is illusionary. We
will face various conflicting messages and our eventual
r^ental state, our receptivity to one or another of the
in^ages and strategies of limits to growth politics, will
reflect this confusion. In addition, the precondition.uuj
signals of present political appeals must hope for favor-
able circumstances whenever the crisis situation will
demand public input. If the role of: the press, events in
foreign affairs, and the nature of the economic decline
are not advantageous for a given perspective, the public
v;ill likely side with a more appropriate scenario. Yet,
our definition of "appropriateness" is quite subjective
because these variables (circumstances) are themselves
subject to the politics of predisposit ioning
. In the end,
paradigm disputes (of which the conflict among these four
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-ages Of the
.utu.e is a case in point, are aeciCea
the interaction between evidence (events, variables
-rcu.stance, and values, the role of present political
cusputes bern, a central factor i„ the future defrnition
^>nd application of either criterion.
Normal politics is designed to work on mundane
matters with incremental tools.
„o„ever, the anomalies of
normality build up to crisis proportions; the structure of
our system is less and less able to cope. Incremental,
equilibrium-maintaining policies, the sum and substance
Of consensus politics, are futile remedies for the imbal-
ances and strains of the evolving crisis. Though perhaps
successful as temporary adjustments to system stress,
their continued application intensifies both the basic
condition and mass frustration. Many people take comfort
in a flight from freedom-the search for a strong leader,
personal withdrawal from political involvement and responsi
bility, regression into antisocial attitudes and behavior.
Our worsening political-social-economic-environraental-
existential problems may simply make these paths more
attractive.
Maybe, however, the depth of the coming challenge
fo con.sensus politics does not allow for such easy evasions
The record of America's political history speaks to the
potential democratizing opportunity represented by the
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cr.s.s Of U,ni,s to growth. The debate a„,ong proponents
Of each of these
.eenarios ,or the eonf.ont.tion between
thei. ^ore realistically created intermixtures,, the con-
flrcting appeal., „,ade by the different i,„ages of the future,
are the signs of a crrtical era i„ American poUtic.; a
s.ries Of electoral confrontations addressing vital issues
^" an ideologically charged and polarizing fashron ,„ay
reverse trends toward voter disaggregation and apathy. it
would bring the electorate back into the political process
as had been the case periodically in our nation's history,
by offering the public a choice on the general direction
of the polity for the next 30-50 years. Critical elections
socialize conflict as nothing else in normal politics
89
And Limits to growth is a cause, par excellence,
for a critical elocLion. The fear that democracy will end
and that an antidemocratic dictatorship will somehow
seize control is not to be lightly dismissed; the potential
is there for such an occurrence. But T would suggest that
a different future beckons. The po.l itics of the future
may mean the regeneration of our political process, the
re-introduction of citizen input. Perhaps it signals not
the end of democracy, but its rebirth.
"AFTER VII
CONCLUSION
All systems contain feedback mechanisms enabling
them to maintain stability in the face of incremental
Changes. Readjustments rn a system's peripheral, secondary
elements allow it to preserve its central character.
These mechanisms obviously operate best when the upsettrn,
exogenous or endogenous changes do not dxrectly threaten
the system's primary supports. However, when such threats
do occur, normal patterns of sel f
-regula tion may no longer
suffice. The system must then either adjust by transform-
ing itself, reaching a new equilibrium diverging more or
less markedly from what had previously r.xisted, or collapse
entirely. A complete examination of this process ought
to be highly instructive regarding the nature of the prior
system, the dynamics of the transitional state, and the
basic outlines of the future structure.
This study h.as attempted to apply such an examina-
tion to political change in the United States. It has
been argued in Chapter II that the ideological biases, power
relationships and institutional arrangements which together
constitute the political structure conspire to inhibit the
formation of redistriloutj.ve drMnands and to blunt the
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redistributivo nature of those econon.i c demands whi.U do
-ch the po.l.U:.ical agenda.
.:.on t
,
. t ton. of pnU Uoa I
interaction-consensus pol i tics-p
.oven t the issue of
economic ine,uaii.ty tro. enlivening our political discourse.
A wob of conceptual and procedural cpivens insulates the
political systen, f.orn the potent ..ally unsettlin, conse-
quences of economic stratification and material deprivation.
Reference was .ade to two areas of social conflict (party
politics and lahor-management relations) which ,n,u,ht other-
wise have become scenes of intense battles over relative
shares were it not for the success of consensus politics
in nullifyinq any eqali tarian impulses. Issue avoidance
is the key goal in the operation of consensus politics.
The traditional ability of the political system to divert
social energies away from the tensions arising I rom economic
stratification rests on I he existence of economic growth.
Perceptions of cp-owth counterbalance and conceal percep-
tions of inecjuality. Chapter III indicated the ways in which
economic expansion has promoted a set of attitudes and
activities that is (p.iite system-sui>por t i ve . In its impact
both on our iiope for persona) upward mobility and on our
belief in a future of shared prosperity, a high and steady
rate of econc^nric- ^)r(M^'Lll serves to mod(M'ate the [)oliticaJly
disruptive potential inherrMil in a stratified society.
Cj owt h is the crucia l varial)le strc-ng thenincj bhe feedback
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cycles Of consensus polit.es. Once these cycles are
b.oken other perceptions, structures and st.bili.m,
.echanis.s win inevitably fin the political vacuu.
thus created. Questions re.ardrnc, the permanence of
economic growth therefore ,o to the heart of the future
of consensus po.Iitics.
Chapters IV and V explored the controversy surround-
ing limits to growth. Various arguments were summoned to
support or refute the prime contention
-that this nation
will be unable and/or unwilling to sustain economic
growth of a kind and at levels that typified its previous
history. Interrelated problems involving both physical
and social trends threaten to remove this central pillar
of consensus politics. Claims have been made that the
development and application of technology (scientific,
economic, managerial) will overcome the most troubling
obstructions to further economic growth. Yet, as I have
tried to demonstrate, the inevitable role of politics in
the problem-solving process will impede our ability to
find and utilize efficient and effective policies. In fact,
politics will more likely compound the growth-reducing
problems we will confront. Finally, the element of time
lends an air of urgency to the controversy, creating seri-
ous consequences for decision makers who wish to follow
their natural inclinations and delay action. The conclusion
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I draw fro,,, tMs analyse.
.3 that c.p.ctations of
.educed
growth rates are plausible, i„deoa probable, and are
-de ever ™ore undeniable the lon.er we ignore the issues
rarsed by the H„,its to growth debate.
The previous four chapters were preli,„inary to the
speculative task this study had undertaken. They have
presented the outlines of our present political syste.,
noted the crucial function of a central variable, and
surveyed the nu,„erous forces that threaten this primary
support and, with it, the stability of the system. Such
'
an analysis of the dynamics of syste,,, stability is a
necessary prelude to any examination of future political
trends. But it is hardly sufficient. Knowing how an
important factor in a complex social syste,,, will chance
is not equivalent to knowing how the system itself will
be transformed in adapting to this initial change.
In social systems the future is not pre-ordained
through immutable laws of cause and effect. The human
element impels us to focus on the choices open to society
and the historical context within whjch they will be ,nade.
Present futures research all too often succumbs to an
apolitical posture. The language of scientific predictabil
ity rather than of public choice frames our conclusions.
While certain static images of the future seem to plot out
the inevitable direction of change (e.g., steady-state.
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a
:ion, .
:Gd
no-gro„th, spaceship economy,, they have ignored the
politics of choice in societv's f,.iy s future-creating, direction-
determining activities. These tr„,e-fixed pictures of
hypothetical future society serve a heuristic funct
illuminating the values and policy objectives associate
with a given image and mobilizing politrcal support
around those values and objectives. However, they cannot
aet as guides for tactics and strategies in the all-
important transitional phase for they do not address the
problems of coping with the lost stability of a growth-
oriented society.
Chapter VT aimed at creatine a model for the study
of political futures which would overcome the predictive
emphasis of most futurology. The four scenarios presented
here have avoided this difficulty by stressing the ongoing
interaction of power and purpose m order to reveal more
concretely the politics of the future. In this regard
it is significant to note that each scenario, each image
of the future, has reference to a traditional body of
social philosophy which gives credibility to its specific
expectations of political development. My belief is that
the classic confrontation among diverse theoretical per-
spectives does have relevance in a no-growth future.
Political ideologies, recast to address the issues of the
day, help to structure our awareness of events and to
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motivate our poUt.cal actions. Undoubtedly, the specifics
°£ the conflicts over equality, freedom, co.n.unity and
well-being „lu be shaped by numerous situational vari-
ables (e.g., the actual nature of our economic decline).
For this reason analysts would do well to explore the prob-
ability of alternative futures within various hypothetical
(possible) supportive and inhibiting settings. In any
case, this recognition of competing perspectives and public
choices is an intrinsic part of the speculative enterprise.
Chapter VI sought to illustrate this approach to futures
research and to convey the unavoidable uncertainty that
accompanies it.
One final cominent concerns the content of the
competing images of the future. Researchers must somehow
incorporate the notion of political change into the alter-
native futures they construct. These images, like the
society they reflect, must be dynamic, containing within
them internal contradictions and necessities for choice,
and thus conceived as transitional stages in the development
of even more distant futures. An image of the future that
is devoid of politics, that fails to embrace the .idea of
change, has implicitly posited an end to human history.
In this Light, we can conclude that an analysis
of the political future ought to be closely akin to an
analysis of politico.] history. This is true on two accounts.
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F.rst, the need to analyze political behavior, to assess
the impact Of Change, to evaluate, interpret, assu.e and
xmagine binds both the historian and the futurologist
to a common intellectual endeavor. Second, the object
of investigation is the same-political man operating
within a political context. The values and philosophies
of the past and present will still motivate partisans
of the future; various interests and factions will still
combine, confront one another, and then recombine in quest
of relative advantages; the claims of power and self-
interest and the pull of reason and ideals will, like
always, form the sum and substance of political debate.
A study of future political behavior, by including the
human element in its analysis, allows us to view forecast-
ing in its propter historical light. Stated simply, past,
present and future intermingle and merge in perpetual
drama, the continuing story of the human experience.
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